Opinion
Civil Action 4:21-cv-3797-MGL-TER
05-31-2023
CHAVIS COX, Plaintiff, v. JOEL ANDERSON, DENNIS PATTERSON, JOSEPH STINES, STACEY RICHARDSON, ESTHER LABRADOR, JANA HOLLIS, SHERRY MACKEY, STEPHANIE SKEWES, and BRANDON BYRD, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various violations of his constitutional rights while detained at the Kirkland Correctional Institution. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 62). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendants' motion could result in the motion being granted and his claims dismissed. Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 77). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(d), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff is an inmate confined at the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). Although Plaintiff raised many claims in his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14), the majority of those claims were summarily dismissed prior to service of process. See Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 19); Order (ECF No. 50). The only claims remaining are due process claims regarding the solitary nature and the length of his confinement. See id. Plaintiff alleges that he has been confined to an SSR unit since December 28, 2020, following “an incident” at another facility. Am. Compl. p. 17. He alleges that the administrative review procedures for releasing a prisoner from SSR are “constitutionally inadequate to protect his liberty interest in avoiding longterm solitary confinement.” Am. Compl. p. 18. He alleges that he was placed on security detention in February of 2021 and Defendants Hollis and Mackey held the hearing in his absence, thus, he was not afforded the right to attend the hearing or contest the placement. Am. Compl. p. 19.
Plaintiff alleges that he was given another review by Defendants Hollis and Mackey and a QMHP (Qualified Mental Health Professional) who recommended that he be placed in max custody, and the hearing was held on June 8, 2021. Id. That recommendation was forwarded to members of the RHU Multi-Disciplinary Committee-Defendant Anderson, Patterson, Stines, Richardson, Byrd, Labrador, and Skewes-who reviewed the recommendation on June 22, 2021, and decided to adopt the recommendation “due to the charges on the night of the incident.” Am. Compl. p. 20. Plaintiff alleges, however, that those charges had been dismissed. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he contacted the grievance coordinator in July of 2021 regarding his privileges and she informed him that his release had been recommended but the recommendation had been ignored. Id.
On September 9, 2021, Plaintiff contacted Defendant Hollis regarding his upcoming review and request for placement in a program. Defendant Hollis informed Plaintiff that he would remain in SSR until Defendant Anderson deemed it necessary to release him to another institution. His next review was on November 9, 2021, which Plaintiff alleges is beyond the 90-day time period required by policy. The RHU Multi-Disciplinary Committee determined that Plaintiff remain in max custody based on the “severity of the incident.” Am. Compl. p. 21. Plaintiff alleges that these reviews are inadequate and the recommendations are not based on Plaintiff's positive behavior while in SSR but are rather “mechanical and repetitive.” Am. Compl. p. 23.
Defendants present evidence showing that Plaintiff was involved in an escape and hostage taking incident that occurred on December 27, 2020, at McCormick Correctional Institution (MCI). Patterson Aff. ¶ 3 and Exs. A and B (ECF No. 62-2). Plaintiff also had a previous conviction for the charge of Possession of Escape Tools/Paraphernalia on October 30, 2018. Patterson Aff. ¶ 3. As a result of the December 27, 2020 incident at MCI, Plaintiff was transferred the following day to the Substantiated Security Risk Unit or SSR Unit (now referred to as Kirkland Max Unit), which is located at Kirkland Correctional Institution (KCI). Plaintiff was transferred to the SSR Unit at the direction of Director of Operations Joel Anderson and was initially placed on S.D. custody level. Patterson Aff. ¶ 4.
Plaintiff received a hearing before the RHU Classification Committee on January 8, 2021, and he was placed in Security Detention with a Behavioral Level of 2. Patterson avers that he was present for the RHU Classification Committee hearing on that date and was given the opportunity to address the Committee, which he declined to do. Patterson Aff. ¶ 4. During his subsequent confinement in the SSR Unit, Plaintiff has continued to receive periodic reviews by the RHU Classification Committee. The record includes recordings of additional RHU Classification Committee hearings for June 8, 2021, November 4, 2021, and June 29, 2022. As Dennis Patterson attests, those recordings reflect Inmate Cox's attendance at each hearing and that he was given the opportunity to address the committee and ask questions. On each occasion, except for the November 4, 2021 hearing, he declined the opportunity to address the committee. At the November 4, 2021, hearing, Plaintiff provided a lengthy statement. Patterson Aff., ¶ 8.
