Opinion
No. 2022-00384 Index No. 601979/21
12-20-2023
Courtney Greenfader, respondent, v. Chicago School of Professional Psychology, et al., appellants.
Jackson Lewis, P.C., White Plains, NY (Susan D. Friedfel of counsel), for appellants. Fox Rothschild LLP, New York, NY (Ernest Edward Badway of counsel), for respondent.
Jackson Lewis, P.C., White Plains, NY (Susan D. Friedfel of counsel), for appellants.
Fox Rothschild LLP, New York, NY (Ernest Edward Badway of counsel), for respondent.
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P. LINDA CHRISTOPHER LILLIAN WAN CARL J. LANDICINO, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Thomas Rademaker, J.), entered January 7, 2022. The order denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint is granted.
The plaintiff was enrolled as a student at the Chicago School of Professional Psychology (hereinafter the Chicago School) from 2019 until May 2021. In January 2021, she commenced this action against the Chicago School and one of its instructors (hereinafter together the defendants) to recover damages for breach of contract and related claims stemming from a grading dispute.
The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Dean of the Chicago School averred that it was a not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois and that it did not have any New York contacts. The instructor attested that she was a Canadian citizen then residing in Illinois, and that she did not conduct any business in New York. In opposition, the plaintiff, a New York resident, argued that beginning in March 2020, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, her classes had been conducted virtually, the only contact she had with the defendants was either virtually or by telephone, and that therefore, the defendants had transacted business in New York within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1).
In an order entered January 7, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding that, "[b]y conducting virtual classes, and by conducting numerous classes with the [p]laintiff, a New York resident, and availing itself of the benefits of conducting business here, the [d]efendants have established sufficient contacts with New York to authorize the Court to exercise jurisdiction." The defendants appeal. We reverse.
Pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), the courts of this State may exercise jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries who, personally or through an agent, "transact[ ] any business within the state or contract[ ] anywhere to supply goods or services in the state." The ultimate burden of proving a basis for personal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting it (see P.S. Fin., LLC v. Eureka Woodworks, Inc., 214 A.D.3d 1, 17; Economy Premier Assur. Co. v. Miflex 2 S.p.A., 212 A.D.3d 775, 776; Aybar v. U.S. Tires and Wheels of Queens, LLC, 211 A.D.3d 40, 49). In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8), "[t]he facts alleged in the complaint and affidavits in opposition... are deemed true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff" (P.S. Fin., LLC v. Eureka Woodworks, Inc., 214 A.D.3d at 17 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Fanelli v. Latman, 202 A.D.3d 758, 759).
To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302(a)(1), a court must determine "(1) whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State by either transacting business in New York, or contracting to supply goods or services in New York and (2) whether the claim arose from that business transaction or from the contract to supply [goods] or services" (Economy Premier Assur. Co. v. Miflex 2 S.p.A., 212 A.D.3d at 776 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see State of New York v. Vayu, Inc., 39 N.Y.3d 330, 332-336).
When assessing whether there is personal jurisdiction over a defendant pursuant to the "transacts any business" clause of New York's long-arm statute, courts must ask "'whether what the defendant did in New York constitutes a sufficient "transaction" to satisfy the statute'" (State of New York v. Vayu, Inc., 39 N.Y.3d at 332, quoting David D. Siegel & Patrick M. Connors, New York Practice § 86 [6th ed, Dec 2022 Update] [emphasis added]). This inquiry requires the court to determine, based on the facts before it, whether the defendant's acts in the state were purposeful, that is, whether they were "volitional acts by which the non-domiciliary avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws" (State of New York v. Vayu, Inc., 39 N.Y.3d at 332 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Aybar v. U.S. Tires and Wheels of Queens, LLC, 211 A.D.3d at 49).
Here, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in New York so as to subject them to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) (see Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 24 N.Y.3d 370, 378-379; Economy Premier Assur. Co. v. Miflex 2 S.p.A., 212 A.D.3d at 776). While the plaintiff attests in her affidavit that since March 2020, she has not taken a class at the defendants' Illinois location, that the only contact she had with the defendants since that date was either virtually or by telephone, and that none of the facts alleged in her complaint took place in person in Illinois, none of this demonstrates that the defendants were engaged in any activity in New York, let alone purposeful activity. Other than the plaintiff's allegation that she is a New York resident, there is no other reference to New York in the complaint or in the plaintiff's affidavit. Significantly, the plaintiff's allegations are devoid of any indication that she was in New York during the time of the alleged communications with the defendants.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a).
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendants' remaining contentions.
DUFFY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WAN and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.