Opinion
Civil Action No. 8:16-cv-00430-PMD-JDA
02-17-2017
John Crawford Coulter, Plaintiff, v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed.
A Report and Recommendation is being filed in this case, in which one or both parties declined to consent to disposition by a magistrate judge.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB alleging disability onset beginning August 1, 2003 [R. 140-46], subsequently amended to November 29, 2013 [R. 247]. The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). [R. 50-60, 62-77.] Plaintiff filed a request for hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), and on September 18, 2015, ALJ Ronald Sweeda conducted a hearing on Plaintiff's claims. [R. 26-49.]
On October 28, 2015, the ALJ issued his decision finding that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act ("the Act"), from November 29, 2013, through the date of the decision. [R. 10-20.] At Step 1, the ALJ found Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2018, and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 29, 2013, the amended alleged onset date. [R. 12, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: ankylosing spondylosis and Crohn's disease. [R. 12, Finding 3.]
The five-step sequential analysis used to evaluate disability claims is discussed in the Applicable Law section, infra.
At Step 3, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 14, Finding 4.] Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a). Sedentary exertional work is described by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration as requiring lifting/carrying no more than 10 pounds at a time, sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday, and standing/walking for two hours in an eight-hour workday. The claimant must be allowed to change position from sit/stand, in place, at least every 20 minutes. He can never climb, but he can perform stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling
occasionally. Additionally, he must avoid all exposure to workplace hazards.[R. 15, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC, at Step 4, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant work as an accountant and account executive. [R. 19, Finding 6.] Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from November 29, 2013, through the date of the decision. [R. 20, Finding 7.]
Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ's decision with the Appeals Council, which denied review. [R. 1-3.] Plaintiff commenced an action for judicial review in this Court on February 11, 2016. [Doc. 1.]
THE PARTIES' POSITIONS
Plaintiff contends the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and contains multiple legal errors warranting the reversal and remand of the case. [See Docs. 22, 24.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to properly consider the combined effect of Plaintiff's multiple impairments in evaluating his RFC [doc. 22 at 10-12], and failed to properly evaluate the opinion evidence of record [id. at 12-15].
The Commissioner contends the ALJ's decision should be affirmed because there is substantial evidence of record that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. [See Doc. 23.] Specifically, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff's RFC [id. at 5-7], and sufficiently considered the opinion evidence of record and drew appropriate inferences [id. at 7-8].
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963))("Substantial evidence, it has been held, is evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is 'substantial evidence.'").
Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Bird v. Comm'r, 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).
The reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision 'with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Remand is unnecessary where "the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose." Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974).
The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sargent v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). To remand under sentence four, the reviewing court must find either that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding remand was appropriate where the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair record of the claimant's residual functional capacity); Brehem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding remand was appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm but was also insufficient for court to find the claimant disabled). Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a remand under sentence four is usually the proper course to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for the decision or for additional investigation. See Radford v. Comm'r, 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985); see also Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (remanding case where decision of ALJ contained "a gap in its reasoning" because ALJ did not say he was discounting testimony or why); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (remanding case where neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council indicated the weight given to relevant evidence). On remand under sentence four, the ALJ should review the case on a complete record, including any new material evidence. See Smith, 782 F.2d at 1182 ("The [Commissioner] and the claimant may produce further evidence on remand."). After a remand under sentence four, the court enters a final and immediately appealable judgment and then loses jurisdiction. Sargent, 941 F.2d 1207 (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991)).
In contrast, sentence six provides:
The court may . . . at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding . . . .42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may remand a case to the Commissioner on the basis of new evidence only if four prerequisites are met: (1) the evidence is relevant to the determination of disability at the time the application was first filed; (2) the evidence is material to the extent that the Commissioner's decision might reasonably have been different had the new evidence been before him; (3) there is good cause for the claimant's failure to submit the evidence when the claim was before the Commissioner; and (4) the claimant made at least a general showing of the nature of the new evidence to the reviewing court. Borders v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 954, 955 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1983); Sims v. Harris, 631 F.2d 26, 28 (4th Cir. 1980); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979)), superseded by amendment to statute, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as recognized in Wilkins v. Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 769, 774 (4th Cir. 1991). With remand under sentence six, the parties must return to the court after remand to file modified findings of fact. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98. The reviewing court retains jurisdiction pending remand and does not enter a final judgment until after the completion of remand proceedings. See Allen v. Chater, 67 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (holding that an order remanding a claim for Social Security benefits pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is not a final order).
Though the court in Wilkins indicated in a parenthetical that the four-part test set forth in Borders had been superseded by an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), courts in the Fourth Circuit have continued to cite the requirements outlined in Borders when evaluating a claim for remand based on new evidence. See, e.g., Brooks v. Astrue, No. 6:10-cv-152, 2010 WL 5478648, at *8 (D.S.C. Nov. 23, 2010); Ashton v. Astrue, No. TMD 09-1107, 2010 WL 3199345, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2010); Washington v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:08-cv-93, 2009 WL 86737, at *5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2009); Brock v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 807 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 n.3 (S.D.W. Va. 1992). Further, the Supreme Court of the United States has not suggested Borders' construction of § 405(g) is incorrect. See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626 n.6 (1990). Accordingly, the Court will apply the more stringent Borders inquiry.
