Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CSD010949, Nicholas D. Taubert, Commissioner.
Thomas Barnes Jr., in propria persona, for Defendant and Appellant.
Lori A. Cruz, Deputy Director, County of Los Angeles Child Support Services Department, Nancy K. Ruffolo and Fesia Davenport, Staff Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, J.
SUMMARY
This is an appeal from an order determining child support arrears. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS
In a prior appeal, Thomas Barnes, Jr., appealed from the trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate or, alternatively, modify a 1983 judgment that established paternity and required him to pay child support. (County of Los Angeles v. Barnes (Sep. 22, 2004, B164151) [nonpub. opn.].)
At that time, we summarized the proceedings to date as follows:
“After Philojan Karie Barnes was born on May 16, 1982, the County of Los Angeles (County) instituted proceedings against Barnes to establish paternity and require him to pay child support. On May 19, 1983 Barnes and the County entered an agreement for entry of judgment (agreement), in which Barnes acknowledged he was Philojan’s father and agreed to pay monthly child support of $150, plus a $3 service charge, through the court trustee beginning on June 25, 1983. In the agreement Barnes confirmed that he understood the court had continuing authority to increase or decrease the amount of child support payments and that he had the right to ask the court to decrease or eliminate the payments.
“On the same day, May 19, 1983, the trial court entered a judgment, finding that Barnes had willingly, knowingly and intelligently waived his due process rights to contest paternity and that Barnes was the father and Elizabeth Latson was the mother of Philojan. The court ordered Barnes to pay Latson through the court trustee child support of $150 per month, plus a $3 service change, beginning on June 25, 1983 and continuing until Philojan ‘dies, marries, reaches the age of majority, becomes self- supporting, or until further order of Court.’ The court stated, ‘The child support order contained in this Judgment is subject to modification upon a showing of change in circumstances, at a hearing before this Court.’ Barnes subsequently signed a notice of acknowledgement and receipt indicating he had received a conformed copy of the judgment and notice of the County’s intent to seek a wage assignment.
“More than 19 years later, on August 9, 2002, Barnes filed a motion to vacate or, alternatively, modify the judgment. Barnes contended he had been informed in 2000 by Latson, whom he had married in 1987, that he was not Philojan’s biological father; he had supported Philojan over the years; he had not received notice of his right to contest the paternity action against him when it was filed; and he had the right, as specified in the judgment, to request that support be eliminated entirely. Barnes asserted that, if the trial court declined to vacate the judgment, it should modify the judgment to order the County to (1) release the suspension of his driver’s license and security officer contracting license; (2) return to him payments intercepted from his tax refunds and other sources; (3) provide copies of his records and an accounting of all monies received from him and alleged arrears; and (4) remove all derogatory information about him from credit reporting agencies. Barnes also asked the court to enjoin the County from pursuing him for any further child support payments.
“The County opposed the motion, contending it was untimely and the County had properly garnished Barnes’s unemployment and disability payments and seized his income tax refunds to collect support payments Barnes had failed to make through the court trustee. According to the County, Barnes had voluntarily mailed his child support payments to the court trustee only from January 25, 1984 to January 30, 1985.
“The trial court heard testimony and arguments on December 6, 2002 and took the matter under submission. Later that day the court issued a minute order denying Barnes’s motion. On December 26, 2002 Barnes filed a notice of appeal from the December 6, 2002 minute order. On March 3, 2003 the trial court entered an order denying Barnes’s motion, finding the motion was untimely and the County had had authority to collect child support payments from sources other than Barnes’s salary or wages.” (County of Los Angeles v. Barnes, supra, B164151.)
As discussed in our prior opinion, we found the trial court had properly denied Barnes’s motion to vacate the judgment, but remanded the matter for the trial court to determine whether Barnes had satisfied or discharged any part of his support obligation, noting: “Barnes contends Philojan resided with him and he supported her for substantial periods prior to her 18th birthday, although he acknowledges he should have made the County aware he was not making payments to the court trustee because he was otherwise supporting Philojan. The County does not respond to Barnes’s contention, simply stating that he failed to make the monthly child support payments as directed by the judgment. Because the trial court’s order on Barnes’s motion does not address the issue of compliance in relation to Barnes’s contention that he supported Philojan while she resided with him, a remand is necessary to determine arrearages and appropriate penalties, if any.” (County of Los Angeles v. Barnes, supra, B164151.)
The County then filed a motion to determine arrears and Jackson [v. Jackson (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 363]credits on remand, arguing Barnes was not entitled to such credits because Latson had been receiving welfare for herself and Philojan. Barnes (representing himself in propria persona) filed opposition. After hearing argument on the motion, the trial court determined that the County was entitled to child support arrears in the amount of $43,903.83, comprised of $19,539.10 in principal and $24,364.73 in interest. In its order, the court observed Barnes signed the 1983 agreement which specifically stated Barnes would pay child support and expressly acknowledged that Philojan was receiving public assistance. “[I]t is not credible that [Barnes] was with and supporting [Philojan] if he would agree to pay child support” and the agreement “imputes specific knowledge to [Barnes] that aid was being paid out. . . . Jackson [v. Jackson, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d 363] credits are not available for periods welfare was paid out.”
In our prior opinion, we acknowledged that under Jackson v. Jackson (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 363, 366-368, and subsequent authorities, “‘the court may refuse to enforce past-due child support amounts that accrued during the period the supported child was living with the obligor parent.’” (County of Los Angeles v. Barnes, supra, B164151.)
