Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-0069 Section: "R" (2)
June 4, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a motion by defendants Harry F. Connick, Roger W. Jordan, Jr., and C. Byron Berry, Jr. to dismiss plaintiff Shareef Cousin's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c). For the following reasons, the Court dismisses plaintiff's claims against defendants under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. Background
On March 2, 1995, Michael Gerardi was shot in the head as he and his date left a restaurant in the French Quarter in New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Gerardi died of his injuries.
After the New Orleans Police Department arrested plaintiff Shareef Cousin for the murder of Michael Gerardi, Assistant District Attorney Greg Kennedy screened the case. He recommended presenting it to the Grand Jury, and the District Attorney's "Charge Committee" accepted the recommendation. Kennedy then presented the case to the Grand Jury, which returned an indictment of first degree murder against Shareef Cousin.
The prosecution of Shareef Cousin was assigned to Assistant District Attorney Roger Jordan. Jordan reviewed the police report and evidence, handled the pre-trial discovery and motions, summoned and interviewed witnesses, selected the witnesses and evidence to present at trial, and generally prepared the case. Assistant District Attorney Byron Berry assisted Jordan.
A jury sentenced plaintiff Shareef Cousin to death for the murder of Michael Gerardi. See State v. Cousin, 710 So.2d 1065, 1066 (La. 1998). Plaintiff appealed, and the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned the conviction on April 14, 1998, remanding the case for a new trial. See id. at 1074. The Louisiana Supreme Court found "clear violations of defendant's right to a fair trial." Id.. at 1073. Specifically, the prosecutor "improperly urged the jury to accept the substance of . . . hearsay statements and to use the statements to convict defendant." Id.. In two footnotes, the Supreme Court also admonished the prosecutors for failing to disclose exculpatory witness statements to the defense. See Id. at 1066 n. 2, 1073 n. 8. On January 8, 1999, the eve of the second trial, the district attorney's office dismissed the murder charges against Shareef Cousin.
On January 7, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 as well as state tort law. Plaintiff alleges a multitude of prosecutorial and law enforcement abuses:
fabrication of evidence, unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, interference with and coercion of witnesses, presentation of perjured testimony, suppression of exculpatory evidence, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and failure to train and supervise subordinates. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
Defendants Connick, Jordan, and Berry now move to dismiss plaintiff's claims or, alternatively, for summary judgment. They argue that plaintiff's claims are prescribed, assert absolute and qualified immunity, and contend that no policy, custom, or practice of the Office of the District Attorney in Orleans Parish violated plaintiff's civil rights.
II. Discussion
1. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
A. Legal Standards
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). Dismissal is warranted if "it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)). In deciding whether dismissal is warranted, the Court will not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as true. See Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will not consider matters outside the pleadings, except those matters of which the Court takes judicial notice. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b); FED R. EVID. 201. See also Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.E (5th Cir. 1994) ("In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may permissibly refer to matters of public record."); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., 909 F. Supp. 400, 403 (E.D. La. 1995) ("[T]he Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record."); Chadwick v. Layrisson, 1999 WL 717628, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 1999) (same)
2. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Accordingly, a court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. In other words, "if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden." Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000)
Initially, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. See also Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential on which it bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 5. Ct. at 2552. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54; Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1999).
B. Federal Claims
Plaintiff asserts claims for fabrication of evidence, unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, suppression of exculpatory evidence, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, defamation, and failure to train and supervise subordinates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988.
1. Absolute Immunity
Defendants Jordan and Berry argue that the doctrine of absolute immunity precludes plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them in their individual capacities because their actions were taken in furtherance of their prosecutorial duties. Although § 1983 does not, on its face, allow for a defense of official immunity, the United States Supreme Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376, 71 S.Ct. 783, 788 (1951), that Congress did not intend § 1983 to abrogate immunities "well grounded in history and reason." Since Tenney, the Supreme Court has recognized two kinds of immunity — absolute and qualified.