APPLICABLE LAW
The Act provides that disability benefits shall be available to those persons insured for benefits, who are not of retirement age, who properly apply, and who are under a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). "Disability" is defined as:
the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 consecutive months.Id. § 423(d)(1)(A).
I. The Five Step Evaluation
To facilitate uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, federal regulations have reduced the statutory definition of disability to a series of five sequential questions. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 n.2 (1983) (noting a "need for efficiency" in considering disability claims). The ALJ must consider whether (1) the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals an impairment included in the Administration's Official Listings of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; (4) the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) the impairment prevents the claimant from having substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the claimant. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983). The claimant must prove disability on or before the last day of her insured status to receive disability benefits. Everett v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 412 F.2d 842, 843 (4th Cir. 1969). If the inquiry reaches step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to produce evidence that other jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Grant, 699 F.2d at 191. If at any step of the evaluation the ALJ can find an individual is disabled or not disabled, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
A. Substantial Gainful Activity
"Substantial gainful activity" must be both substantial—involves doing significant physical or mental activities, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a)—and gainful—done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized, id. § 404.1572(b). If an individual has earnings from employment or self-employment above a specific level set out in the regulations, he is generally presumed to be able to engage in substantial gainful activity. Id. §§ 404.1574-.1575.
B. Severe Impairment
An impairment is "severe" if it significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic work activities. See id. § 404.1521. When determining whether a claimant's physical and mental impairments are sufficiently severe, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant's impairments. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B). The ALJ must evaluate a disability claimant as a whole person and not in the abstract, having several hypothetical and isolated illnesses. Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that, when evaluating the effect of a number of impairments on a disability claimant, "the [Commissioner] must consider the combined effect of a claimant's impairments and not fragmentize them"). Accordingly, the ALJ must make specific and well-articulated findings as to the effect of a combination of impairments when determining whether an individual is disabled. Id. at 50 ("As a corollary to this rule, the ALJ must adequately explain his or her evaluation of the combined effects of the impairments."). If the ALJ finds a combination of impairments to be severe, "the combined impact of the impairments shall be considered throughout the disability determination process." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B).
C. Meets or Equals an Impairment Listed in the Listings of Impairments
If a claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals the criteria of a listing found at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1 and meets the duration requirement found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509, the ALJ will find the claimant disabled without considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
D. Past Relevant Work
The assessment of a claimant's ability to perform past relevant work "reflect[s] the statute's focus on the functional capacity retained by the claimant." Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1204 (4th Cir. 1995). At this step of the evaluation, the ALJ compares the claimant's residual functional capacity with the physical and mental demands of the kind of work he has done in the past to determine whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to do his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b).
Residual functional capacity is "the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).
E. Other Work
As previously stated, once the ALJ finds that a claimant cannot return to her prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant could perform other work that exists in the national economy. See Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)-(g). To meet this burden, the Commissioner may sometimes rely exclusively on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "grids"). Exclusive reliance on the "grids" is appropriate where the claimant suffers primarily from an exertional impairment, without significant nonexertional factors. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(e); see also Gory v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 929, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that exclusive reliance on the grids is appropriate in cases involving exertional limitations). When a claimant suffers from both exertional and nonexertional limitations, the grids may serve only as guidelines. Gory, 712 F.2d at 931. In such a case, the Commissioner must use a vocational expert to establish the claimant's ability to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a; see Walker, 889 F.2d at 49-50 ("Because we have found that the grids cannot be relied upon to show conclusively that claimant is not disabled, when the case is remanded it will be incumbent upon the [Commissioner] to prove by expert vocational testimony that despite the combination of exertional and nonexertional impairments, the claimant retains the ability to perform specific jobs which exist in the national economy."). The purpose of using a vocational expert is "to assist the ALJ in determining whether there is work available in the national economy which this particular claimant can perform." Walker, 889 F.2d at 50. For the vocational expert's testimony to be relevant, "it must be based upon a consideration of all other evidence in the record, . . . and it must be in response to proper hypothetical questions which fairly set out all of claimant's impairments." Id. (citations omitted).
