Opinion
C.A. No. 99A-04-008-NAB.
Submitted: August 9, 1999.
Decided: September 2, 1999.
Claimant's Motion to Affirm a Decision of the Industrial Accident Board. Motion Granted. Decision Affirmed.
Nancy Chrissinger, Esquire, Chrissinger Baumberger, Wilmington, Delaware, for Employer.
Cassandra F. Kaminski, Esquire, Young, Conaway, Stargatt Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware, for Claimant.
ORDER
Having reviewed the parties' submissions, as well as the record below, the Court finds and concludes as follows:
1. Posture. Claimant John E. Lewis worked for Corrado-American (Corrado or Employer) when he allegedly injured his left knee. He filed a petition for workers' compensation benefits, which was granted by the Industrial Accident Board (Board). Employer filed a timely appeal to this Court, and Claimant filed a motion to affirm.
2. Facts. Claimant started working for Corrado as a general laborer in June 1998. He had previously worked as a machine operator and welder for Forbes and Steel Wire. At Corrado, Claimant's duties included loading lumber on trucks, transporting the lumber to various work sites and then unloading it. He also filled water trucks, which entailed climbing a ladder onto the top of a truck, filling the tank with water from a hose and climbing down from the truck.
3. On September 9, 1998, Claimant felt a pull in his left leg as he climbed down from a truck. He believed that he had pulled a muscle, which he did not consider to be a serious injury. He saw a site paramedic, and apparently told the paramedic that he hurt himself while unloading heavy water containers. He saw his physician, whom he had seen on August 19, 1998 for left knee pain, on the day of the injury. His doctor referred him to Mohammed Kamali, M.D., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Kamali's notes indicate that Claimant could not remember a specific injury, but believed that he hurt himself at work. Dr. Kamali diagnosed Claimant with degenerative torn left medial and lateral cartilage.
4. On September 22, 1998, Dr. Kamali operated on Claimant's knee, and released him to return to work on January 8, 1999. On January 26, 1999, Claimant was seen by Leo Raisis, M.D., for an independent medical examination. Dr. Raisis diagnosed Claimant with moderate degenerative arthritis of the left knee.
5. Claimant filed a petition for compensation due for total disability benefits from September 9, 1998, to January 8, 1999, as well as medical expenses, medical witness fees and attorneys' fees. The Board granted his petition, and this appeal ensued.
6. Issues. Employer argues that "there was not sufficient evidence" to support a theory of either an identifiable work accident or cumulative detrimental effect. In so arguing, Employer raises many points, all of which are factual. Claimant responds that the Board's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and that the decision must be affirmed.
See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 72.1(b).
7. Standard of review. The function of this Court on review of a Board decision is to determine whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility or make factual findings. It merely determines if the evidence is adequate to support the Board's factual findings.
General Motors v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686 (1960).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994).
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1965).
8. Discussion. On appeal, Employer attempts to reargue the factual questions of the case. However, as counsel surely knows, the standard of review on fact questions is strictly limited: if the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court must affirm. This Court is not to substitute its judgment, even if it might have come to a different conclusion. In other words, the Court is to review the record to determine only whether substantial evidence exists, not whether there is other evidence that might have led to a different outcome.
General Motors v. Freeman, 164 A.2d at 688.
Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., Del. Supr., 549 A.2d 1102 (1988).
9. In this case, the Board made specific factual determinations on all the salient issues, and based its findings squarely on the evidence. As a threshold matter, the Board addressed the seeming lapses in Claimant's memory. Observing that Claimant was a "poor historian," the Board noted that his overall story was consistent and that the timing and sequence of Claimant's evidence was also convincing. The Board's task is to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility. The Board appropriately carried out this duty, and the Court will not disturb its findings regarding Claimant's credibility.
General Motors Corp. v. Cresto, Del. Super., 265 A.2d 42, 43 (1970).
10. The Board also resolved the conflicts in the testimony, as it is required to do. In so doing, the Board stated that the discrepancies in the medical records regarding Claimant's exact activities at the time he injured his knee were inconsequential for two reasons. First, medical records are not always complete or precise on such questions. Second, Claimant indicated that he did not believe a pulled muscle to be a serious injury at the time.
11. As to the medical evidence, the Board found the opinion of Dr. Kamali, who operated on Claimant's knee, to be more convincing than that of Dr. Raisis, at least in part because he had a more complete picture of Claimant's condition. The Board is free to rely on the testimony of either expert where the evidence is in conflict, and the substantial evidence requirement is met either way. In applying the law to Dr. Kamali's testimony, the Board relied on the well-established principle that a claimant who has a pre-existing condition is not precluded from receiving workers' compensation benefits if the work aggravated, accelerated or otherwise produced disability. The Board also noted that the work activities need not be the sole cause of the disability.
DiSabatino Bros. v. Wortman, Del. Supr., 453 A.2d 102 (1982).
Reese v. Home Budget Center, Del. Supr., 619, A.2d 907, 910 (1992).
Id.
12. Finally, the Board dispensed with several of Employer's arguments. First, the Board rejected the theory that Claimant's prior employment caused his knee injury because there was no evidence of prior knee complaints. Second, the Board rejected Employer's suggestion that Claimant must put forth only one theory of recovery in order to prevail. The Board correctly observed that Claimant amended the pre-trial memorandum after the medical evidence showed that a specific trauma occurred on September 9, 1998. If forced to choose, Claimant indicated that he would elect the specific injury theory. The Board also correctly stated that plaintiffs commonly proceed against tortfeasors on alternative theories of recovery.
13. Conclusion. The Court concludes that the Board's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and that the decision is free from errors of law. Thus, Claimant's motion must be Granted and the Board's decision
Affirmed.
It Is So ORDERED.