The Supreme Court has been "quite sparing" in its recognition of absolute immunity in § 1983 actions, and it has adopted a "functional approach" to determine whether a particular defendant merits absolute immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127, 118 S.Ct. 502, 508 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.s. 259, 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2613 (1993). Consistent with this functional approach, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity only for those activities "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995 (1976). See also Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, "in initiating and presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995. Absolute immunity does not shield a prosecutor's administrative duties or those investigatory functions that do not relate to his preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. at 2615 ("We have not retreated, however, from the principle that acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity."). An official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1939 (1991)
a. Fabrication of Evidence, Suppression of Exculpatory Evidence, and Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff challenges Jordan's and Berry's assertion that all. of their actions were in furtherance of their prosecutorial duties. He argues that absolute immunity does not shield Jordan and Berry because they (1) forced witnesses to talk against their will, (2) suppressed exculpatory evidence, (3) kidnaped witnesses, (4) illegally investigated witnesses, and (5) had a racial motive for pursuing the death penalty.
The Court rejects plaintiff's arguments and finds that absolute immunity shields Jordan and Berry from plaintiff's § 1983 claims for fabrication of evidence, suppression of exculpatory evidence, and malicious prosecution. First, merely asserting that defendants coerced statements from witnesses does not present a violation of plaintiff's, constitutional rights. Plaintiff's assertion that these interviews produced exculpatory evidence that defendants' suppressed is unavailing, because it is well settled that a prosecutor cannot be held personally liable for the knowing suppression of exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 995; Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 336 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing cases); Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1994); Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1979). Second, although plaintiff alleges that the prosecutors removed certain witnesses from the state courthouse to the district attorney's office, this occurred during the trial. Jordan and Berry are absolutely immune for their actions during the presentation of the State's case. Third, plaintiff challenges the witness interviews conducted by defendants seven months after his indictment and a few weeks before his originally scheduled trial date in October 1995. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 1 at 2.) This is not the type of investigatory activity that falls outside a prosecutor's role as advocate. A prosecutor's evaluation of evidence assembled by police and preparation of it f or presentation at trial after a decision to indict has been made are covered by absolute immunity. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272-73, 113 S.Ct. at 2615. Indeed, Jordan's testimony, which plaintiff relies upon, indicates that he interviewed witnesses identified by the police or by plaintiff's trial counsel as alibi witnesses in the criminal proceeding. (P1. "s Supplemental Reply Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, Ex. J at 191-93.) This activity falls within absolute immunity. Even though plaintiff alleges that defendants coerced or conspired with some of these witnesses to present false evidence at trial, however distasteful, the presentation of false evidence to the trial court necessarily implicates an assistant district attorney's prosecutorial function and, accordingly, is shielded by absolute immunity. See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 995; Carter, 34 F.3d at 263 ("[T]he presentation of false testimony in court is a charge for which the prosecutor is afforded absolute immunity."); Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994). Fourth, absolute immunity analysis is objective. The focus is on the function performed by the district attorney; motive is irrelevant. See Groom v. Fickes, 966 F. Supp. 1466, 1472 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 129 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor "enjoys absolute immunity even if he maliciously singled out the plaintiff for prosecution"). Therefore, the alleged racial ammus is irrelevant.
b. Conspiracy
As Jordan and Berry are absolutely immune from plaintiff's § 1983 claims for fabrication of evidence, suppression of exculpatory evidence, and malicious prosecution, the Court further finds that "plaintiff derives no benefit from alleging a conspiracy" predicated on those immune actions and dismisses those conspiracy claims. Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1148 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing cases). See also Dory, 25 F.3d at 83 ("The fact that such a conspiracy is certainly not something that is properly within the role of a prosecutor is immaterial, because `[t]he immunity attached to his function, not to the manner in which he performed it.'" (quoting Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original)); Smith v. City of New Orleans, Dep't of Police, 1996 WL 39424, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 1996) ("The Court has already determined that the underlying acts were protected by absolute immunity; mere allegations that defendants performed those acts in the course of a conspiracy will not be sufficient to avoid absolute immunity."). All of plaintiff's alleged conspiracies involving Jordan and Berry — conspiracies to fabricate evidence, to suppress exculpatory evidence, and to commit perjury — arose after plaintiff had been arrested and indicted by the grand jury and during the preparation for trial. (Compl. at 5, 32-34, 38, 45, 51, 53, 64, 67.)