An exertional limitation is one that affects the claimant's ability to meet the strength requirements of jobs. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(a). A nonexertional limitation is one that affects the ability to meet the demands of the job other than the strength demands. Id. Examples of nonexertional limitations include but are not limited to difficulty functioning because of being nervous, anxious, or depressed; difficulty maintaining attention or concentrating; difficulty understanding or remembering detailed instructions; difficulty seeing or hearing. § 404.1569a(c)(1). --------
II. Developing the Record
The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly develop the record. See Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1173 (4th Cir. 1986). The ALJ is required to inquire fully into each relevant issue. Snyder, 307 F.2d at 520. The performance of this duty is particularly important when a claimant appears without counsel. Marsh v. Harris, 632 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 1980). In such circumstances, "the ALJ should scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts, . . . being especially diligent in ensuring that favorable as well as unfavorable facts and circumstances are elicited." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
III. Treating Physicians
If a treating physician's opinion on the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence" in the record, the ALJ must give it controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The ALJ may discount a treating physician's opinion if it is unsupported or inconsistent with other evidence, i.e., when the treating physician's opinion does not warrant controlling weight, Craig, 76 F.3d at 590, but the ALJ must nevertheless assign a weight to the medical opinion based on the 1) length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; 2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship; 3) supportability of the opinion; 4) consistency of the opinion with the record a whole; 5) specialization of the physician; and 6) other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Similarly, where a treating physician has merely made conclusory statements, the ALJ may afford the opinion such weight as is supported by clinical or laboratory findings and other consistent evidence of a claimant's impairments. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 590 (holding there was sufficient evidence for the ALJ to reject the treating physician's conclusory opinion where the record contained contradictory evidence).
In any instance, a treating physician's opinion is generally entitled to more weight than a consulting physician's opinion. See Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that treating physician's opinion must be accorded great weight because "it reflects an expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient's condition for a prolonged period of time"); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). An ALJ determination coming down on the side of a non-examining, non-treating physician's opinion can stand only if the medical testimony of examining and treating physicians goes both ways. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 346 (4th Cir. 1986). Further, the ALJ is required to review all of the medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source's statement that a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). However, the ALJ is responsible for making the ultimate determination about whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability. Id.
IV. Medical Tests and Examinations
The ALJ is required to order additional medical tests and exams only when a claimant's medical sources do not give sufficient medical evidence about an impairment to determine whether the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517; see also Conley v. Bowen, 781 F.2d 143, 146 (8th Cir. 1986). The regulations are clear: a consultative examination is not required when there is sufficient medical evidence to make a determination on a claimant's disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517. Under the regulations, however, the ALJ may determine that a consultative examination or other medical tests are necessary. Id.
V. Pain
Congress has determined that a claimant will not be considered disabled unless he furnishes medical and other evidence (e.g., medical signs and laboratory findings) showing the existence of a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). In evaluating claims of disabling pain, the ALJ must proceed in a two-part analysis. Morgan v. Barnhart, 142 F. App'x 716, 723 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion). First, "the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has produced medical evidence of a 'medically determinable impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce . . . the actual pain, in the amount and degree, alleged by the claimant.'" Id. (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 594). Second, "if, and only if, the ALJ finds that the claimant has produced such evidence, the ALJ must then determine, as a matter of fact, whether the claimant's underlying impairment actually causes her alleged pain." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Craig, 76 F.3d at 595).
Under the "pain rule" applicable within the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, it is well established that "subjective complaints of pain and physical discomfort could give rise to a finding of total disability, even when those complaints [a]re not supported fully by objective observable signs." Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Hicks v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 1022, 1023 (4th Cir. 1985)). The ALJ must consider all of a claimant's statements about his symptoms, including pain, and determine the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has rejected a rule which would require the claimant to demonstrate objective evidence of the pain itself, Jenkins v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 107, 108 (4th Cir. 1990), and ordered the Commissioner to promulgate and distribute to all administrative law judges within the circuit a policy stating Fourth Circuit law on the subject of pain as a disabling condition, Hyatt v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 329, 336-37 (4th Cir. 1990). The Commissioner thereafter issued the following "Policy Interpretation Ruling":
This Ruling supersedes, only in states within the Fourth Circuit (North Carolina, South Carolina, Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia), Social Security Ruling (SSR) 88-13, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Pain and Other Symptoms:
...
FOURTH CIRCUIT STANDARD: Once an underlying physical or [m]ental impairment that could reasonably be expected to cause pain is shown by medically acceptable objective evidence, such as clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, the adjudicator must evaluate the disabling effects of a disability claimant's pain, even though its intensity or severity is shown only by subjective evidence. If an underlying impairment capable of causing pain is shown, subjective evidence of the pain, its intensity or degree can, by itself,
support a finding of disability. Objective medical evidence of pain, its intensity or degree (i.e., manifestations of the functional effects of pain such as deteriorating nerve or muscle tissue, muscle spasm, or sensory or motor disruption), if available, should be obtained and considered. Because pain is not readily susceptible of objective proof, however, the absence of objective medical evidence of the intensity, severity, degree or functional effect of pain is not determinative.SSR 90-1p, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,898-02, at 31,899 (Aug. 6, 1990). SSR 90-1p has since been superseded by SSR 96-7p, which is consistent with SSR 90-1p. See SSR 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,483-01 (July 2, 1996). SSR 96-7p provides, "If an individual's statements about pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by the objective medical evidence, the adjudicator must consider all of the evidence in the case record, including any statements by the individual and other persons concerning the individual's symptoms." Id. at 34,485; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1)-(c)(2) (outlining evaluation of pain).
