Opinion
5-23-0092
05-23-2024
DeANGELO COWPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDREW FLYNN and TETZLAFF & ASSOCIATES, Defendants-Appellees.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Saline County. No. 18-L-41 Honorable Todd D. Lambert, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BOIE JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Where the plaintiffs claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to acts or omissions in the performance of professional legal services, and there was no evidence that the plaintiff was under a legal disability at the time the cause of action accrued or at any time during the limitations period, the circuit court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and its order must be affirmed.
¶ 2 The plaintiff, DeAngelo Cowper, filed a complaint against the defendants, Andrew Flynn and Tetzlaff & Associates. Cowper alleged that Flynn, an attorney employed by Tetzlaff & Associates, a law firm, had provided him with poor and unethical legal representation in a prior civil action. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted their motion. Cowper appeals from that order. This court affirms the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 This factual background is derived from the common law record in this case. Additional facts will be added, as necessary, in the analysis section. The record on appeal does not include any reports of proceedings.
¶ 5 On October 1, 2018, the plaintiff Cowper filed a pro se complaint against Flynn and his employer, Tetzlaff & Associates. The two-count complaint presented claims of legal malpractice and "deceptive practice." Cowper alleged that Flynn represented him in the case of Cowper v. Nyberg, a civil action brought by Cowper, and that Flynn had performed negligently in negotiating a settlement of that case. Then, according to the complaint, sometime in October 2016, Flynn came to see Cowper at the Saline County jail, where Cowper was incarcerated, and it was then that Flynn "manipulated" Cowper into signing settlement papers in that case. During that jailhouse meeting, Cowper was "heavily medicated under the influence of Risperdal 4 mg & Cogentine [ sic ] 2 mg," and Flynn either knew or should have known that Cowper was seriously impaired. In the prayer for relief, Cowper sought compensatory damages "in an amount exceeding $124,000.00" plus "an additional $100,000.00 in monitory [ sic ] damages" for violating legal ethics in the attorney-client relationship.
¶ 6 On May 28, 2019, Cowper filed a pro se amended complaint against the defendants. The amended complaint was substantially the same as the original complaint, with the same material facts. However, it sought compensatory damages "in an amount exceeding $124,000" plus punitive damages of $800,000 for Flynn's allegedly violating legal ethics in the attorney-client relationship.
¶ 7 Accompanying the pro se amended complaint was a handwritten affidavit from Cowper, which was notarized on March 14, 2019. In his affidavit, Cowper described his meeting with Flynn at the Saline County jail and how Flynn had "manipulated" him into signing the Cowper v. Nyberg settlement papers. In the affidavit, Cowper stated that the date of the jailhouse meeting between himself and Flynn was July 26, 2016. (In the complaint and the amended complaint, Cowper stated that the jailhouse meeting occurred sometime in October 2016.) On that date, Cowper was called to the jail library. There, he encountered Flynn, who had piles of money and papers sitting on a table. Cowper said to Flynn, "I hope your [ sic ] not here to settle." Flynn replied that he was there for that purpose, and that he had a check for Cowper and some papers for him to sign. Cowper referred to a letter that he had written to Flynn, wherein Cowper expressed a desire for a larger settlement. When Flynn said that he had the money now, Cowper retorted that he did not want to settle. Flynn said that they needed to talk, and Cowper agreed to sit down.
¶ 8 According to Cowper's handwritten affidavit, Flynn stated that if Cowper did not sign the papers, he would sue Cowper for all the work he had done, and that when Cowper was released from prison, he would be sent back to jail because he would not be able to pay all of the money that he would owe Flynn. Cowper responded that he could not "think clearly," and that he needed a few days in order to talk to someone, in order to make sure that he was doing the right thing. They continued to argue, with Flynn insisting that Cowper agree to the settlement offer, and Cowper asking for more time to consider the offer. Finally, Cowper said, "If your [ sic ] saying I have to settle, I have to settle." Flynn instructed Cowper to find an officer to "witness everything." Cowper stepped out of the jail's library and hailed a correctional officer named Al, who agreed to be a witness. Al walked into the jail's library.
