Opinion
Record No. 1813-94-4
Decided: April 25, 1995
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(William B. Pierce, Jr.; Daniel E. Lynch; Williams Pierce, on brief), for appellants.
(Michael A. Kernbach; Cohen, Dunn Sinclair, on brief), for appellee Wallace J. Robertson.
(Charles F. Midkiff; Ruth N. Carter; Midkiff Hiner, on brief), for appellees Employer's Fire Insurance Company/Commercial Union Insurance Company and County of York.
Present: Judges Barrow, Koontz and Bray
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
County of York, Virginia Municipal Self-Insured Association and VML Member Services (hereinafter collectively referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that employer's evidence did not prove that Wallace J. Robertson's (claimant) heart condition constituted a compensable consequence or change in condition related to claimant's pre-existing compensable coronary artery disease. Instead, the commission found that claimant's thrombosis was a new occupational disease. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
On appellate review, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). "The actual determination of causation is a factual finding that will not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible evidence to support the finding." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App. 684, 688, 376 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1989). "Questions raised by conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the commission." Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1989).
The commission considered voluminous medical evidence, including the written reports and/or deposition testimony from five cardiologists. The treating physician, Dr. St. George T. Lee, opined that atherosclerosis in vein grafts was not the product of pre-existing coronary artery disease, but, rather, that it began in the graft itself, and that claimant's pre-existing disease was not present in the new tissue. The commission found that there was "no unanimity between the expert witnesses [in] relating the thrombosis to claimant's underlying atherosclerosis." Based on this finding, the commission held that employer's evidence did not establish that claimant's 1992 thrombosis was either a compensable consequence or a change in condition from the claimant's original claim. In its role as fact-finder, the commission was entitled to discount the conflicting expert opinions. The commission's conclusion that the 1992 thrombosis was not the natural result of claimant's coronary artery disease was also based upon evidence which showed that claimant was free of significant coronary symptoms from 1987 through February 1992.
Based upon the differing expert opinions and the five-year period in which claimant was free of significant coronary symptoms, we cannot say as a matter of law that the commission erred in finding that employer's evidence did not preponderate in establishing a change in condition or compensable consequence related to claimant's pre-existing compensable coronary artery disease.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.