VI. Credibility
The ALJ must make a credibility determination based upon all the evidence in the record. Where an ALJ decides not to credit a claimant's testimony about pain, the ALJ must articulate specific and adequate reasons for doing so, or the record must be obvious as to the credibility finding. Hammond v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1985). Although credibility determinations are generally left to the ALJ's discretion, such determinations should not be sustained if they are based on improper criteria. Breeden, 493 F.2d at 1010 ("We recognize that the administrative law judge has the unique advantage of having heard the testimony firsthand, and ordinarily we may not disturb credibility findings that are based on a witness's demeanor. But administrative findings based on oral testimony are not sacrosanct, and if it appears that credibility determinations are based on improper or irrational criteria they cannot be sustained.").
APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS
Combination of Impairments
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision as failing to consider the combined effect of Plaintiff's multiple impairments on his RFC. Plaintiff explains that there is nothing in the ALJ's decision showing that he revisited the effect of Plaintiff's non-severe impairments on his RFC, constituting reversible error. [Doc. 22 at 12.]
The Commissioner contends that, contrary to Plaintiff's allegations, the ALJ considered all of Plaintiff's alleged impairments and properly limited Plaintiff to being able to perform the minimal exertional requirements of sedentary work. [Doc. 23 at 7.]
ALJ's Consideration of Plaintiff's Impairments in Combination
The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments of ankylosing spondylosis and Chron's disease. [R. 12.] The ALJ also found Plaintiff suffered from non-severe impairments of gout, depression, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, and alcohol abuse. [R. 12-13.] With respect to gout, the ALJ found that the medical evidence of record showed this condition was adequately controlled with prescribed medications and infrequent episodes. [R. 13.] The ALJ also found that, with respect to Plaintiff's alleged mental limitations, Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Mary Gay, indicated that the claimant had minimal functional limitations as a result of those identified diagnoses. [Id.] The ALJ also found Plaintiff had no limitations in his activities of daily living; mild limitations in social functioning; mild limitations in concentration, persistence and pace; and no episodes of decompensation. [Id.] In evaluating Plaintiff's impairments under the listing analysis at step 3, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equaled a listed impairment. [R. 14-15.] The Court notes that Plaintiff does not challenge any of those findings by the ALJ.
In considering Plaintiff's impairments during the RFC determination, the ALJ explained his evaluation of the record evidence as follows:
* With respect to Plaintiff's back problems, the ALJ explained that there is certainly evidence of impairments, which could reasonably be expected to cause back pain. The medical records showed that the claimant was maintained fairly well with injections, hydrocodone, and fentanyl patches. Initial reports of the claimant's physical response to a permanently implanted spinal cord stimulator have shown very good pain control. [R. 16.]
* In terms of the Crohn's Disease, the ALJ explained that the medical evidence of record does not suggest anywhere near the degree of symptomology alleged by the claimant. It is noted that the claimant was assessed with inflammatory arthritis secondary to Crohn's Disease, but medical records from Rheumatology Associates did not identify joint swelling, despite indicating that the claimant occasionally complained of tenderness. Additionally, the record clearly showed that the claimant was able to work despite his Crohn's condition for a number of years. Further, medical evidence seemed to indicate that the claimant's Crohn's condition was mostly asymptomatic with infrequent flares. [R. 16-17.]
* Additionally, the ALJ noted that in August 2015, Dr. Noble noted that the claimant had been doing well from a Crohn's Disease and bowel standpoint. He noted that the claimant reported significant relief of pain symptoms since placement of spinal cord stimulator. A CT scan indicated no abnormal pathology and an endoscopy was generally unremarkable. (Exhibit 22F/4, 6, 10, 11-12). [R. 18.]
* With respect to Plaintiff's mental health issues, the ALJ noted that in April 2015, Dr. John Petzelt concluded that the claimant's mental health issues of depression, ADHD, and alcohol dependence were non-severe. He noted that medical evidence showed that multiple mental status examinations were normal with conditions adequately controlled with medication (Exhibit 3A/9-10). [R. 19.] The ALJ also referenced a mental medical source statement dated December 2014 by Dr. Mary Gay in which Dr. Gay concluded that the claimant's
mental health status was essentially normal when he was compliant with medications, with good and/or adequate abilities in all levels of functioning (Exhibit 13F). [Id.]
After reviewing the above evidence the ALJ concluded as follows:
In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the weight of the evidence of record. There are no medical findings of such severity that suggest the claimant is completely incapable of all work activity. There are positive finding that somewhat support some of the claimants subjective symptoms and reported limitations. While the medical evidence of record establishes the existence of the above-mentioned impairments, the objective findings do not confirm that these impairments are of such a severity that they could reasonably be expected to produce the degree of pain and functional limitations alleged.[Id.]
