Opinion
No. CV 08-5016846-S
December 29, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This medical negligence case arises out of the death of the plaintiff's decedent, Karen Cotnoir. The defendants are Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center (Saint Francis), Radiology Associates of Hartford, P.C. (Radiology Associates), American Radiology Services, Inc. (ARS), Bolivia T. Davis, M.D., Stephen J. Roberts, M.D. and John T. Ziewacz, M.D. The complaint alleges the following facts: The plaintiff's decedent was seen at Saint Francis by its agent, servant or employee, Roberts, a specialist in emergency medicine. Roberts noted that she presented with symptoms which included "severe or atypical headache" and ordered a "CAT" scan from Ziewacz, a specialist in radiology who works for Radiology Associates, a company that contractually provides radiological services to Saint Francis. Radiology Associates electronically sent the scan to ARS in Maryland for review in accordance with a contract between ARS and Radiology Associates. Davis, also a medical doctor, working as an agent or apparent agent, servant or employee of Radiology Associates and/or ARS, reviewed and misread the scan as negative. She sent her report back to Ziewacz, who, in turn, also misread the scan as negative. Roberts thereafter failed to properly diagnose and treat Karen Cotnoir's medical condition and discharged her home. Approximately, three weeks later, she died of a ruptured brain aneurysm. The complaint alleges that Karen Cotnoir's death resulted from the negligence of all of the defendants. In addition, Gary Cotnoir, husband of the decedent, alleges loss of consortium against each defendant.
Ziewacz has not appeared in this case.
Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by ARS and Davis asserting that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over either of them under the applicable long-arm statutes, General Statutes §§ 33-929(f) and 52-59b, respectively. Objections and opposition memoranda were filed by the plaintiff as well as co-defendants, Saint Francis and Roberts. In response to the objections, ARS and Davis argue that Saint Francis and Roberts have no standing to object to the motion to dismiss.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 627, 941 A.2d 266 (2008). "The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone . . . Where, however . . . the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).
I STANDING
First, the court must address whether Saint Francis and Roberts have standing to object to the motion to dismiss. ARS and Davis argue that Saint Francis and Roberts do not have standing to object to the motion to dismiss because Saint Francis and Roberts are not adverse parties to ARS and Davis as contemplated by Practice Book § 10-31. In support, they argue the motion to dismiss is not directed at Saint Francis or Roberts but, in fact, is directed at Gary Cotnoir, in both his representative and individual capacities. Further, ARS and Davis argue that the objection is improper and should be disregarded as Saint Francis and Roberts have no legal interest in the motion to dismiss.
The relevant practice book section, 10-31, entitled "Grounds of Motion to Dismiss," refers to "[a]ny adverse party who objects to this motion [to dismiss] . . ." Practice Book § 10-31(b). "A complaining party ordinarily can show that it [has standing] when it makes a colorable claim of [a] direct injury [it] has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Community Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim, 241 Conn. 546, 553-54, 698 A.2d 245 (1997); See also Duprey v. Gaito, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 98 0358725 (December 11, 2000, Melville, J.) (The phrase "complaining party" used interchangeably with "adverse party" for purposes of standing).
While there is no direct appellate authority, the Superior Court has provided some reasoning in the context of a motion for summary judgment. In that context, courts have stated, "the status of a party as a co-defendant [does not] preclude it from resisting a motion for summary judgment filed by a co-defendant . . . On the other hand, the fact that a defendant is a party does not necessarily mean that the defendant has a right to oppose a co-defendant's motion for summary judgment . . . The question should really be resolved by the facts of a particular case as to whether a co-defendant has standing in this situation." (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Robertson v. Delsanto, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 98 0578887 (December 9, 1999, Teller, J.) ( 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 111, 113). Where granting the party's motion for summary judgment "has the potential to present a direct injury to the [co-defendants] . . . [the co-defendants] have standing to challenge [their co-defendant's] motion for summary judgment." Guercia v. Connecticut Post, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 03 0474056 (December 6, 2004, Zoarski, J.T.R.). See also Scarvales v. Inland Wetlands Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 96 0382669 (May 1, 1996, Booth, J.) (16 Conn. L. Rptr. 549)("[w]hatever rule may be applied to `adverse parties' in either discovery proceedings or summary judgment motions, the court is not convinced that similar rules should be applied to limit the right of a co-defendant to be heard on a motion to dismiss").