c. Search and Seizure
Defendants argue that they are absolutely immune from plaintiff's claims for illegal search and seizure. While plaintiff alleges that a New Orleans police detective fabricated a false basis for the arrest warrant and the search of plaintiff's home, he does not allege that Connick, Jordan, or Berry were involved in that fabrication. Greg Kennedy, the assistant district attorney who screened the case against plaintiff and presented it to the grand jury, has been dismissed, on plaintiff's motion, as a defendant. (Pl. 's Mat. Dismiss Greg Kennedy at 1.) Jordan and Berry were assigned to plaintiff's prosecution after the grand jury indicted him. (Def s.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Exs. 3 at 1-2, 4 at 1-2.)
Even though Jordan and Berry had no involvement in the search and seizure, plaintiff claims that they had to have learned that the warrant application was false because they had "records" to this effect. Plaintiff also claims that defendants failed to expose the "lies" and took investigative steps outside their roles as prosecutors to fabricate a stronger case. (Compl. at 19, 23, 65.) Given the stage of the proceedings at which Jordan and Berry became involved in plaintiff's prosecution, these claims are not claims for illegal search and seizure, but instead fall under plaintiff's complaints that Jordan and Berry suppressed exculpatory evidence, fabricated evidence, and maliciously prosecuted him. As the Court has already explained, Jordan and Berry are absolutely immune for the suppression of exculpatory evidence, fabrication of evidence, and malicious prosecution.
d. False Arrest and False Imprisonment
The Court further dismisses plaintiff's claims for false arrest and false imprisonment against Jordan and Berry. The predicate for these claims is that Jordan and Berry suppressed exculpatory evidence that the basis for plaintiff's arrest was "false or insufficiently reliable." (Compl. at 68.) As Jordan and Berry did not become involved in plaintiff's prosecution until after his arrest and incarceration, these claims are not claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. Rather, plaintiff presents a claim for the suppression of exculpatory evidence, from which, as the Court already explained, Jordan and Berry are absolutely immune.
2. Qualified Immunity
Plaintiff claims that Connick, in his individual capacity, failed to train and supervise his subordinates adequately to prevent them from suppressing exculpatory evidence. (Compl. at 77.) Connick argues that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields him from this claim.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability for damages based upon the performance of discretionary functions if the acts were objectively reasonable in light of then clearly established law. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268, 113 S.Ct. at 2613; Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001). Once a § 1983 defendant pleads qualified immunity and shows that he is a governmental official whose position involves the exercise of discretion, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting this defense by establishing that the official's wrongful conduct violated clearly established law. Thompson, 245 F.3d at 456-57, 460 (quoting Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1977)).
The first step in the qualified immunity analysis is to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. Id.. at 457. If the plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation, the Court must assess whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time that the challenged conduct occurred. Id. "Clearly established" means the "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987). A defendant's acts are objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in those circumstances would have then known that the defendant's conduct violated the Constitution or federal statute as alleged by plaintiff. Thompson, 245 F.3d at 457 (citing cases). In this determination of objective reasonableness, the defendant's subjective state of mind is irrelevant. Id.. (citing cases). Furthermore, even officials who reasonably, but mistakenly, commit a constitutional violation are entitled to immunity. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001)
Here, plaintiff alleges violations of his clearly established constitutional rights. However, as it is undisputed that Connick was not personally involved in the acts that allegedly deprived plaintiff of his constitutional rights, the issue is whether his policies were objectively reasonable in light of the then clearly established law.
Under § 1983, "[s]upervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability." Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459 (quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987)). A supervisor is liable if he failed to train or supervise the assistant district attorneys involved, there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of plaintiff's rights, and the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See id. (citing cases). For a lack of training or supervision to constitute deliberate indifference, plaintiff must demonstrate at least a pattern of similar violations. See Id. (citing Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998)). "Furthermore, the inadequacy of training must be obvious and obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation." Id.. (citing cases).
