Opinion
No. 12R003766.
2012-07-30
CORPORATE SERVICE BUREAU, INC., Plaintiff(s) v. The LAW FIRM OF HALL & HALL, LLP d/b/a Hall & Hall P.C., Defendant(s).
Ellows Hymowitz & Epstein, P.C., New City, for Plaintiff. Thomas J. Hall, Esq., Staten Island, for Defendant.
Ellows Hymowitz & Epstein, P.C., New City, for Plaintiff. Thomas J. Hall, Esq., Staten Island, for Defendant.
ORLANDO MARRAZZO JR., J.
As is set forth below, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in its entirely, and the complaint is dismissed.
In this action plaintiff seeks to recover under the legal theory of unjust enrichment and a claim of account stated from defendant law firm for the agreed upon price and reasonable value for municipal services and title searching rendered to defendant's law firm at their request. These services include but are not limited to UCC, Tax Lien, Judgment and Bankruptcy Search within the State of New Jersey and copies, reports and disbursements to the Secretary of State New Jersey and Essex County Court Systems.
The Statute of limitations for unjust enrichment pursuant to CPLR § 213(2) and prevailing New York Law is six (6) years.
Put another way, the cause of action to recover damages for unjust enrichment which is indistinguishable from the breach of contract cause of action, must be commenced within the six-year statute of limitation set forth in CPLR § 213(2) ( see, EMD Constr. Corp. V. New York Dept. Of Hous. Prserv. & Dev., 70 A.D.3d 893, 894, 895 N.Y.S.2d 469 [2d Dept 2010]; 37 Park Dr. S., Inc. v. Duffy, 63 A.D.3d 1040, 1041, 881 N.Y.S.2d 481 [2d Dept 2009].)
The central issue surrounding the case at bar is whether or not plaintiff's cause of action for unjust enrichment and account stated is barred under the statute of limitations.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Recently the New York State Court of Appeals in HaHn Automotive Warehouse Inc. v. American Zurich Ins. Co., 18 N.Y.3d 765 [2012] visited the issue of the statute of limitations and its application. As far as this court can tell, this action is the first court action where the holding of HaHan Automotive Warehouse Inc., is being applied to a live controversy, thus perhaps making this decision to be a case of apparent first impression.
In HaHn Automotive Warehouse Inc v. American Zurich Ins. Co., the Court of Appeals determined that [u]nder CPLR 213(2), a claim for breach of contract is governed by a six-year statute of limitations. As a general principle, the statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues (see CPLR 203[a] ), that is, when all of the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred so that the party would be entitled to obtain relief in court (Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169, 175 [1986] ). In contract actions, we have recognized that a claim generally accrues at the time of the breach (see Ely–Cruikshank Co. v. Bank of Montreal, 81 N.Y.2d 399, 402 [1993] ). And, we have explained further that when the right to final payment is subject to a condition, the obligation to pay arises and the cause of action accrues, only when the condition has been fulfilled (John J. Kassner & Co. v. City of New York, 46 N.Y.2d 544, 550 [1979] ).
A consistent line of Appellate Division precedent holds that, where the claim is for payment of a sum of money allegedly owed pursuant to a contract, the cause of action accrues when the [party making the claim] possesses a legal right to demand payment (Minskoff Grant Realty & Mgt. Corp. v. 211 Mgr. Corp., 71 A.D.3d 843, 845, 897 N.Y.S.2d 485 [2d Dept 2010]; see also Kuo v. Wall St. Mtge.Bankers, Ltd., 65 A.D.3d 1089, 1090, 885 N.Y.S.2d 520 [2d Dept 2009]; Swift v. New York Med. Coll., 25 A.D.3d 686, 687, 808 N.Y.S.2d 731 [2d Dept 2006]; Kingsley Arms, Inc. v. Copake–Taconic Hills Cent. School Dist., 9 A.D.3d 696, 698, 780 N.Y.S.2d 805 [3d Dept 2004], lv dismissed3 N.Y.3d 767 [2004];Albany Specialties v. Shenendehowa Cent. School Dist., 307 A.D.2d 514, 516, 763 N.Y.S.2d 128 [3d Dept 2003] ). In other words, the statute of limitations in these cases was triggered when the party that was owed money had the right to demand payment, not when it actually made the demand ( see, HaHn Automotive Warehouse Inc v. American Zurich Ins. Co., 18 NY3d 765,770–771 [2012].)
Here, the services for which plaintiff seeks recovery were performed on April 21, 2006. Indeed invoices annexed to plaintiff's complaint state “report with copies were provided to you on April 21, 2006.” And the calender date of April 21, 2006 is when the services were allegedly rendered, and the date when the plaintiff allegedly was owed money and had the right to demand payment from the defendant. Thus April 21, 2006 is the date when the statute of limitations began to run. Plaintiff did not file its complaint until May 18, 2012, more than six (6) years after services were rendered, which means plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment are barred by the statute of limitations. This court rejects plaintiff's claim that the correct date when the statute of limitation began to run was from April 20, 2007, the date from when the plaintiff allegedly made a demand for payment from the defendant. As the Hahn court found to hold otherwise would allow potential plaintiffs, “to extend the statute of limitations indefinitely by simply failing to make a demand.” Id. at 771.
Accordingly, defendant has proved that plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment is time barred by the statute of limitations.
The court further notes that plaintiff in its pleadings fails to state a cause of action for breach of contract. The elements necessary to state a cause of action for breach of contract are, “the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance under the contract, the defendant's breach of that contract, and resulting damages” ( see Agway, Inc. v. Curtin, 161 A.D.2d 1040, 1041, 557 N.Y.S.2d 605;Furia v. Furia, 116 A.D.2d 694, 695, 498 N.Y.S.2d 12; quoted by JP Morgan Chase j J.H. Elec. Of New York, Inc., 69 A.D.3d 802, 803, 893 N.Y.S.2d 237 [2d Dept 2010].)
The court notes that plaintiff in its affirmation in opposition to defendant's motion attaches a copy of purported invoices. Plaintiff fails to attach a copy of the contract that they allegedly entered into with the defendant. Therefore, the complaint fails to state a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract ( seeCPLR 3211[a][7] ).
ACCOUNT STATED
In this action plaintiff seeks to recover on a claim for an account stated. It is well settled that under New York Law, “A claim for an account stated must demonstrate that (1) an account was presented, (2) the account was accepted as correct and (3) the debtor promised to pay the amount stated (Nanjing Textiles IMP/EXP Corp., Ltd. v. NCC Sportswear Corp., [2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56111, 2006 WL 2337186 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.11, 2006) ]; Jim Mar Corp. v. Aquatic Constr., 195 A.D.2d 868, 869, 600 N.Y.S.2d 790 [3d Dep't], lv. denied, 82 N.Y.2d 660, 605 N.Y.S.2d 6, 625 N.E.2d 591 (1993); Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl v. Daelen Corp., 59 A.D.2d 375, 399 N.Y.S.2d 222 [1st Dep't 1977]; quoted by Fox Linen Service, Inc., v. Brentwood Golf & Country Club, 26 Misc.3d 1225(A) [District Court Suffolk County 2010].)
Here, the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a valid account or the existence of sums due under a valid contract. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action for an account stated.
Accordingly, defendant's motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.