Discussion
When a claimant has more than one impairment, the statutory and regulatory scheme for making disability determinations, as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit, requires that the ALJ consider the combined effect of these impairments in determining the claimant's disability status. Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.1989); Aurand v. Astrue, 6:07-3968-HMH, 2009 WL 364389 (D.S.C. Feb.12, 2009) (remanding with instruction that ALJ consider severe and medically-determinable non-severe impairments in combination). Whether or not the impairments are found to be severe, the ALJ must consider the severe and non-severe complaints and impairments in combination in determining the plaintiff's disability. Furthermore, "[a]s a corollary, the ALJ must adequately explain his or her evaluation of the combined effects of the impairments." Walker, 889 F.2d at 50.
Courts in this District have refined their interpretation of Walker. For example, in Brown v. Astrue, C/A No. 0:10-1584-RBH, 2012 WL 3716792 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2012), the Court held that the adequacy requirement of Walker is met if it is clear from the decision as a whole that the Commissioner considered the combined effect of a claimant's impairments. Id. at *6. In so finding, he noted that Fourth Circuit precedent issued after Walker suggested that Walker was not meant to be used as a trap for the Commissioner. Id. The Court ultimately concluded that the Commissioner's determination of the plaintiff's RFC, which included findings regarding the severity of each of the plaintiff's impairments, demonstrated that the Commissioner considered the impairments in combination. Id. at *7. Similarly, in Thomsberry v. Astrue, C/A No. 4:08-475-HMH-TER, 2010 WL 146483 (D.S.C. Jan.12, 2010), the Court found that "while the ALJ could have been more explicit in stating that his discussion dealt with the combination of [the plaintiff's] impairments, his overall findings adequately evaluate the combined effect of [the plaintiff's] impairments." Id. at *5.
In this case, while performing the listing analysis at Step 3, the ALJ clearly stated that he considered the combined effects of Plaintiff's impairments, severe and non-severe, and found they were not equal in severity to Listings 1.04, 5.06, 12.04, 12.06 and 12.09. [R. 14-15.] At Step 2, the ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff's non-severe impairment of gout was neither supported by objective signs, symptoms or laboratory findings and had no more than a minimal affect on Plaintiff's ability to perform basic work. [R. 13.] And, at Step 2, the ALJ specifically considered Plaintiff's mental impairments of depression, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, and alcohol abuse, in combination and found those impairments did not cause any significant limitations in Plaintiff's ability to perform basic mental work activities. [Id.] During the RFC analysis, the ALJ also noted that Dr. Petzelt found Plaintiff's combined mental health issues were non-severe and adequately controlled with medication. [R. 19.] Evidence that Plaintiff's mental impairments were controlled by medication tends to demonstrate that Plaintiff possessed the ability to function independently while compliant with his medications. See Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) ("If a symptom can be reasonably controlled by medication or treatment, it is not disabling."). Consequently, the Court finds that it is apparent the ALJ reasonably concluded that these non-severe impairments had no combined effects with the remaining impairments that would adversely impact Plaintiff's RFC. As the ALJ explained, these impairments were either not supported by objective signs or were controlled with medications and, notwithstanding, there was no medical evidence of associated persistent functional limitations.
While determining Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ thoroughly discussed Plaintiff's medical history including the medical records, objective medical evidence, and Plaintiff's subjective complaints concerning each of his impairments. [R. 15-19.] Upon consideration of the evidence, the ALJ adopted the limitations imposed by Dr. Lina Caldwell that Plaintiff was capable of light exertional work with frequent climbing of ramps/stairs, balancing, kneeling, and crawling as well as occasional climbing of ladders/ropes/scaffolds, stooping, and crouching. [R. 19.] However, the ALJ further limited Plaintiff's RFC to include no climbing, a sit/stand option in place every 20 minutes, occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling as well as no exposure to workplace hazards. [Id.] The ALJ also gave significant weight to the portion of Dr. Vanterpool's September 2015 opinion finding Plaintiff capable of sedentary work activities, while rejecting her opinion that Plaintiff would be unreliable due to symptoms of Crohn's. [Id.] The ALJ ultimately concluded that there were no medical findings of such severity that suggested Plaintiff was completely incapable of all work activity. [Id.] While the ALJ found positive findings that somewhat supported Plaintiff's reported limitations, the ALJ found the objective findings did not confirm the level of severity reasonably expected to produce the degree of pain and functional limitations alleged. [Id.]
Upon review, the Court finds that from a review of the decision as a whole that the ALJ sufficiently considered the effects of Plaintiff's impairments in combination on his ability to engage in work activity. The ALJ did consider Plaintiff's severe and non-severe impairments and fashioned an RFC that took into account the combination of the limitations the ALJ found were credibly imposed by the impairments. Even if the ALJ had somehow erred by not articulating this analysis of the combined effects of Plaintiff's impairments, it would be harmless error. Plaintiff does not argue that he was disabled under any particular Listing, even though it was his burden to do so. Absent the identification of a particular Listing and a theory of disability thereupon, it is impossible for Plaintiff to show how the alleged error would have been harmful. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not suggest any additional functional limitations the ALJ failed to consider during the RFC analysis in evaluating Plaintiff's impairments in combination; instead he contends that "the total impact of all his impairments was greater than their individual effects." [Doc. 22 at 12.] Thus, even if the ALJ had somehow erred in this regard, Plaintiff has not established any harm resulting from such error, and his argument fails. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409, (2009) ("[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency's determination."). Accordingly, the Court finds no error in the ALJ's consideration of Plaintiff's impairments in combination. And, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC determination.
