Other problems as to the meaning of the term "landowner" under ORS 222.170 may arise but we think that they can be solved in the same manner as similar problems of definition have been solved under other statutes where it is found necessary to define land ownership. See for example, Lantz v. Caraway, 180 Ind 484, 103 N.E. 335 (1913) (remainderman treated as landowner); Chan v. City of South Omaha, 85 Neb. 434, 123 N.W. 464 (1909) (administrator of estate and corporation owning property treated as landowners); City of Corpus Christi v. Cartwright, 288 S.W.2d 836 (Tex Civ App 1956) (owner of mineral estate considered as landowner in water control petition requiring a majority). The decree of the trial court is affirmed.
which the district is proposed to be created, and the regularity of all precedent proceedings, may be contested in the district court, and the court shall apply to the determination of such cause its full legal and equitable powers to the end that substantial justice may be done.' This statute was construed to provide for a true trial de novo and not for a trial under the substantial evidence rule in City of Corpus Christi v. Cartwright, 1956, Tex.Civ.App., 288 S.W.2d 836. This Court refused the application for writ of error. The validity of the de novo provision was not questioned in that case.
When interpreting an owner's right to act with regard to his or her property under the Water Code, as opposed to a district's authority to annex territory, Texas courts have held that mineral estate owners must be treated as separate owners with rights separate from those of the surface estate owner. See Nueces County Water Control Improvement Dist. No. 4 v. Wilson, 304 S.W.2d 281, 285-86 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (owners of severed mineral estates may petition for exclusion from a water control and improvement district without regard to the surface estate); City of Corpus Christi v. Cartwright, 288 S.W.2d 836, 837-38 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1956, writ ref'd) (owners of severed mineral estates must be counted separately from owners of surface estates in determining whether a majority of landowners petitioned to create a water improvement district). We must determine whether, in enacting Section 51.714, Section 52.521 and S.B. 1634, the Legislature intended for the owners of severed estates in land to have the ability to choose whether to remain in Santa Rita, or to opt into Glasscock.
We think, however, that the courts would hold that both the owners of the surface estates and the owners of the severed mineral estates are separate landowners for purposes of section 51.714 and 51.718. See City of Corpus Christi v. Cartwright, 288 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1956, writ ref'd) (holding owners of severed mineral estates and owners of surface estates were landowners for district creation purposes and had to be considered in determining the sufficiency of a petition filed under article 7880-10 [now section 51.013 of the Water Code]); see also Nueces County Water Control Improvement Dist. No. 4 v. Wilson, 304 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e) (court has jurisdiction to review denial by water district board of separate petitions filed under article 7880-76 [now section 51.692 of the Water Code] by owners of surface estates and oil and gas leases to exclude their interests in lands from the district). Thus, we think the courts would construe section 51.714 to permit the annexation of lands only owned by the landowner filing the petition for annexation.
In an instance in which the irregularity is deemed sufficiently serious, a proposed district has been declared to be without legal existence. City of Corpus Christi v. Cartwright, 288 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1956, writ ref'd) (court invalidated proposed district when relevant statute required petition to be signed by "majority in number of the holders of title to the lands [within the proposed district] and the owners of a majority in value of the lands therein" and the owners of the mineral estates were not considered in determining the sufficiency of the petition; under the facts presented, court found that less than a majority of landowners signed the initiatory petition); see generally, Yoakum County Water Control Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. First State Bank, 449 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. 1969); Fannin-Lamar-Delta Improvement Dist. No. 3 v. State, 73 S.W.2d 1101 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1934, writ dism'd) (irregularities in creation of levee district would make district bonds voidable, not void). Moreover, subsection (b) of section 54.701 of the code provides:
The Commissioners' Court, in determining whether the petition for the creation of the District was sufficient to comply with the requirements of Article 7882, acts in an administrative capacity. City of Corpus Christi v. Cartwright, 288 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.Civ.App., Corpus Christi, 1956, writ ref.). Article 5, Sec. 8 of our Constitution grants the District Courts "appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court, With such exceptions and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law."
See Art. 7880-18, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.Stat.' (The section referred to is the one here under attack.) In City of Corpus Christi v. Cartwright, Tex.Civ.App., 288 S.W.2d 836, 838, the court pointed out that the specific questions to be decided by the Commissioners Court as set out in art. 7880-19 are: 'Is the proposed district feasible and practicable?
See also State ex rel. Richardson v. Larkin, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 253, 90 S.W. 912, 916, (Writ Ref.); Wolf v. Young, Tex.Civ.App., 277 S.W.2d 744, (Ref. N.R.E.); City of Corpus Christi v. Cartwright, Tex.Civ.App., 288 S.W.2d 836, 838 and 29 C.J.S. Elections Secs. 69, 82, pp. 92, 106. The County Judge had the power to revoke his order calling the incorporation election before the election was held.