By specifying this certain date, the decree manifests an intent that LaDonna would not be entitled to any contributions or increases that accrued after that date. Compare Cox v. Carter, 145 S.W.3d 361, 365 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (holding that the wife was not entitled to post-divorce increases to her husband's retirement plan where the decree provided that she was to receive a 50% share "calculated as of the date of the divorce"), with Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 441-42 (Tex. 2003) (holding that the wife was entitled to a share of her husband's total retirement account, including any post-divorce contributions and increases, where there was no language in the decree indicating that her benefits were to be calculated as of a certain date). LaDonna responds that her award of "the community portion" under the decree necessarily included post-divorce contributions and increases.

No such facial error has been demonstrated in this case with regard to either the 1997 judgment or the 2008 order. Husband argues that the trial court properly granted him relief based upon the Texas Court of Appeals decision in Cox v. Carter, 145 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). We note, however, that decisions from other states may be persuasive authority but are not binding on this Court.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the 2013 order. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.007(b) (order altering or changing the substantive division of property in final divorce decree is "beyond the power of the divorce court and is unenforceable"); Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 449 (same); Hernandez v. Hernandez, No. 04-97-00025-CV, 1998 WL 466096, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 12, 1998, pet. denied) (opin., not designated for publication) (trial court abused its discretion in modifying decree to calculate former wife's percentage of retirement benefits from date of divorce because unambiguous decree did not limit her share of retirement benefits to value that accrued at time of divorce); cf. Cox v. Carter, 145 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (clarification order did not impermissibly modify property division where decree provided former wife's share of federal employee retirement benefits to be "calculated as of the date of divorce" because decree "unambiguously provides by its plain language that [former wife's] share is to be calculated as of the date of the divorce" where decree did not incorporate federal regulations). We sustain Linda's sole issue.

" Id. § 9.203(a) (Vernon 2006). The Family Code also allows a court to enter further orders to enforce the division of property; to assist in the implementation of the order; to clarify the order; and to "specify more precisely the manner of effecting the property division previously made," as long as the substantive division of property is not altered or changed. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.006(a), (b) (Vernon 1998); Cox v. Carter, 145 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). A subsequent order may clarify a decree to correct an ambiguity so that the parties to that decree may comply with its terms.

The trial court must enforce the decree as written, not as it should have been written. Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 447; Cox v. Carter, 145 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). Section 9.007 of the Texas Family Code is typically read in tandem with section 9.008.