At oral argument, Saint Francis and Roberts argued that they have an important interest in opposing the motion to dismiss for the principal reason that if the case against ARS and Davis is dismissed, Saint Francis and Roberts will unfairly be exposed to greater liability arising out of an interpretation of a radiological study for which they were not actively responsible. Saint Francis and Roberts further claim that they contracted out the evening portion of radiological interpretation to ARS with the expectation that if there was a medical malpractice claim arising out of its services, that ARS and its agents, servants and/or employees, would be there to respond to the claim. In any event, the arguments raised by Saint Francis and Roberts in opposition to the motion to dismiss have been adopted by the plaintiff and therefore are appropriately before the court.
II PERSONAL JURISDICTION
"If the defendant challenging the court's personal jurisdiction is a foreign corporation or a nonresident individual, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove the court's jurisdiction." Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 515. In this context, "the court must undertake a two-part inquiry to determine the propriety of its exercising such jurisdiction over the defendant. The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant]. If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process." Kenny v. Banks, 289 Conn. 529, 533, 958 A.2d 750 (2008).
A JURISDICTION OVER DAVIS 1 Long Arm
Davis argues that she was not transacting business in Connecticut as contemplated by § 52-59b(a)(1). She asserts that her only action with respect to the alleged injury was to form a medical conclusion and send it via facsimile to Connecticut. She contends that this action alone does not constitute transacting business as contemplated by § 52-59b(a)(1). In support, she cites to a Superior Court case, Mitchell v. Patterson, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 4001501 (June 21, 2005, Levine, J.) [ 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 560]; finding that email and facsimile communications alone do not rise to the level of transacting business under § 52-59b(a)(1). Further, Davis maintains that although she is an employee of ARS and arguably its agent, ARS does not transact business in Connecticut and cannot be held to jurisdiction in Connecticut. Thus, because there is no jurisdiction over her employer, there can be no jurisdiction over Davis as her employer's agent. Finally, Davis argues that although she maintains a license to practice medicine in Connecticut, this is not enough to subject her to jurisdiction because she does not actually practice medicine in Connecticut.
In response, the plaintiff counters that the interpretation and transmission of the scan to Connecticut constitutes a single purposeful business transaction as contemplated by § 52-59b(a)(1). In the alternative, he argues that, according to Davis' affidavit, submitted in support of the motion to dismiss, she has engaged in a multitude of similar transactions. Further, he contends that the reason Davis maintains a Connecticut license is because § 20-9 requires her to maintain a license if she receives compensation for practicing medicine in Connecticut — even if she practices remotely. It is the plaintiff's position that maintaining a license in Connecticut evidences that Davis is regularly engaging in the business and practice of medicine in Connecticut and that finding personal jurisdiction in this case is in keeping with legislative intent.
Davis also argues that personal jurisdiction is lacking under § 52-59b(a)(2) through (5), which addresses tortious acts committed within Connecticut, tortious acts committed outside Connecticut that impact an individual inside Connecticut, ownership of real property in Connecticut and the use of a computer or computer network as defined by General Statutes § 53-451. The plaintiff, in turn, argues that personal jurisdiction is proper under each of these prongs. The court, however, need not reach these arguments because it should find jurisdiction proper under § 52-59b(a)(1).
Pursuant to § 52-59b(a), "a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual . . . who in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any business within the state . . ." "The General Statutes do not define what the phrase `transacts any business' means in the context of § 52-59b." Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, 184 Conn. 471, 474, 440 A.2d 179 (1981). "[W]e construe the term `transacts any business' to embrace a single purposeful business transaction." Id. "In determining whether the [plaintiff's] cause of action arose from the defendants' transaction of business within this state we do not resort to a rigid formula. Rather, we balance considerations of public policy, common sense, and the chronology and geography of the relevant factors." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 122, 918 A.2d 867 (2007).
