Opinion
Cause No. IP99-1642-C-M/S
February 7, 2001
Barbara Malone Indianapolis, IN.
Daniel C. Emerson Bose McKinney Evans Indianapolis, IN.
David J. Parsons Littler Mendelson Pc Chicago, IL.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on defendant International Truck and Engine Corporation's ("International"), formerly known as Navistar International Transportation Corp., motion for summary judgment on plaintiff Larry K. Cornett's ("Cornett") claim of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. On August 29, 2000, International served its motion for summary judgment and accompanying documents upon Cornett's counsel. Cornett's response was due on or around November 12, 2000. Counsel for International indicates that it has received no response from Cornett, and the Court has confirmed that its docket shows no response. As a result, International's motion is unopposed. After reviewing the undisputed facts, the Court concludes that there is no evidence that International discriminated against Cornett, and that it is entitled to summary judgment on his Title VII claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS International's motion for summary judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
International operates an engine assembly plant in Indianapolis where it manufactures diesel truck engines. Charles Thatcher Affidavit ¶ 3. Cornett, who was represented by the United Automobile, Aerospace, Agricultural Implement Workers of America Local 98 ("UAW"), was a Spare Operator in International's Department 8, Trim Line. Id. ¶ 4; Eric Tharp Affidavit ¶ 1. An engine carrier conveyor system that transported engines throughout the assembly process ran through the area in which Cornett worked. Tharp Aff. ¶ 2. In Cornett's department, the conveyor carrier device was approximately six feet, two inches from the employees' standing surface. At various times, International covered pins that extended downward from the carrier device with protective rubber caps. Id. ¶ 3. Sometime in late 1998,
Because Cornett has not opposed International's statement of facts, the Court will assume the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by International are admitted to exist without controversy. See Local Rule 56.1(g).
International learned that an engine carrier had dropped down on one side as a result of a loose carrier nut.
Id. ¶ 4. In response, International removed the rubber protective caps from the pins so the maintenance and assembly workers could visually inspect the engine conveyor carrier as it passed through their work stations. Id. ¶ 5.
On or around March 2, 1998, International Safety/Medical Team Leader Steve Metz ("Metz") was summoned to talk to Cornett, who was refusing to work because the carrier pins were allegedly hitting him in the head. Steve Metz Affidavit ¶¶ 2-3. In response, International first considered whether an equipment modification or reconfiguration was feasible. International could not, however, raise the height of the entire engine carrier device because of the nature and size of the assembly. Id. ¶ 4. Instead, International concluded that giving Cornett a hard hat to protect his head was an effective solution to the pin concern. Id. ¶ 6.
On or around March 2, 1998, Metz provided Cornett with an approved hard hat and instructed him to wear it at any time he might hit his head. Id. ¶ 7. On March 3, 1998, Cornett presented a written medical restriction from his doctor that read "Larry Cornett suffers from headaches due to bumping his head in his work area. He needs a different work area or job assignment due to medical necessity." Id. ¶ 8. Metz subsequently met with Cornett and his union representatives. Metz explained that, based upon the medical restriction which was not confined to any specific hazard, Cornett would have to permanently wear the hard hat unless and until the doctor lifted the restriction. Id. ¶ 9. International then ordered Cornett to wear the hat in any area where he could hit his head. Id. ¶ 10. During these discussions, Cornett expressed his desire for a "medical bump" to a different job. Metz responded that obtaining a medical bump was a last option, which was only allowed within the UAW seniority scheme and only if engineering controls or personal protective equipment were not feasible solutions. Id. ¶ 11. Cornett then asked if the rubber protective covers could be restored. Metz responded that even if the caps were restored, based upon his doctor's note Cornett would still have to wear the hard hat. Id. ¶ 12.
On March 5, 1998, International supervisor Eric Tharp formally counseled Cornett for failing to wear his hard hat. Tharp Aff. ¶ 6. Tharp and Loss Prevention Director Bill Seagraves told Cornett that if he refused to wear the hard hat he would be terminated for insubordination. Id. ¶ 7. Cornett responded that he did not need to wear the hard hat since the pins had been recapped. Id. ¶ 8. Tharp and Seagraves explained, however, that the doctor's restriction was not limited to the pins in their uncapped state and that if Cornett got another doctor's statement clarifying the restriction they could lift the hard hat requirement. Id. ¶ 9.
