The legislature's intent is determined by reading the language used and construing the statute in its entirety. Id.; see Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 378-79 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied). We read every word as if it were deliberately chosen and presume that omitted words were excluded purposefully.
We read every word as if it were deliberately chosen and presume that omitted words were excluded purposefully. Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied). Finally, we also consider the objectives of the statute and the consequences of a particular interpretation.
We may not add words to the statute or ignore words the Legislature chose to include. Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
If the legislature intended to require an employer or carrier to file a report of injury after the first day of lost time, and then a second report if the injured employee subsequently died, the statute would say so. SeeCornyn v. Univ. Life Ins. Co. , 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) (explaining that courts must presume words used have a purpose and "every word excluded was excluded for a purpose"). As to section 409.008, it provides:
If the legislature intended to require an employer or carrier to file a report of injury after the first day of lost time, and then a second report if the injured employee subsequently died, the statute would say so. See Cornyn v. Univ. Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) (explaining that courts must presume words used have a purpose and "every word excluded was excluded for a purpose"). As to section 409.008, it provides:
We also presume that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that every word excluded was excluded for a purpose. Emeritus Corporation v. Blanco , 355 S.W.3d 270, 276 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2011, pet. denied) ; see alsoIn re M.N. , 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008) ; Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co. , 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied). As noted, provisions related to land development are found in Title 25 of the City Code.
We must "presume that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that every word excluded was excluded for a purpose." Emeritus Corporation v. Blanco , 355 S.W.3d 270, 276 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2011, pet. denied) ; Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co. , 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied). Subsection (b) states two predicates before one may directly pursue a partner: (1) having a judgment against the partnership; and (2) that judgment going unsatisfied for at least ninety days.
We must "presume that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that every word excluded was excluded for a purpose." Emeritus Corporation v. Blanco, 355 S.W.3d 270, 276 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2011, pet. denied) ; Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.–Austin 1999, pet. denied). These general rules apply unless enforcing the plain language of the statute as written would produce absurd results.
Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex.1999) (internal citations omitted); see alsoTex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 2013); Fresh Coat, Inc., 318 S.W.3d at 901; Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 378–79 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied). After the 2011 amendments, the express, unambiguous terms of section 141.032(g) of the Election Code prohibit a candidate from amending an application after the filing deadline and prohibit a party chair from accepting such an amendment.
A court reads every word as if it were deliberately chosen and must presume that omitted words were excluded purposefully. See Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied). Construction of a statute that would render a provision useless is not favored by law. Carson v. Hudson, 398 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1966, no writ). B. Because Section 408.221 States the Trial Court Will Determine the Amount of Attorney's Fees, Appellee Did Not Waive Her Claim