General Statutes § 20-9, provides in relevant part: "No person shall, for compensation, gain or reward, received or expected, diagnose, treat, operate for or prescribe for any injury, deformity, ailment or disease, actual or imaginary, of another person, nor practice surgery, until he has obtained such a license as provided in section 20-10, and then only in the kind or branch of practice stated in such license." "The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply to any individual whose practice of medicine includes any ongoing, regular or contractual arrangement whereby, regardless of residency in this or any other state, he provides, through electronic communications or interstate commerce, diagnostic or treatment services, including primary diagnosis of pathology specimens, slides or images, to any person located in this state. In the case of electronic transmissions of radiographic images, licensure shall be required for an out-of-state physician who provides, through an ongoing, regular or contractual arrangement, official written reports of diagnostic evaluations of such images to physicians or patients in this state . . ." General Statutes § 20-9(d).
While Connecticut courts have yet to address the issue of jurisdiction over a nonresident physician, federal courts "have found jurisdiction over nonresident doctors where they purposefully directed their actions at plaintiffs' states." Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1990). For example, in Kennedy, the tenth circuit found personal jurisdiction over a nonresident physician doing business in Texas because that physician "rendered his diagnosis to [the plaintiff] in Oklahoma, through the mail, knowing its extreme significance and that it would be the basis of Kennedy's further treatment there." Id. This was enough to be considered purposefully directing his actions toward the forum state. See also McGee v. Riekhof, 442 F.Sup. 1276 (D.Mont. 1978) (finding personal jurisdiction where medical advice received telephonically).
Furthermore, the language of § 20-9(a) contemplates a business transaction between a resident hospital and a nonresident physician that would reasonably and logically fall within the parameters of § 52-59b(a)(1). If the business Davis conducted required her to be licensed in Connecticut in accordance with Connecticut's laws, it is only fair and reasonable that legal action resulting from the business conducted pursuant to the license would be adjudicated in Connecticut. To hold otherwise would undermine the public policy concerns which gave rise to the licensing requirement set forth in § 20-9.
Additionally, Davis' reliance on Mitchell v. Patterson, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 05 4001501, for the argument that personal jurisdiction is lacking because Davis has only communicated with Connecticut via electronic communication is misplaced. In Mitchell, the court found that evidence of emails and faxes sent to Connecticut were insufficient to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. That case is distinguishable from the present case because in Mitchell the court noted that the emails and faxes were merely describing the services the nonresident defendant would be providing; these were not the services in and of themselves. Here, the electronic communication Davis sent to Connecticut actually provided the contracted for service. As a result, the reasoning in Mitchell is inapplicable here.
2 Due Process
The court must also determine whether subjecting Davis to jurisdiction in Connecticut comports with constitutional due process. Davis argues that subjecting her to personal jurisdiction in Connecticut violates due process because she has not maintained the requisite minimum contacts. Specifically, Davis states that she resides and practices in Maryland, her only connection to Connecticut is that she maintains a license to practice medicine here and she occasionally reviews medical documents via facsimile. Further, she claims she does not avail herself of the privileges or benefits of Connecticut. Finally, Davis contends that subjecting her to suit in Connecticut is unreasonable because her few ties are unrelated to the present action.
The plaintiff argues that personal jurisdiction over Davis does comport with the requirements of due process because Davis has continuously and systematically maintained business contacts with Connecticut thus establishing a general presence in the forum state. In support, he cites to Davis' Supplemental Responses to Interrogatories stating Davis has personally reviewed and reported on approximately 1224 radiological scans for Connecticut patients. Second, in relation to this specific cause of action, he argues due process is satisfied because she directed this activity at a resident of the forum state. Additionally, the plaintiff adopts the arguments of Saint Francis and Roberts that Davis has directed her activities toward Connecticut residents by maintaining a license to practice medicine in Connecticut, which she utilized by regularly interpreting radiological scans of Connecticut residents pursuant to contractual arrangements with Saint Francis and other Connecticut hospitals. The plaintiff further maintains that because actively sending such information is purposefully directing oneself at the forum state and the controversy at hand is directly related to a particular contact, the requirements of due process are satisfied.