¶ 9 Cowper's handwritten affidavit further stated that as Flynn arranged paperwork for Cowper to sign, Cowper asked Flynn whether he still needed to sign a paper stating that Cowper was settling for less than $30,000 against the advice and recommendation of Flynn. Flynn answered that Cowper did indeed need to sign such a paper. Cowper repeated that he did not want to settle. He asked Al whether Flynn's words made any sense, and Al answered that he was only present as a witness. Flynn said, "At least you will be out of jail." Flynn started to hand Cowper papers for his signature. As Cowper began to sign, he said, "This doesn't seem right." Flynn then handed Cowper a check for $25,000 for his signature, and Cowper signed it. Shortly afterward, Cowper finished signing paperwork. Cowper asked to see the check again, and commented that it was a lot of money. Flynn agreed and said that he (Flynn) could have gotten much more than that. Cowper asked him why he did not get more, and Flynn answered, "Cause you already signed." At that point, Cowper "jumped" out of his seat and expressed to Al his disbelief at the situation. When Al stepped out of the library, Cowper asked Flynn how much more he could have gotten as a settlement. Flynn said that they "were going for $150,000.00" but that "now we will never know."
¶ 10 Cowper's handwritten affidavit went on to describe Cowper's reactions after his jailhouse meeting with Flynn. As Cowper walked with Al back to his cell, Cowper talked about what Flynn had said, and he commented that it was obvious that he did not want to settle the case. Cowper was transferred to prison. There, he discussed with a counselor how agitated he was about the settlement. After that discussion, on approximately August 15, 2018, Cowper filed a complaint against Flynn with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. However, due to Flynn's lies to the Commission, nothing came of Cowper's complaint. Also in August 2018, there was a misguided attempt to sue the defendants in federal district court. Flynn also represented Cowper in "a few of [his] criminal cases," and he asked Flynn to arrange for continuances in those cases because Cowper was "in a mental hospital." Cowper concluded his affidavit by stating that Flynn had "violated a code of ethics" by accepting a settlement offer even though his client, Cowper, made clear that he did not want the settlement.
¶ 11 In February 2020, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2020)). Cowper responded to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The defendants replied.
¶ 12 In August 2020, the court entered a written "order granting partial summary judgment." The order granted the defendants summary judgment in regard to Cowper's legal-malpractice claim, due to that claim's being filed beyond the two-year limitations period established in section 13-214.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 2020)). The court noted that the defendants' summary-judgment motion did not address Cowper's claim of deceptive practice. Nevertheless, the court found that the deceptive-practice claim was timely filed and denied summary judgment in regard to it.
¶ 13 In September 2020, Cowper filed a pro se motion to reconsider the partial summaryjudgment order. Also in September 2020, the defendants filed a motion to reconsider the order granting partial summary judgment, asking the circuit court to enter an order granting them "total summary judgment." The defendants stated that Cowper, despite invoking the term "deceptive practice," had not presented a deceptive-practice claim, and that his amended complaint was "solely a complaint for legal malpractice."
¶ 14 In April 2021, the defendants filed a supplement to their motion to reconsider the order granting partial summary judgment. They argued that section 13-214.3 established a two-year statute of limitations on all actions against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services, regardless of whether the action was based on tort, or contract, or otherwise. Thus, even if Cowper brought a claim for deceptive practice, it was filed beyond the two-year limitations period and therefore should be dismissed. The next month, Cowper filed a response to the defendants' supplement.
¶ 15 On January 20, 2023, the court entered a docket-entry order. The court denied Cowper's motion to reconsider the partial summary-judgment order and it granted, in full, the defendants' motion for summary judgment. According to the court, the two-year limitations period established in section 13-214.3 applied to Cowper's "fraud claim," just as it applied to his legal-malpractice claim. Accordingly, the court concluded, the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
¶ 16 On February 1, 2023, the court entered a written order that granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against Cowper, on the grounds that all the claims raised in Cowper's complaint were filed outside the two-year limitations period applicable to actions arising out of the provision of legal services.