In addition, Plaintiff has received periodic reviews by the RHU Multi-Disciplinary Review Board (which was formerly referred to as the SSR Review Board). On February 2, 2021, the RHU Multi-Disciplinary Review Board met and approved the placement of Plaintiff in S.D. (Security Detention) Custody. Patterson Aff. ¶ 9, Ex. F. Thereafter, on June 22, 2021, the RHU Multi-Disciplinary Review Board met to evaluate Plaintiff for a change in his custody level in SSR to MX custody. By a 2-1 vote, the RHU Multi-Disciplinary Review Board recommended that Plaintiff be placed in MX custody due to the escape that occurred at McCormick Correctional Institution on December 27, 2020. The recommendation was concurred by Joel Anderson, the Director of Operations. Patterson Aff. ¶ 10, Ex. G. Later, on November 16, 2021, the RHU Multi-Disciplinary Review Board met again to evaluate Plaintiff for release from the SSR Unit. The RHU Multi-Disciplinary Review Board unanimously recommended that Plaintiff remain in MX custody due to the escape that occurred on December 27, 2020. The recommendation was again concurred by Joel Anderson. Patterson Aff. ¶ 11, Ex. H. The same process was followed once again on January 10, 2022, when the RHU Multi-Disciplinary Review Board met to evaluate Inmate Cox for release from the SSR Unit. The RHU Multi-Disciplinary Review Board unanimously recommended that Inmate Cox remain in MX custody due to the escape that occurred on December 27, 2020. The recommendation was again concurred by Joel Anderson. Patterson Aff. ¶ 13, Ex. I.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 87475 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4thCir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). A legal action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). To be successful on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). The parties do not dispute that they were acting under color of state law in their individual capacities at all times relevant to this action.
Plaintiff alleges that his procedural due process rights were violated with respect to his placement in the SSR Unit and the subsequent reviews regarding that placement. “To state a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Because “the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner, to demonstrate a liberty interest meriting procedural due process protection, a prisoner must show (1) denial of an interest that can arise either from the Constitution itself or from state laws or policies, and that (2) this denial imposed on him an atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 251 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995)). Changes “in a prisoner's location, variations of daily routine, changes in conditions of confinement (including administrative segregation), and the denial of privileges [are] matters which every prisoner can anticipate [and which] are contemplated by his original sentence to prison.” Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991); Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The federal constitution itself vests no liberty interest in inmates in retaining or receiving any particular security or custody status ‘[a]s long as the [challenged] conditions or degree of confinement ... is within the sentence imposed ... and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution.'”) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)). As stated above, this court has already held in an earlier Order that the conditions of his confinement in SSR about which he complains do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 19); Order (ECF No. 50). Further, segregation, in and of itself, does not deprive an inmate of a liberty interest or create an atypical hardship. See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997). However, the length of time that segregation is imposed is a factor which courts must consider in determining whether conditions are significant and atypical. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2394-95, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005); Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 80 (2nd Cir. 2000)(finding an inmate's confinement in segregation for 514 days without having a hearing resulted in confinement that was atypical and significant). The Fourth Circuit explained in Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015) that the prolonged placement in security detention generally implicates a liberty interest where the inmate was previously assigned to the general population and that procedural safeguards should be provided consistent with the three-prong test established by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and as further addressed by the Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court reiterated that “the requirements of due process are flexible and call for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Wilkerson, 545 U.S. at 224. In applying the three-prong framework from Mathews, the Supreme Court concluded that annual reviews after an inmate is assigned to supermax satisfies due process. The Supreme Court, in fact, held that “the informal, nonadversary procedures” as Ohio had adopted satisfy due process under the Mathews case.
Plaintiff complains that he has been confined to an SSR unit since December 28, 2020. However, as set forth above, he has had numerous periodic reviews of his placement since that time. He has had either a hearing before the RHU Classification Committee or review by the RHU Multi-Disciplinary Review Board on January 8, 2021, February 2, 2021, June 8, 2021, June 22, 2021, November 4, 2021,November 16, 2021, January 10, 2022, and June 29, 2022. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's confinement in SSR since December of 2020 creates an “atypical and significant hardship,” the periodic reviews of his placement is constitutionally sufficient to meet the due process requirements set forth in Wilkinson. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff's remaining due process violation claim.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 62) be granted and this case be dismissed in its entirety.
The parties are directed to the important information on the following page.