As a threshold matter, plaintiff admits that Connick's Brady policy is adequate. (Pl. "s Supplemental Reply Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 22.) He complains, however, that his injuries are a consequence of Connick's failure to enforce that policy. To substantiate his allegation that Connick's failure to train or supervise his staff constitutes deliberate indifference, plaintiff cites seven opinions over the past twenty-five years in which courts found Brady violations sufficient to reverse convictions and a handful of other cases where Brady problems were not sufficient to warrant reversing convictions. (Pl. "s Mem. Reply Not. Dismiss at 20 n. 26, 20 n. 27.) None of these cases, however, found a lack of a Brady policy or a failure to train and supervise.
Evidence of Connick's policy and training program is substantiated in eight affidavits, which explain section 5.25 of the district attorney's policy manual, the training classes (which qualify for Continuing Legal Education credits), and the regular circulation of judicial opinions and professional publications. ( Id., Exs. 2 Kennedy affidavit) at 3-4, 3 (Berry affidavit) at 2-3, 4 (Jordan affidavit) at 3-4, 5 (Connick affidavit at 2-4), 6 (McElroy affidavit) at 2-7, 7 (Solino affidavit) at 2, 8 (McSmith affidavit) at 2-3, 9 (Buras affidavit) at 2-4.) The only evidence to the contrary that plaintiff offers is an affidavit by Bruce G. Whittaker, whom Connick reported to the state bar for prosecutorial misconduct. Mr. Wittaker describes three cases in which there were delays in obtaining DNA tests. (Pl.'s Supplemental Reply Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, Ex. L at 1-2.) He does not aver, however, that those delays are attributable to any deficiencies in Connick's training and supervision. Mr. Wittaker also states: "From my lengthy experience in and around Tulane and Broad, Mr. Connick's office has a reputation for not always disclosing in a timely manner exculpatory evidence as required by law." ( Id.., Ex. L at 3.) Mere reputation, however, is insufficient to raise a question of fact or to assign Connick liability for failure to train and supervise. Plaintiff makes serious allegations, which the Court takes seriously. Absent the necessary evidence, however, plaintiff fails to satisfy his burden of showing that a genuine issue of fact exists.
Furthermore, the Court finds that plaintiff has not raised a triable issue as to whether there is a pattern of Brady violations. Taking judicial notice of the tens of thousands of cases handled by the Office of the District Attorney in Orleans Parish during Connick's tenure since April 1, 1974, the Court finds that the cases cited by plaintiff span twenty-five years and are isolated, fact-specific incidents that do not constitute a pattern evidencing Connick's deliberate indifference. (Defs.' Mem. Supp Mot. Dismiss, Exs. 5 at 1-2, 5 at 4-5, 8 at 2-3.) While no constitutional violation is insignificant, the issue here is whether the violations occurred with such frequency that Connick could be deemed to be deliberately indifferent. At the very best, plaintiff has shown that Brady problems occurred in fewer than one out of a thousand cases. Further, plaintiff fails to provide the Court a benchmark to determine that his showing is significant enough to amount to a pattern. Cf. Thompson, 245 F.3d at 463. Accordingly, in the absence of a pattern, Connick is not liable for any failure to train or supervise.
3. Official Capacity
The Court further dismisses plaintiff's claims against Connick, Berry, and Jordan in their official capacities. Official-capacity suits are tantamount to a suit against the public entity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985). In order to hold a public entity liable under § 1983 for the misconduct of one of its employees, "a plaintiff must initially allege that an official policy or custom `was a cause in fact of the deprivation of rights inflicted.'" Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dep't, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994)).
A public entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 168, 105 S. Ct. at 3016; Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036 (1978). "To satisfy the cause in fact requirement, a plaintiff must allege that `the custom or policy served as the moving force behind the [constitutional) violation' at issue, or that [his) injuries resulted from the execution of the official policy or custom." Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167 (citations omitted). See also Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997). "The description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation, moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts." Id..
Plaintiff alleges that the policies (or lack of enforcement thereof) of the Office of the District Attorney are the cause in fact of his injuries. As the Court already explained, plaintiff fails to present any evidence of a policy or custom to suppress exculpatory evidence. In the absence of that evidence, plaintiff fails to satisfy his burden of showing a genuine issue of fact exists. The Court therefore dismisses plaintiff's claims against defendants in their official capacities.
