Opinion
Case No. 04-4075-RDR.
December 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action brought by the plaintiff proceeding pro se. He asserts various civil rights claims and claims under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against six defendants. The claims arise out of two prior state court actions in which plaintiff was involved. This matter is presently before the court upon defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions.
The defendants have filed individual motions to dismiss but all have joined in the motion and memorandum filed by defendant Guy R. Steier. They have jointly requested sanctions in one motion.
In the motion to dismiss, the defendants contend that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. They assert that plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata. In the motion for sanctions, the defendants assert they are entitled to sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 because plaintiff's lawsuit is frivolous.
A brief review of the factual background is necessary to understand the arguments of the parties. In 1999 and 2000, defendant Doris Fahlstrom filed two separate cases in the District Court of Cloud County, Kansas. One of the cases was a contested probate proceeding involving the division of property from the estate of Madaline M. Young. The other case was a civil lawsuit to recover estate assets from the plaintiff and another. Defendant Thomas M. Tuggle, Chief Judge for the District Court of Cloud County, presided over these cases. During the course of the proceedings, defendants Guy R. Steier, Patrik W. Neustrom, Samantha P. Angell and Dana Brewer represented Fahlstrom. As a result of his involvement in these actions, plaintiff accepted a settlement on November 8, 2000 to resolve certain claims brought by Fahlstrom as well as real or potential claims that plaintiff might have against her. The settlement agreement was incorporated into a journal entry of dismissal filed on November 21, 2000 in the Cloud County District Court.
Despite the provisions of the settlement agreement, plaintiff filed an action in federal court in Wichita against Fahlstrom, Judge Tuggle, Steier, Neustrom, Angell and Brewer on August 30, 2002. He alleged that the defendants conspired to deny him due process and denied him due process in connection with the two state cases. Judge Marten granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on February 11, 2003. Cory v. Fahlstrom, 212 F.R.D. 593, 596 (D.Kan. 2003). Judge Marten determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff's action. Id. at 595. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. Cory v. Fahlstrom, 80 Fed.Appx. 656 (10th Cir. 2003). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on April 5, 2004. Cory v. Fahlstrom, 124 S.Ct. 1879 (2005). Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 29, 2004.
The complaint in this case is against the same defendants as plaintiff sued in the earlier federal case. Plaintiff raises the same claims he asserted in the earlier case, but adds one more cause of action, the RICO claim.
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002). For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint are taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.Ruiz, 299 F.3d at 1181; Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999); GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997). Further, in considering the complaint the court bears in mind that pro se pleadings should be liberally construed. Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1998); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Though res judicata is an affirmative defense, it may be raised on a 12(b)(6) motion when the allegations of the complaint show it plainly applies. Miller v. Shell Oil Co., 345 F.2d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 1965). In the instant case, it is clear from the face of the complaint that res judicata is applicable here. Plaintiff spells out the basis for this affirmative defense in his pleading. In fact, the whole point of the complaint appears to be an argument why the prior federal case was wrongly decided. He continues to assert the prior claims and adds the RICO claim, but spends several pages discussing why Judge Marten and the Tenth Circuit should not have determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred his first action.
An action is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata when the following criteria are met: (1) the identical cause of action was previously litigated; (2) to a final judgment on the merits; (3) by the same parties or their privies. Wilkes v. Wyoming Dept. Employment Labor Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 2002). "Under res judicata, . . . a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in the prior action." Id. at 503-04 (emphasis in original) (further quotations omitted).
When, as here, the subsequent claim was not, but could have been, brought in the earlier suit, we do not focus primarily on whether the precluded claim is based on similar operative facts or legal theories as those raised in the earlier suit, but instead focus on whether both actions arise from the same "cause of action." King v. Union Oil Co., 117 F.3d 443, 445 (10th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff, in response to the defendants' motion, has suggested that there was no judgment on the merits and there was not a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims in the prior suit. Plaintiff appears to argue that Judge Marten's reliance upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in that case precludes res judicata. He further contends that Judge Marten misapplied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in that case.
The court finds no merit to any of the arguments raised by the plaintiff. The prior case was decided on the merits and the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims. The application of theRooker-Feldman doctrine in that case does not prevent the application of res judicata here. Watson v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County, 70 Fed.Appx. 493, 496 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2003) (final judgment based upon Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude subsequent application of claim preclusion). Moreover, the subsequent RICO claim arose from the same causes of action as the prior case and thus should have, and could have, been brought in the prior lawsuit. Plaintiff cannot defeat the application of res judicata "by simply alleging new legal theories." Clark v. Haas Group, Inc., 953 F.2d 1235, 1238 (10th Cir. 1992). In sum, the court finds that the instant case must be dismissed based upon res judicata grounds.
The court shall next turn to the matter of sanctions. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is violated when an attorney or unrepresented party "present[s] to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper" for an improper purpose, such as to harass or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1). A person's actions must be objectively reasonable in order to avoid sanctions under Rule 11. Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. 1988). A litigant's pro se status may certainly be considered when determining whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments ("[T]he court has sufficient discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations."). However, Rule 11 "speaks of attorneys and parties in a single breath and applies to them a single standard." Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 548 (1991). Thus, the standard of objective reasonableness under the circumstances applies whether the person against whom sanctions are sought is an attorney, a pro se litigant, or both. Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D.Kan. 1998).
The court has carefully reviewed the recent litigation history of plaintiff, including his actions in filing and prosecuting this case. At this time, the court shall not award sanctions to the defendants. The court is not persuaded that plaintiff's position was objectively unreasonable given his pro se status and the difficulty in understanding the res judicata rules. The court notes that the concept of res judicata is a difficult one for some attorneys, and is particularly demanding for a pro se litigant. The court shall, however, warn plaintiff that any further actions against the defendants arising out of the state court cases will almost assuredly be concluded with an imposition of sanctions against him.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' joint motion to dismiss (Doc. # 21) be hereby granted. Plaintiff's action is hereby dismissed based upon res judicata.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the individual motions to dismiss filed by the defendants (Doc. ## 23, 24, 25 and 26) be hereby granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' joint motion for sanctions (Doc. # 30) be hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.