"The due process test for personal jurisdiction has two related components: the `minimum contacts' inquiry and the `reasonableness' inquiry . . . For the purposes of this initial inquiry, the Supreme Court of the United States has articulated, and this court has recognized, two types of personal jurisdiction. Either specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction can satisfy the constitutional requirement of sufficient minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum. A state court will have specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whenever the defendant has purposefully directed [its] activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation [has] result[ed] from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 524. "Alternatively, [e]ven when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign [defendant's] activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the [defendant] to its in personam jurisdiction if the defendant has had continuous and systematic general business contacts with the state." Id.
"The twin touchstones of [the] due process analysis under the minimum contacts doctrine are foreseeability and fairness. [T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 41, 495 A.2d 1034 (1985). "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. This `purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of `random,' `fortuitous,' or `attenuated' contacts . . . or of the `unilateral activity of another party or a third person' . . ." Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 530.
Additionally, because "in enacting § 52-59b, the legislature used New York Civil Practice Law § 302 . . . as a model;" Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, supra, 184 Conn. 474; New York interpretations are persuasive. In similar situations where business was conducted entirely through electronic communications, the New York courts have stated that "[s]o long as a party avails itself of the benefits of the forum, has sufficient minimum contacts with it, and should reasonably expect to defend its actions there, due process is not offended if that party is subjected to jurisdiction even if not present in that State . . . We have in the past recognized CPLR 302(a)(1) long-arm jurisdiction over commercial actors and investors using electronic and telephonic means to project themselves into New York to conduct business transactions and we do so again here." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank v. Mont. Board of Investments, 7 N.Y.3d 65, 71, 850 N.E.2d 1140, 818 N.Y.S.2d 164, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1095, 127 S.Ct. 832, 166 L.Ed.2d 665 (2006).
"Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state . . ." N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302.
Lastly, "while the exercise of jurisdiction is favored where the plaintiff has made a threshold showing of minimum contacts at the first stage of the inquiry, it may be defeated where the defendant presents a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 525. "[T]he court must evaluate the following factors as part of this reasonableness analysis: (1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Panganiban v. Panganiban, 54 Conn.App. 634, 640, 736 A.2d 190, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 920, 742 A.2d 359 (1999).
In the present case, subjecting Davis to jurisdiction in Connecticut comports with due process. Davis has continuously and repeatedly interpreted scans and sent her medical opinion to Connecticut. These were not random or fortuitous contacts, but repeated and purposeful activities sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test. Further, Davis has purposefully directed her business activity of interpreting scans at residents of Connecticut by sending her interpretations directly to a Connecticut hospital treating Connecticut patients. In addition, it is foreseeable that these interpretations could subject her to suit in Connecticut as evidenced by the requirement that Davis be licensed in Connecticut in order to perform this work. It would be counterintuitive to state that Davis must be licensed in Connecticut to perform her services for Connecticut residents but that she would not have foreseen a potential cause of action arising in Connecticut as a result of this work.
Finally, Davis has not presented a compelling case that jurisdiction would be unreasonable. She has not made a showing that jurisdiction would be burdensome to her. Further, Connecticut has a greater interest in this case considering that the plaintiff is a resident here; the decedent's estate is being administered here; two of the defendants, Saint Francis and Roberts, also reside or are incorporated in Connecticut; and finally, the alleged injury occurred here. It follows that holding Davis to jurisdiction in Connecticut is both fair and reasonable.