4. Defamation
Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 defamation claim, alleging that Connick defamed him when Connick commented on August 5, 1996 that plaintiff's conviction "was based on fact." (Compl. at 60.) Connick argues that defamation is not a constitutional tort and is not actionable under § 1983. Plaintiff did not respond to this argument.
The Court previously ruled that the only defamatory comment by Connick, Jordan, or Berry that was sufficiently alleged in plaintiff's complaint was an August 5, 1996 comment by Connick that plaintiff's conviction "was based on fact." See Cousin v. Small, 2000 WL 1100384, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2000). See also Compl. at 60. Plaintiff has not amended his complaint to specify any additional defamatory comments.
Defamation, in itself, is not a constitutional tort. See Kerr, 171 F.3d at 339. A false accusation of wrongdoing, however, "can be a link in a chain showing a deprivation of liberty or property without due process." Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993) (King, J., concurring) (quoting Mahoney v. Kesert, 976 F.2d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir. 1992)). See also San Jacinto Say. Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1991) (§ 1983 claimant must show stigma plus infringement of some other interest). In his opposition briefs, plaintiff does not show how this single statement by Connick satisfies the stigma plus rationale. He does not explain how the statement was a link in the deprivation of his liberty, as he had been convicted and incarcerated for several months when Connick made the statement. Indeed, the Court has found no authority validating a § 1983 claim in this context. The Court accordingly dismisses plaintiff's § 1983 claim for defamation.
C. State Claims
Plaintiff also asserts state tort claims for fabrication of evidence, unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, interference with and coercion of witnesses, presentation of perjured testimony, suppression of exculpatory evidence, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and failure to train and supervise subordinates. Defendants argue that Louisiana law does not recognize a cause of action against a district attorney arising out a criminal prosecution outside of a claim for malicious prosecution and that the doctrine of absolute immunity shields them from plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution.
In 1996, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly adopted the United States Supreme Court's functional analysis set forth in Imbler to determine whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. Knapper v. Connick, 681 So.2d 944, 950-51 (La. 1996) (citing cases). As the Court already explained, a district attorney and his assistants are absolutely immune from civil liability for actions taken within the scope of their prosecutorial duties. See id.; Sinclair v. Louisiana, 769 So.2d 1270, 1271 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2000). An official seeking absolute immunity, however, bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 486, 111 S.Ct. at 1939.
Despite defendants' assertion to the contrary, Louisiana law recognizes causes of action other than malicious prosecution against prosecutors. See, e.g., West v. Foti, 654 So.2d 834, 836 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1995) (district attorney may be subject to suit for false arrest and false imprisonment). Although defendants only argue that they are absolutely immune from plaintiff's state claims for malicious prosecution, the Court's analysis of defendants' absolute immunity under federal law applies to plaintiff's state law claims. Accordingly, the Court extends that analysis and dismisses plaintiff's state law claims for fabrication of evidence, unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, interference with and coercion of witnesses, presentation of perjured testimony, suppression of exculpatory evidence, conspiracy, and malicious prosecution. The Court also dismisses plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress because it is predicated on acts shielded by absolute immunity.
The Court further dismisses plaintiff's claims for failure to train and supervise as well as his claims against defendants in their official capacities. As the Court already explained, plaintiff fails to provide the requisite evidence to create an issue of fact as to these claims.
Finally, the Court dismisses plaintiff's state defamation claim. Plaintiff fails to cite any cases in which a state prosecutor has been held civilly liable for defamation, and he has not briefed the validity of this claim. Further, pretermitting questions of possible privileges, any Louisiana defamation claim requires malice. See Gugliuzza v. K.C.M.C., Inc., 606 So.2d 790, 791 (5th Cir. 1992); Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., 390 So.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1980). There are no allegations of actual malice in the complaint, and malice can not be implied from the circumstances. Indeed, as to the challenged statement in issue, plaintiff does not even allege that Connick knew the statement was false when he made it.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses all of plaintiff's claims against defendants Connick, Jordan, and Berry.