Treating Physician Opinions
Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not properly explain the weight he assigned to Dr. David S. Rogers's ("Dr. Rogers") statements as to upper extremity limitations and did not address all of Dr. Rogers's opinions, and failed to explain his rejection of Dr. Stephanie Vanterpool's (Dr. Vanterpool") finding that Plaintiff was unreliably capable of sustaining work activity due to his impairments. [Doc. 22 at 14.]
The Commissioner contends the ALJ sufficiently considered the opinions of Dr. Vanterpool and Dr. Rogers and correctly determined that the evidence did not support an opinion that Plaintiff could not perform any type of work. [Doc. 23 at 8.]
Drs. Vanterpool and Rogers's Opinions
On September 11, 2015, Dr. Vanterpool, with Pain Management Associates, drafted a letter indicating that Plaintiff had been a patient of hers since September 2014 for ankylosing spondylitis, degenerative disc disease, facet and SI joint arthropathy. [R. 685.] Dr. Vanterpool noted that implantation of the spinal cord stimulator was an attempt to reduce the amount of pain medication Plaintiff required on a daily basis and provide more comprehensive pain coverage. [Id.] Dr. Vanterpool noted that, while Plaintiff has received additional pain relief post implantation, it was too soon to adequately determine the level of relief on a longstanding basis; and, although his pain level had improved, she was judging improvement relative to Plaintiff's level of pain prior to implementation. [Id.] Dr. Vanterpool indicated that Plaintiff continued to have substantial low back pain and SI joint pain that impairs his stamina and ability to complete daily functioning activities. [Id.] Dr. Vanterpool opined as follows:
I have advised him to limit the time he spends standing/walking to occasionally and to avoid stooping, crouching, overhea[]d reaching and bending due to continued lower extremity weakness and back pain, as well as to avoid sit[t]ing for continuous periods to avoid aggravation of the SI joints. In order for the stimulator to be effective in reducing pain on a long term basis [Plaintiff] needs to complete additional physical therapy for which we are processing a referral. I have advised [Plaintiff] to avoid any strain on his body including lifting over 10 pounds or overexerting himself aggravating his pain complaints not covered by the spinal cord stimulator.[Id.]
At this point in time, due to the unpredictability of [Plaintiff's] conditions and need for continued aggressive therapy, I do not feel he would be reliable in any employment capacity.
Dr. Rogers of Oaktree Medical Centre, P.C., Department of Neurology, conducted an independent medical evaluation, at the request of Dr. Vanterpool. [R. 492-98.] Dr. Rogers noted that he reviewed a medical evaluation from Dr. Robert Blackwell dated September 10, 2014; office notes from Stephanie Vanterpool dated March 5, 2015; an MR[I] of Plaintiff's pelvis dated December 10, 2014, and an MRI of the Plaintiff's lumbar spine report from December 10, 2014. [R. 492.] Plaintiff also reported the following to Dr. Rogers: constant "shooting pain and deep pressure" discomfort in the lumbar spine; bilateral hip discomfort made worse with bending, reaching and lifting; bilateral lower extremity radicular type discomfort with left lower extremity affected more greatly than right; substantial left lower extremity weakness resulting in falls and minor injuries; and right lower extremity discomfort that is intermittent. [Id.]
During his time spent with Plaintiff, indicated to be one hour and twenty-five minutes [R. 498], Dr. Rogers also conducted a physical exam; reviewed Plaintiff's medical, family, social and surgical history; reviewed his current medications [R. 494-97], and concluded that, in his medical opinion, beyond a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Plaintiff was unable to return to his previous level of employment within the course of the next year. [R. 497.] Dr. Rogers opined that Plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled and was not a suitable candidate for vocational retraining due to dominant upper extremity deficits and behavioral/emotional dysfunction. [Id.]
ALJ's Consideration of Drs. Vanterpool and Rogers's Opinions
Dr . Vanterpool
The ALJ gave significant weight to the portion of Dr. Vanterpool's September 2015 opinion finding Plaintiff could perform sedentary work activities, but discounted her portion of the opinion finding Plaintiff to be an unreliable employee in light of evidence that Plaintiff's Crohn's symptoms were sporadic and Plaintiff had good pain management with the current treatment regimen. [R. 19.] In discounting Dr. Vanterpool's opinion that Plaintiff would be unreliable due to pain secondary to his back disorder and Crohn's disease, the ALJ cited to the medical evidence of record in support of his decision:
In terms of the claimant's back disorder, treatment notes dated September 2014 from Dr. Stephanie Vanderpool showed that the claimant reported increased back pain that radiated into his bilateral lower extremities. On examination, Dr. Vanderpool observed that the claimant demonstrated a normal gait, without muscle weakness or neurological deficit. She assessed the claimant with low back pain, and lumbar spondylosis without myelopathy. Later that month, Dr.Vanderpool noted that the claimant received two thoracic trigger point injections secondary to aggravated back pain symptoms from moving. In October 2014, the claimant reported that these injections had
been very helpful in providing significant pain relief and elected to receive additional injections (Exhibit 17F/6-9, 13, 15, 21).[R. 17-18.]