¶ 17 Cowper filed a timely notice of appeal, thus perfecting the instant appeal.
¶ 18 ANALYSIS
¶ 19 This appeal is from a circuit court's order that granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants Flynn and Tetzlaff & Associates, and against the plaintiff Cowper, on statute-of-limitations grounds. For the reasons that follow, this court affirms.
¶ 20 Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2022). Summary judgment should be granted only when the moving party's right to judgment is "clear and free from doubt." Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill.2d 90, 102 (1992). To determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, a court will construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits strictly against the moving party and liberally in favor of the opponent. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill.2d 32, 43 (2004). This court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill.2d 404, 417 (2008).
¶ 21 Section 13-214.3(b) of the Code provides:
"An action for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise (i) against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services or (ii) against a nonattorney employee arising out of an act or omission in the course of his or her employment by an attorney to assist the attorney in performing professional services must be commenced within 2 years from the time the person bringing the action knew or reasonably should have known of the injury for which damages are sought." 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b) (West 2022).Under the rule set forth in section 13-214.3(b), a limitations period begins to run on the date that the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his injury and also knows or reasonably should know that the injury was wrongfully caused. Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill.2d 28, 35-36 (2001). That specific date is generally a question of fact; the issue may be determined as a matter of law only where it is apparent from the undisputed facts that only one conclusion may be drawn. Id. at 36; see also Racquet v. Grant, 318 Ill.App.3d 831, 836 (2000) (judgment as to that specific date should be entered as a matter of law "only when the undisputed facts allow for only one conclusion").
¶ 22 Here, there can be no doubt or dispute that the claims included in Cowper's complaint accrued on July 26, 2016. In his handwritten affidavit accompanying his amended complaint, Cowper described in detail his crucial meeting with attorney Flynn on that exact date, and how Flynn had allegedly "manipulated" him into signing the unwanted settlement papers. He also described the outrage he felt at that moment, and the steps he took after the meeting with Flynn had concluded. See the summary of Cowper's affidavit, supra. Nevertheless, it was not until October 1, 2018, that Cowper filed his complaint-just over 26 months after July 26, 2016. The two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions against attorneys, arising out of the performance of professional services (see 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b) (West 2022)), had already expired.
¶ 23 Furthermore, Cowper's mental illnesses did not serve to delay or pause the running of the statute of limitations. A person has a legal disability that tolls a statute of limitations only when that person is entirely without understanding or capacity to make or communicate decisions regarding his person and totally unable to manage his estate or financial affairs. In re Doe, 301 Ill.App.3d 123, 126-27 (1998). "In a case where a legal disability is alleged, the record must contain sufficient allegations of fact from which one could conclude that the person seeking to be found legally disabled was incompetent or suffered from serious mental disorder which made that person entirely without understanding or capacity to make or communicate decisions regarding his person and totally unable to manage his estate or financial affairs." Id. at 127.
¶ 24 Here, Cowper filed with the circuit court his medical records from the Harrisburg Medical Center from May 2015, well before his claims accrued. Cowper was voluntarily admitted to the medical center's psychiatric ward with complaints of depression, suicidal ideation, and homicidal ideation. He had a history of schizoaffective disorder. However, he was found to be "legally competent" and not subject to involuntary admission. He was discharged after less than a week. The record also contains a "psychiatric progress note" from the Illinois Department of Corrections, dated December 16, 2019, well after the statute of limitations had run in this case. The note stated that the defendant wanted to know whether he was "severely mentally ill" (SMI), and he was told that he was classified as SMI because of his "current diagnosis of unspecified bipolar disorder." The note also stated that Cowper had "adequate" insight, judgment, and motivation. In short, the record does not contain any evidence that Cowper had a legal disability on July 26, 2016, the date his claims accrued, nor is there evidence that he had a legal disability at any time during the two years after they accrued.
¶ 25 CONCLUSION
¶ 26 Cowper's complaint, which presented claims arising from acts or omissions in the performance of professional legal services, was filed after the statute of limitations for such claims had expired. The circuit court properly granted, in full, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 27 Affirmed.