B JURISDICTION OVER ARS 1 Long Arm
ARS asserts it cannot be brought into court here because it does not satisfy the applicable long-arm statute, § 33-929(f)(1)-(4). ARS maintains that it is incorporated in Delaware and doing business under the laws of Maryland. ARS argues that jurisdiction under § 33-929(f)(1) is improper because the cause of action does not arise out of a contract made or performed in Connecticut. ARS maintains that it has a contract with Radiological Associates, but it provides services remotely and all of its services are performed in Maryland. Second, ARS contends that jurisdiction under § 33-929(f)(2) is inappropriate because it did not solicit business in Connecticut and its interactions with Connecticut are limited to radiological interpretations. ARS also argues that jurisdiction is improper under § 33-929(f)(3) because ARS does not produce, manufacture or distribute goods in Connecticut and that § 33-929(f)(4) does not provide jurisdiction because ARS did not commit tortious conduct in Connecticut. Nevertheless, the court need not reach the arguments for a lack of jurisdiction under § 33-929(f)(1), (3) and (4) because it finds jurisdiction pursuant to § 33-929(f)(2).
In support of jurisdiction under § 33-929(f)(2), the plaintiff argues that ARS solicited business by entering into contracts with three different Connecticut hospitals. He adopts the argument of Saint Francis and Roberts that the definition of "solicitation" under § 33-929(f)(2) should include the actions healthcare providers take to increase their business in light of the fact that medical ethics forbid traditional advertising. Thus, while ARS did not solicit business by advertising, ARS set up institutional arrangements via these contracts that resulted in Connecticut residents receiving medical services from ARS. The plaintiff contends that because ARS acted to increase its business by entering into a contract with a Connecticut hospital, personal jurisdiction is authorized under § 33-929(f)(2).
In its motion to dismiss, in addition to Saint Francis, ARS states it had similar contracts with New Britain General Hospital and Bristol Hospital.
Section 33-929(f) provides in relevant part: "Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state . . . whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this state . . . on any cause of action arising as follows: (1) Out of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state; (2) out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise . . . (3) out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods by such corporation with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be used or consumed in this state . . . (4) out of tortious conduct in this state, whether arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance."
"[The language of General Statutes 33-411(c), now § 33-929(f)] directs us to inquire not only into the various elements of the plaintiffs' cause of action, spelled out in the various subparts of subsection [(f)], but also into the totality of contacts which the defendant may have with the forum . . . [I]n enacting § [33-929(f)] . . . the legislature intended to exercise its full constitutional power over foreign corporations in cases falling within one of the designated causes of action. Under [§ 33-929(f)], consistent with the constitutional demands of due process, it is the totality of the defendant's conduct and connection with this state that must be considered, on a case by case basis, to determine whether the defendant could reasonably have anticipated being haled into court here." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomason v. Chemical Bank, 234 Conn. 281, 291, 661 A.2d 595 (1995). "If the plaintiff's cause of action alleges conduct falling within one of the four statutorily designated classes, the court must examine the totality of the defendant's contacts with the state of Connecticut to determine whether personal jurisdiction over the defendant is proper." Frazer v. McGowan, 198 Conn. 243, 250, 502 A.2d 905 (1986). In considering the solicitation prong "we must take into account the totality of business allegedly solicited by the defendant in this state, including but not limited to transactions between the defendant and the underlying plaintiffs." Pitruzello v. Muro, 70 Conn.App. 309, 318-19, 798 A.2d 469 (2002).
Section 33-411(c) formerly read: "[e]very foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows: (1) Out of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state; or (2) out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without the state; or (3) out of the production manufacture or distribution of goods by such corporation with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be used or consumed in this state and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers; or (4) out of tortious conduct in this state, whether arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance."