...
Additionally, in December 2014, the claimant reported that a recent lumbar epidural injection was very helpful in pain relief and in February 2015, he reported that a recent sacroiliac (SI) joint injection had worked tremendously well, which allowed him to stop using a cane for ambulation. His diagnosis was expanded to include disorders of the sacrum (Exhibits 17F/34, 44, 48, 79-80 and 21F/23). A further review of the medical evidence indicated that the claimant was seen every 2-3 weeks for routine treatment of his back pain issues of ankylosing spondylosis, degenerative disc disease, facet arthropathy, and SI joint arthopathy occasional injections with partial, temporary relief and medications refills. The claimant participated in a spinal cord stimulator trial in May 2015 (Exhibit 17F/76), with stimulator placement in June 2015 (Exhibits 18F/12 and 20F). An MRI of the thoracic spine dated May 2015 was unremarkable except for a small central cord syrinx at T5 (Exhibit 20F/9). In August 2015, Dr. Vanderpool reported that the claimant's lumbar posture was within normal limits with a nonantalgic gait. She noted that the claimant's pain medications were working well with no reported side effects (Exhibit 24F/6-7).
...
Progress notes dated August 2014 through August 2015 indicated diagnosis of Crohn's-related arthritis with reports of fatigue. However, the claimant was routinely noted to have a normal gait and stance with 5/5 muscle strength in upper and lower extremities and improvement in pain levels after injections, despite more complaints of gastrointestinal problems (Exhibits 21F and 23F). In August 2015, Dr. Noble noted that the claimant had been doing well from a Crohn's Disease and bowel standpoint. He noted that the claimant reported significant relief of pain symptoms since placement of spinal cord stimulator. A CT scan indicated no abnormal pathology and an endoscopy was generally unremarkable. (Exhibit 22F/4, 6, 10, 11-12)
The ALJ also cited to medical evidence of record indicating that Plaintiff was
maintained fairly well with injections, hydrocodone, and fentanyl patches. Initial reports of the claimant's physical response to a permanently implanted spinal cord stimulator have shown very good pain control. In terms of the Crohn's Disease, the medical evidence of record does not suggest anywhere near the degree of symptomology alleged by the claimant. It is noted that the claimant was assessed with inflammatory arthritis secondary to Crohn's Disease, but medical records from Rheumatology Associates did not identify joint swelling, despite indicating that the claimant occasionally complained of tenderness. Additionally, the record clearly showed that the claimant was able to work despite his Crohn's condition for a number of years. Further, medical evidence seemed to indicate that the claimant's Crohn's condition was mostly asymptomatic with infrequent flares.[R. 16.]
Dr . Rogers
With respect to Dr. Rogers opinion, the ALJ assigned little weight to his March 2015 opinion finding that "there is no other supporting evidence of upper extremity limitations except for the remote history of right carpal tunnel release," and that "a conclusion regarding any mental health limitations is not consistent with or supported by the medical source statement of the claimant's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Gay." [R. 19.]
In discounting Dr. Rogers' opinion, the ALJ cites to the following evidence of record:
In May 2014, Dr. Aksentijevich stated that a course of prednisone had provided significant relief of his hand pain. She stated that imaging records had revealed osteoarthritis, but laboratory workup had shown normal inflammation markers and negative for rheumatoid arthritis. She assessed the claimant with Crohn's related arthritis and counseled him regarding methods for gout recurrence prevention (Exhibits 6F/3, 5, 7 and 9F/5, 26). In December 2014, the claimant reported that he had no abdominal pain, no nausea or vomiting, or no diarrhea or incontinence issues (Exhibit 17F/36). Progress notes dated August 2014 through August
2015 indicated diagnosis of Crohn's-related arthritis with reports of fatigue. However, the claimant was routinely noted to have a normal gait and stance with 5/5 muscle strength in upper and lower extremities and improvement in pain levels after injections, despite more complaints of gastrointestinal problems (Exhibits 21F and 23F). In August 2015, Dr. Noble noted that the claimant had been doing well from a Crohn's Disease and bowel standpoint. He noted that the claimant reported significant relief of pain symptoms since placement of spinal cord stimulator. A CT scan indicated no abnormal pathology and an endoscopy was generally unremarkable. (Exhibit 22F/4, 6, 10, 11-12)[R. 18-19.]
...
