Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co.

21 Citing cases

  1. McLane Co. v. Strayhorn

    148 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App. 2004)   Cited 40 times
    Finding immunity barred suit because the statute granted discretion to the comptroller to determine the adequacy of collateral when it stated “similar types of collateral acceptable to the comptroller.”

    The legislature's intent is determined by reading the language used and construing the statute in its entirety. Id.; see Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 378-79 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied). We read every word as if it were deliberately chosen and presume that omitted words were excluded purposefully.

  2. Discover Prop. v. Tate

    298 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App. 2009)   Cited 13 times
    Adopting Vega-Garcia court's reasoning and holding that section 408.221(c) does not allow for recovery of attorney's fees in pursuit of attorney's fees

    We read every word as if it were deliberately chosen and presume that omitted words were excluded purposefully. Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied). Finally, we also consider the objectives of the statute and the consequences of a particular interpretation.

  3. Abbott v. Cnty. of Fort Bend, Tex.

    No. 01-21-00453-CV (Tex. App. Oct. 13, 2022)   Cited 1 times
    Involving a county issued mask mandate

    We may not add words to the statute or ignore words the Legislature chose to include. Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).

  4. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Diaz

    566 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. App. 2018)

    If the legislature intended to require an employer or carrier to file a report of injury after the first day of lost time, and then a second report if the injured employee subsequently died, the statute would say so. SeeCornyn v. Univ. Life Ins. Co. , 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) (explaining that courts must presume words used have a purpose and "every word excluded was excluded for a purpose"). As to section 409.008, it provides:

  5. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Diaz

    NO. 14-17-00295-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2018)

    If the legislature intended to require an employer or carrier to file a report of injury after the first day of lost time, and then a second report if the injured employee subsequently died, the statute would say so. See Cornyn v. Univ. Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied) (explaining that courts must presume words used have a purpose and "every word excluded was excluded for a purpose"). As to section 409.008, it provides:

  6. Tabrizi v. City of Austin

    551 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. App. 2018)   Cited 19 times

    We also presume that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that every word excluded was excluded for a purpose. Emeritus Corporation v. Blanco , 355 S.W.3d 270, 276 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2011, pet. denied) ; see alsoIn re M.N. , 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008) ; Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co. , 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied). As noted, provisions related to land development are found in Title 25 of the City Code.

  7. Lemon v. Hagood

    545 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App. 2017)   Cited 7 times
    Recognizing the need to obtain a judgment against the partnership before the collection provisions of section 152.306 are triggered

    We must "presume that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that every word excluded was excluded for a purpose." Emeritus Corporation v. Blanco , 355 S.W.3d 270, 276 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2011, pet. denied) ; Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co. , 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied). Subsection (b) states two predicates before one may directly pursue a partner: (1) having a judgment against the partnership; and (2) that judgment going unsatisfied for at least ninety days.

  8. State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Olivas

    509 S.W.3d 499 (Tex. App. 2016)   Cited 5 times
    Construing a statute, such as the Labor Code provisions relevant to the trial court's award of attorney's fees, presents issues of law that are reviewed de novo

    We must "presume that every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and that every word excluded was excluded for a purpose." Emeritus Corporation v. Blanco, 355 S.W.3d 270, 276 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2011, pet. denied) ; Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.–Austin 1999, pet. denied). These general rules apply unless enforcing the plain language of the statute as written would produce absurd results.

  9. Risner v. Harris Cnty. Republican Party

    444 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. App. 2014)   Cited 15 times
    In Risner, the party challenging the county chair's decision concerning the certification of an opponent to appear on the general election ballot filed and presented his case to the trial court well in advance of the ballot deadline and, therefore, afforded both the trial court and the appellate court sufficient time to consider and decide the matter without interfering with the election schedule for the general election.

    Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex.1999) (internal citations omitted); see alsoTex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 2013); Fresh Coat, Inc., 318 S.W.3d at 901; Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 378–79 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied). After the 2011 amendments, the express, unambiguous terms of section 141.032(g) of the Election Code prohibit a candidate from amending an application after the filing deadline and prohibit a party chair from accepting such an amendment.

  10. Transcon. Ins. v. Crump

    274 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. App. 2008)   Cited 13 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Crump, the insurance carrier did not prevail on judicial review of a worker's compensation award, and was held liable for the claimant's attorney's fees under section 408.221(c).

    A court reads every word as if it were deliberately chosen and must presume that omitted words were excluded purposefully. See Cornyn v. Universe Life Ins. Co., 988 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied). Construction of a statute that would render a provision useless is not favored by law. Carson v. Hudson, 398 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1966, no writ). B. Because Section 408.221 States the Trial Court Will Determine the Amount of Attorney's Fees, Appellee Did Not Waive Her Claim