Opinion
1:23-cv-12361
10-13-2023
ROBERT JAMES CORNETT, Plaintiff, v. MICHIGAN, STATE OF, and JOHN DOES, all parties from case number 239003227H 55th Circuit Court, M22034GC 96th District Court, and 231442AGC 80th District Court Defendants.
THOMAS LUDINGTON, DISTRICT JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Patricia T. Morris, United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the case be sua sponte dismissed in its entirety and that the pending motions be denied as moot. (ECF Nos. 7 & 9.)
II. REPORT
A. Introduction
On September 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant pro se Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff states that the basis for this Court's jurisdiction is “Second Amendment, Due Process, Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
Plaintiff's entire statement of his claim reads: “These three cases done in the NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN collectively demonstrate a continued course of conduct violating my rights under color of law, collectively they form stated claim for relief to petition this Court for redress, all rights reserved including amending this complaint in explicit detail and naming additional parties to both plaintiffs and defense.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Plaintiff's requested relief is for “[r]eversing void judgments on the record and satisfying the 52,000,000.00 balance.” (Id.)
B. Standards
In the instant case, Plaintiff paid the filing fee and did not seek to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP); therefore, the complaint will not be screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). However, federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction. U.S. v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995). Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, if a court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
There are two ways this Court can obtain subject matter jurisdiction: first, the United States Code provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This statute confers on the federal district courts what is known as “federal question jurisdiction.” Second, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction arises when the matter is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Dismissal sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate where a complaint's allegations are “totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974); Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999) (same).
The Supreme Court has established that “a complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint is also frivolous and can be dismissed if it provides no basis for federal jurisdiction. Carlock v. Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Since there is no basis for federal jurisdiction apparent on the face of Carlock's complaint . . . the district court properly dismissed the action as frivolous and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (West 1998); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).”); Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS Employees, 164 F.3d 936, 941 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing caselaw for the proposition that a complaint is frivolous and can be dismissed on screening if the subject matter is outside the court's jurisdiction). In addition to the screening statute, Carlock also cited Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), which states that “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”
C. ANALYSIS
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court has no power to overturn state court judgments. The Sixth Circuit has explained the foundation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as follows:
The doctrine originates from two Supreme Court decisions, which were rendered 60 years apart. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In both cases the plaintiffs challenged the validity of state court decisions by filing suit in federal district court. In Rooker, the plaintiff asked the district court to render the state court judgment against him “null and void.” See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414-15. In Feldman, the plaintiffs filed suit against the actual state court that had rejected the plaintiffs' applications to practice law. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 478-79. In both cases the Supreme Court dismissed the suits for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, only the Supreme Court, and not the lower federal courts, enjoys appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414-15; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 478-79.Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 857 (6th Cir. 2006). Lower federal courts also lack jurisdiction to review any federal claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court's decision. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87. A plaintiff's federal claim is inextricably intertwined if the claim can succeed only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998) (“‘Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.'”) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1990)).
Here, Plaintiff' asks the court to reverse his alleged void state court judgments. Therefore, I suggest that Plaintiff's requests for relief are unavailing under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
I further suggest that Plaintiff's complaint is barred by the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Generally, suits challenging the fact or duration of confinement must be brought under the habeas corpus statutes and not § 1983. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). In Heck v. Humphrey, however, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether this rule should be modified where a prisoner does not seek release but instead seeks an award of monetary damages. The Court held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
This “favorable termination” rule bars § 1983 claims that “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of a prior conviction or sentence that has not been overturned. Id. at 487. However, if “the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.” Id. (emphasis in original). The favorable termination rule “is not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a convicted criminal is no longer incarcerated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 490, n.10; Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995). In addition, challenges based on procedural defects rather than erroneous results are also subject to the limitation announced in Heck. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 650, 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (if established, procedural defect would imply the invalidity of the deprivation of good-time credits and thus, was Heck-barred).
Here, Plaintiff's complaint alleges that his prosecution and sentencing were fraught with error and he asks this Court to overturn those results. Unfortunately for Plaintiff these claims are Heck-barred.
Accordingly, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed in its entirety and the case dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, I recommend that this case be sua sponte DISMISSED.
IV. REVIEW
Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. A party may respond to another party's objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155; Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1981). The parties are advised that making some objections, but failing to raise others, will not preserve all the objections a party may have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). According to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this magistrate judge.
Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,” etc.
Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.