Significant weight is given to the mental medical source statement dated December 2014 by Dr. Mary Gay. Dr. Gay concluded that the claimant's mental health status was essentially normal when he was compliant with medications, with good and/or adequate abilities in all levels of functioning (Exhibit 13F). It is noted that this opinion is consistent with and supported by other medical evidence of record, particularly treatment notes from Dr. Gay and Dr. Vanderpool.
Discussion
The responsibility for weighing evidence falls on the Commissioner or the ALJ, not the reviewing court. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder, 307 F.2d at 520. The ALJ is obligated to evaluate and weigh medical opinions "pursuant to the following non-exclusive list: (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician's opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist." Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 (4th Cir.2005) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). ALJs typically "accord 'greater weight to the testimony of a treating physician' because the treating physician has necessarily examined the applicant and has a treatment relationship with the applicant." Id. (quoting Mastro, 270 F.3d at 178). While the ALJ may discount a treating physician's opinion if it is unsupported or inconsistent with other evidence, Craig, 76 F.3d at 590, the ALJ must still weigh the medical opinion based on the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). Additionally, SSR 96-2p requires that an ALJ give specific reasons for the weight given to a treating physician's medical opinion:
[A] finding that a treating source medical opinion is not well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record means only that the opinion is not entitled to "controlling weight," not that the opinion should be rejected. Treating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. 404.1527 and 416.927. In many cases, a treating source's opinion will be entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted, even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.1996 WL 374188, at *4 (July 2, 1996).
The law is clear that the opinion of a treating physician must be weighed against the record as a whole when determining eligibility for benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2). A finding that a treating source medical opinion is not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record means only that the opinion is not entitled to "controlling weight," not that the opinion should be rejected. Treating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 CFR 404.1527. In many cases, a treating source's medical opinion will be entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted, even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.
However, not every opinion offered by a treating source is entitled to deference:
Medical sources often offer opinions about whether an individual who has applied for title II or title XVI disability benefits is "disabled" or "unable to work," or make similar statements of opinions. In addition, they sometimes offer opinions in other work-related terms; for example, about an individual's ability to do past relevant work or any other type of work. Because these are administrative findings that may determine whether an individual is disabled, they are reserved to the Commissioner. Such opinions on these issues must not be disregarded. However, even when offered by a treating source, they can never be entitled to controlling weight or given special significance.SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e) (stating an ALJ does not have to "give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner," such as an opinion that the claimant is disabled, the claimant's impairment or impairments meets or equals a listing, or the claimant has a certain residual functional capacity).
In this case, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's weight assignment to the opinions of Dr. Vanterpool and Dr. Rogers because these opinions fully support Plaintiff's credibility and evidence that Plaintiff was disabled due to the cumulative impact of his non-related impairments. [Doc. 22 at 13.] Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ "glossed over" Dr. Vanterpool's restriction on sitting and that it is not clear that a sit/stand option will address Plaintiff's limitations. [Id. at 14.] And, Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ failed to mention portions of Dr. Rogers's opinion. Upon review of the ALJ's decision and the record evidence, the Court finds the ALJ sufficiently explained his consideration of the opinion evidence and the weight assigned to these opinions.
Upon review of the parties' arguments, ALJ's opinion, the record, and the controlling law, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision adequately considered and weighed the relevant factors under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c); and, adequately explained his consideration of, and weight assigned to, the specifically challenged findings and opinions of Plaintiff's treating and examining physicians with specific reference to the record evidence. With respect to Dr. Rogers's opinion, although Plaintiff suggests the ALJ failed to consider parts of his opinion, Plaintiff failed to explain what part the ALJ did not consider. Indeed, the Court finds that it is apparent the ALJ considered Dr. Rogers's entire opinion and gave the entire opinion little weight. [See R. 17-19.]
Also, Plaintiff failed to direct the Court to any evidence of record not considered by the ALJ in weighing these opinions. As stated above, it is not the purview of the Court to reweigh evidence, and the Court must uphold the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. While Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the ALJ's consideration of Dr. Vanterpool's sit/stand limitations, sedentary work, by definition, requires only occasional walking and, by its very nature, can be performed primarily in a seated position. See SSR 83-10. Also, despite Plaintiff's suggestion, Dr. Vanterpool did not place limitations on Plaintiff's ability to stand and/or sit that the ALJ failed to account for in the RFC.
Additionally, although Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to explain his rejection of Dr. Vanterpool's finding that Plaintiff was unreliably capable of sustaining work activity due to his impairments, the Court finds that the ALJ did explain that he generally agreed with Dr. Vanterpool's functional limitations but did not accept her opinion that Plaintiff would be an unreliable employee. And, the ALJ sufficiently explained that he rejected that part of her opinion because the ALJ did not believe it based on medical evidence in the record. [R. 19.] Furthermore, such a statement by a treating physician—that Plaintiff was not reliable in any employment capacity—is an administrative finding that is reserved to the Commissioner. Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's weighing of the opinion evidence of record, specifically the opinion evidence of Dr. Vanterpool and Dr. Rogers.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. February 17, 2017
Greenville, South Carolina
s/Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge