Coston v. Petro

32 Citing cases

  1. Wallace v. State

    40 F. Supp. 3d 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that an injury was particular to the plaintiff where "the plaintiff [was] himself among the injured and not simply someone who retain[ed] a special interest in the injury"

    (refusing to find a likelihood of success on the merits for the ex post facto claim relating to Alabama's restrictions against any “adult criminal sex offender” living or working within 2,000 feet of a school or childcare facility); Doe v. Petro, No. 05–CV–125, 2005 WL 1038846, at *1–2 (S.D.Ohio Oct. 24, 2006) (finding, for purposes of a temporary restraining order, that Ohio's 1,000–foot residency restriction for any registered sex offender “likely does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not punitive in nature”); Coston v. Petro, 398 F.Supp.2d 878, 884–87 & n. 1 (S.D.Ohio 2005) (anticipating “a likely Ex Post Facto analysis” by holding that the plaintiffs could not establish that the same residency restriction in Ohio constituted a “criminal statute,” such that they had standing to bring a facial challenge to the restriction); cf. Cunningham v. Parkersburg Hous. Auth., No. 05–CV–940, 2007 WL 712392, at *8–12 (S.D.W.Va. Mar. 6, 2007) (Goodwin, J., adopting Findings–Recommendation of Stanley, Mag. J.) (upholding, under the Ex Post Facto Clause, a federal “residency restriction” that prohibited “lifetime registered sex offenders” from receiving public housing assistance as “most analogous” to Iowa's residency restriction in Miller ); Graham v. Henry, No. 06–CV–381, 2006 WL 2645130, at *1, *3–5 (N.D.Okla. Sept. 14, 2006) (holding that the same analysis for the ex post facto claim in Miller “mak[es] it unlikely that Plaintiff will succeed” in proving his claim that Oklahoma's 2,000–foot residency restriction for registered sex offenders is a second “ criminal pun

  2. State v. Williams

    2008 Ohio 6195 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 1 times

    " King, 2008-Ohio-2594, ¶ 16. {¶ 87} In Coston v. Petro (S.D.Ohio 2005), 398 F.Supp.2d 878, the district court held that the residency provision in former R.C. Chapter 2950 was neither a criminal provision nor did it have a punitive effect. As noted earlier, Senate Bill 10 only made a slight change to the residency provision in former R.C. Chapter 2950 by adding day-cares and preschools to the residency prohibition; no drastic change was made.

  3. STATE v. AMOS

    2008 Ohio 1834 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)

    It has been held that a defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 2950.031 where the record fails to show whether the defendant has suffered an actual deprivation of his property rights by operation of R.C. 2950.031. Brown, supra; Palazzi v. Estate of Gardner (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 169, syllabus; see, also, Coston v. Petro (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2005), 398 F.Supp.2d 878. Since Amos failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate an injury in fact or an actual deprivation of his property rights, he lacks standing to raise this assignment of error.

  4. State v. Bruce

    2008 Ohio 926 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)

    "Likewise, it has been held that a defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 2950.031 where the record fails to show whether the defendant has suffered an actual deprivation of his property rights by operation of R.C. 2950.031." State v. Pierce, supra, citing Coston v. Petro (S.D.Ohio 2005), 398 F.Supp.2d 878. Appellant has failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate an injury in fact or an actual deprivation of his property rights or his right to privacy. Neither can he prosecute a facial challenge in order to assert the rights of third parties not before the court.

  5. State v. Pierce

    2007 Ohio 3665 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)

    Likewise, it has been held that a defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 2950.031 where the record fails to show whether the defendant has suffered an actual deprivation of his property rights by operation of R.C. 2950.031. Coston v. Petro (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2005), 398 F.Supp.2d 878. Since Pierce failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate an injury in fact or an actual deprivation of his property rights, he lacks standing to raise this assignment of error.

  6. Hyle v. Porter

    2006 Ohio 5454 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 14 times
    In Hyle v. Porter, 170 Ohio App.3d 710, 2006-Ohio-5454, the offender was both convicted and resided in his residence within 1,000 feet of a school prior to the statute's enactment.

    The restriction does not affirmatively disable or restrain offenders so severely as to be penal. See, e.g., Coston v. Petro (S.D.Ohio 2005), 398 F.Supp.2d 878, 885-886. See id. at 885.

  7. State ex Rel. White v. Billings

    2006 Ohio 4743 (Ohio Com. Pleas 2006)   Cited 1 times

    Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 93, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164. See R.C. Chapter 2953; Coston v. Petro (S.D.Ohio 2005), 398 F.Supp.2d 878, 884 (although the Coston court addressed the ex post facto analysis in the context of legal standing, the court's inquiry concerned whether R.C. 2950.031 was punitive or regulatory, the same question before the court in the case at bar). See R.C. Chapter 2930.

  8. Duarte v. City of Lewisville

    759 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2014)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that "[t]he district court erroneously granted summary judgment for lack of standing because it conflated the actual-injury inquiry for standing purposes with the underlying merits of the Duartes' constitutional claims."

    See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580–81, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Lewisville's reliance on a decision from a district court in Ohio is misplaced because that case, Coston v. Petro, 398 F.Supp.2d 878 (S.D.Ohio 2005), is distinguishable. The differences between Coston and this case illustrate why the Duartes have standing here.

  9. Winters v. Lee

    3:22-cv-00338 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    As the court in Coston v. Petro explained when presented with a facial challenge to Ohio's sex offender registration and classification laws, “[e]xcept in limited circumstances not applicable here, a party to whom a statute does not apply cannot prosecute a facial challenge in order to assert the rights of third parties not before the court.” 398 F.Supp.2d 878, 884 (S.D. Ohio 2005).

  10. Berera v. United States

    Civil Case No. 16-cv-164-JMH (E.D. Ky. May. 11, 2017)

    In the three cases in which this issue has been presented to district courts in the Sixth Circuit since the Rule 23(e) amendment, the Southern District of Ohio has utilized the Doe analysis, despite the fact Doe relied on the prior version of Rule 23(e). See Eastham v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2013 WL 4776701 (S.D. Ohio, September 6, 2013); In re Behr Dayton Thermal Products, LLC, 2012 WL 559913 (S.D. Ohio, February 21, 2012); and Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878, 880 (S.D. Ohio 2005). The undersigned holds, however, that the Doe analysis is inapplicable after the 2003 amendment to Rule 23(e)(1)(A) because the plain language of the Rule clarifies that it only applies to a certified class, not a putative class.