In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that the traditional understanding of solicitation is not applicable to hospitals and medical professionals. See Frazer v. McGowan, supra, 198 Conn. 250. In Frazer, the court found that a foreign hospital had solicited the business of patients within the meaning of § 33-929(f)(2) because it had created a network of Connecticut physicians who would refer patients to that hospital. Id., 251-52. In making this determination the court looked at the number of Connecticut physicians that regularly referred patients to the hospital. Id., 251. The court wanted to avoid a narrow interpretation of solicitation and was unpersuaded by the argument that because these physicians were not agents of the hospital they were not soliciting business. Id., 251. The court, in determining how the word solicitation applied in this case stated "[t]o solicit in Connecticut, a hospital need not send emissaries into the state to issue invitations to state residents. A hospital may solicit in Connecticut by setting up an organizational network that is likely to prompt a significant number of Connecticut patients to seek treatment at that hospital." Id., 251-52. Additionally, a Superior Court case noted that "courts applying § 33-929(f)(2) have tended to focus on defendants' . . . activities geared towards broadening the defendants' general consumer bases." (Emphasis added.) BCH America v. Deko International Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 06 4008327 S (Jan. 26, 2007 Nadeau, J.).
In accordance with the broad interpretation of § 33-929(f) outlined above, this court has personal jurisdiction over ARS pursuant to § 33-929(f)(2). While ARS alleges that it has not actively solicited individual patients in Connecticut, it has entered a contract with Connecticut hospitals to provide services to Connecticut patients remotely, thereby increasing its business by serving Connecticut patients. This conclusion is in line with the court's reasoning in Frazer where the use of interstate networks to provide services to Connecticut patients constituted solicitation. Additionally, while ARS is not incorporated in Connecticut, owns no property here, maintains no offices and files no taxes here, ARS maintains significant contacts by performing similar contracts with two other Connecticut hospitals whereby it provides services to hundreds, if not thousands, of Connecticut residents. Accordingly, the court finds that personal jurisdiction is properly asserted as to ARS pursuant to § 33-929(f)(2), the corporate long-arm statute.
2 Due Process
Next, ARS argues that finding personal jurisdiction over it would violate due process because it maintained no minimum contacts and it was not reasonably foreseeable that ARS would be hailed into this forum. In support of its argument, ARS argues the only contact it had with Connecticut was the sending of a facsimile. ARS states that it does not produce goods that are made or used in Connecticut. Further, ARS states that it conducts no business in Connecticut because its services were provided to a Connecticut entity remotely and only during the evening hours. ARS contends that this does not equal conducting business or providing services in Connecticut. Lastly, ARS argues that subjecting it to suit in Connecticut would be unfair because suit in Connecticut was unforeseeable based on its lack of contacts with Connecticut.
In opposition, the plaintiff argues that personal jurisdiction satisfies due process because ARS has continuously and systematically maintained business contacts with Connecticut and, in relation to this specific cause of action, has purposefully directed its activities to the plaintiff's decedent and other residents of Connecticut. Additionally, the plaintiff adopts the arguments of Saint Francis and Roberts that ARS specifically solicited business in Connecticut and conducted business with Connecticut hospitals and that the alleged injury resulted from those business dealings. Finally, the plaintiff maintains that all of these factors indicate that ARS has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Connecticut.
As stated above, a defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum in order for jurisdiction to not violate due process. Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 523-24. Additionally, a plaintiff's showing of jurisdiction may be defeated where a defendant presents "a compelling case" that jurisdiction is unreasonable. Id., 525. In determining whether ARS has presented a compelling case, the court considers the same four factors outlined in Panganiban v. Panganiban, supra, 54 Conn.App. 640.
ARS maintained sufficient minimum contacts such that it is foreseeable that it would be haled into court in Connecticut. It maintained a contract with a Connecticut entity whereby it provided medical services to Connecticut residents and received compensation from a Connecticut entity for its work. It directed its activities toward Connecticut residents, which gives Connecticut a greater interest in hearing this action. Further, ARS' actions also made it foreseeable that it could be haled into court in Connecticut.
Lastly, although ARS has argued that subjecting it to jurisdiction here is unfair, ARS, like Davis, has failed to provide a compelling case that would overcome jurisdiction. ARS has not demonstrated that jurisdiction would be unduly burdensome on it. Further, for the reasons previously stated, Connecticut has a greater interest in this case than Maryland. It follows that holding ARS to jurisdiction in Connecticut is both fair and reasonable and satisfies due process.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is in all respects denied.