Barnes appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Barnes Has Failed to Demonstrate Prejudicial Error in the Conduct of the
Hearing on Remand.
Barnes says the trial court violated his due process rights and failed to obey this court’s “unequivocal remand instructions” by holding a hearing based on a motion the County improperly put before the trial court; because this court had already issued instructions with respect to determining arrears, he says, the trial court did not need the County “to move it for same.” He objects that, prior to the remand order, the County had not submitted evidence to controvert his claim he had fulfilled his obligation to support Philojan.
According to the record, in support of its motion to determine arrears, the County submitted an “Accounting of Benefits Paid Under TANF and Child Support Collections Received and Applied” which showed that Latson had received welfare for herself and Philojan from February 1982 through February 1988 and from February 1993 through March 1996; in addition, the County presented a copy of the Child Support Services Department’s audit which reflected arrearages through March 31, 1996, of $43,903.83 ($19,539.10 in principal and $24,364.73 in interest). Barnes specifically acknowledged receipt of these documents but objected to their submission after the time of his original motion to vacate and prior appeal.
In our prior opinion, we found the trial court had properly denied Barnes’s motion to vacate or modify the judgment, but in light of Barnes’s claim to have supported Philojan during the relevant time, we raised the issue of whether Jackson v. Jackson, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d 363, and related authorities applied in this case and remanded for a determination in this regard. As the trial court explained, because this matter was remanded for the purpose of determining (for the first time) arrearages if any, these submissions were proper.
Barnes next argues the trial court did not have the court record before it and thus could not rule objectively or adjudicate issues on remand. The record contradicts this assertion.
In opposing the County’s motion for arrears, Barnes relied primarily on documentation submitted in connection with his original motion to vacate or modify the 1983 judgment. Initially, at the time of the hearing on remand, the trial court did indicate it had the moving and “reply” papers but did not have the court file. Barnes referred the court to the “clerk’s transcript for the complete record.” Counsel for the County indicated that she had the two volumes of court transcripts totaling 270 pages, and the court inquired whether it was these documents Barnes wished the court to review. Barnes twice responded: “That is correct.” The trial court adjourned the proceedings and, before resuming the hearing, “read volume 1 and volume 2 of the clerk’s transcript and . . . review[ed] all of the items” to which Barnes directed the court. Consequently, the record establishes the court had before it all documentation on which Barnes relied.
Barnes entitled his opposition papers his “reply.”
In a related argument, Barnes says the trial court improperly vacated its mistrial ruling. We disagree. After the trial court indicated it did not have the court file and Barnes stated he was relying on documents in the file, the court initially indicated it would declare a mistrial to get the documents Barnes wished the court to consider. When counsel for the County asked about a continuance rather than a mistrial, Barnes told the court he would rather have the matter continued. In any event, as already addressed, Barnes said everything he required was contained in the clerk’s transcript from his prior appeal and the trial court had both volumes. Barnes has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding Barnes Was Not Entitled to Jackson Credits.
Barnes objects that we remanded this case for determination “under certain legal authorities” and the trial court reviewed all the documents he submitted but nevertheless the court disallowed him Jackson credits. We find no error.
As discussed in our prior opinion, where, for example, the supported child has been living with the obligor parent, the trial court has discretion to find child support arrearages “satisfied by the obligor’s direct provision for the child’s needs during the applicable time period.” (County of Los Angeles v. Barnes, supra, B164151.)
However, under the authorities cited by the County, by operation of law, upon applying for and receiving welfare assistance, an applicant assigns his or her rights to receive support to the County. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11477.) Further, the assignor may not unilaterally modify the assignment or defeat or impair the rights of the assignee in any other way. (In re Marriage of Shore (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 290, 296; In re Marriage of Lugo (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 427, 436.) “Where the mother is receiving AFDC benefits, ‘the enforcement of child support rights involves not only a matter of private or local concern, but poses an important question for the federal and state governments as well.’” (In re Marriage of Lugo, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 436, citing In re Marriage of Shore, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 295.)
As expressly acknowledged in paragraph 6 of the 1983 agreement for entry of judgment Barnes signed, Philojan was “receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children through [the County’s] Department of Public Social Services . . . .” At the hearing, Barnes claimed he had no idea any aid was coming into the household, a claim the trial court found incredible, just as it did the claim that Barnes would agree to a judgment for support (and pay on that judgment for one year) if, as he now claimed, Philojan had lived with him from birth to adulthood. Barnes has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error in the trial court’s determination he was not entitled to credits under Jackson v. Jackson, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d 363. (See In re Marriage of Lugo, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 436.)
Barnes’s contention that he was never ordered to pay support for the period between 1992 and 1996 ignores the agreement for entry of judgment and judgment. Regarding his claim he submitted new evidence in connection with his motion to augment the record on appeal, that motion was denied.
Barnes also says the trial court erred in failing to vacate the 1983 judgment before entering this “judgment” (order) because, he claims, entry of two judgments in the same matter constitutes error. This inaccurate assertion (like most of Barnes’s arguments) is not supported by any authority and we reject it. (Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Similarly, Barnes says the trial court failed to address the issue of the County’s “illegally levying [his] disability payments.” Again, he failed to support this claim with evidence or applicable authority and therefore waived any claim of error in this regard. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The County is entitled to its costs of appeal.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J. ZELON, J.