About an hour after counseling Cornett, Tharp again noticed him without his hard hat. Tharp summoned the union steward and other witnesses and told Cornett to put on the hard hat. Cornett refused, and Tharp gave him a directive in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement procedure. Id. ¶ 10. Tharp gave Cornett two minutes to comply with the directive. Id. ¶ 11. Instead of complying, Cornett picked up the hard hat and threw it away. Id. ¶ 12. Cornett was then advised that he was discharged.
He turned over his company identification card and was escorted out of the plant. Id. ¶ 13. On March 6, 1998, International sent Cornett written notice that his employment was terminated effective March 5, 1998, based upon insubordination. Under the contract between International and the UAW, "the appropriate discipline for insubordination is discharge for a first offense." Thatcher Aff. ¶ 8.
II. STANDARDS A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997). It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which he relies. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment — even when in dispute. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
On certain occasions, the Seventh Circuit had suggested that a court approach a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case with a particular degree of caution. See, e.g., Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989). The language implied that summary judgment might be less appropriate in this context based upon the presence of issues of motive and intent. Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. As the Seventh Circuit has emphasized, however, these cases do not establish a heightened summary judgment standard for employment-related cases. Instead, the language from the prior cases simply means "that courts should be careful in a discrimination case as in any case not to grant summary judgment if there is an issue of material fact that is genuinely contestable, which an issue of intent often though not always will be." Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). Even when discriminatory intent is at issue, summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant presents no evidence to indicate motive or intent in support of his or her position. See Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. Further, the nonmovant will not defeat summary judgment merely by pointing to self-serving allegations without evidentiary support. Cliff v. Board of School Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1994).
B. TITLE VII STANDARDS
Because Cornett has not attempted to offer any direct evidence of race discrimination, he must proceed under the indirect method of proof. Under that method, Cornett must initially set forth, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If Cornett makes a showing sufficient to prove a prima facie case he will enjoy a rebuttable presumption of discrimination that shifts the burden of production to International to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its actions. Hughes v. Brown, 20 F.3d 745, 746 (7th Cir. 1994). International may do so by producing evidence, whether or not persuasive, of a nondiscriminatory reason. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2747 (noting that the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of intentional discrimination). If International succeeds in this task, the presumption dissolves and the burden of production shifts back to Cornett to demonstrate that the proffered reason for his termination is a pretext for discrimination. Essex v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 111 F.3d 1304, 1309 (7th Cir. 1997).
To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Cornett must establish that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting International's legitimate performance expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) International treated similarly situated persons not in the protected class more favorably. Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1999).
III. DISCUSSION
The undisputed facts in this case are relatively simple. In response to Cornett's complaint about the equipment in his work area injuring his head, International required him to wear a hard hat. For whatever reason, Cornett determined that he did not want to wear a hard hat. After being threatened with termination if he refused to wear the hat, Cornett threw it away. International subsequently terminated him for insubordination.
Cornett now complains that his termination was motivated by his race. He has put forth no evidence, however, that race played any part whatsoever in International's decision. He has not offered any evidence that International treated him any differently from employees outside the protected class that engaged in insubordination. Without such evidence, Cornett cannot establish even a prima facie case of discrimination. See Stalter, 195 F.3d at 289 (prima facie case requires plaintiff to show that similarly situated persons not in the protected class were treated more favorably).
Even assuming Cornett had established a prima facie case, International has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment: it considered his continued refusal to wear a hard hat in his work area as an act of insubordination. There is no doubt that this was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Cornett's employment. See, e.g., Flores v. Preferred Technical Group, 182 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Insubordination is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing an employee."). Because Cornett has produce no evidence that International's reason was a pretext for discrimination, his claim fails on that basis as well. Accordingly, International is entitled to summary judgment on Cornett's claim under Title VII.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cornett has failed to present sufficient evidence from which the Court could find a genuine issue of material fact on his Title VII race discrimination claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS International's motion for summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.