Opinion
1:23-cv-00476-BAM (PC)
09-12-2023
JULIO CORNELIO, Plaintiff, v. B. SCOTT, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO ACTION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM (ECF NO. 15)
BARBARA A. MCAULIFFE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Julio Cornelio (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 7, 2023, the Court screened Plaintiff's complaint and granted him leave to either file a first amended complaint or notify the Court that he was willing to proceed only on a claim against Defendant Scott for failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed on July 27, 2023, is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 15.)
I. Screening Requirement and Standard
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b); 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiffs allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Mos s, 572 F.3d at 969.
II. Plaintiff's Allegations
Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, Corcoran. The events in the amended complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was housed at North Kern State Prison (“NKSP”) in Delano, California. Plaintiff names Defendant B. Scott, a correctional officer at North Kern State Prison, as the sole defendant.
Plaintiff generally alleges a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In particular, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
On August 29, 2022, at approximately 9:00 AM [at] North Kern State Prison, Facility B Building 5, while performing his duties as the Control Booth Officer, Defendant Scott failed to provide reasonable safety for the Plaintiff, a protective custody prisoner. During this time, Building 5 was housing protective custody prisoners and mainline prisoners, sequestered by two tiers. The protective custody prisoners were housed in the lower-tier cells and mainline prisoners were housed in upper-tier cells per the prison's COVID-19 quarantine restrictions.(ECF No. 15 at p. 5.)
Plaintiff further alleges:
Wherefore, it was foreseeable for Defendant Scott to deliberate before unsecuring [sic] any of the building's cell doors to preclude violence on protective custody prisoners. Notwithstanding, Defendant Scott did not act reasonable in response to danger when he [a]llegedly “inadvertentantly [sic] pushed the button on cell 104“ with reckless disregard for the safety of the cell's two occupants: 1) Inmate Cornelio (Plaintiff) and 2) Inmate Saldana (BP8347 B5-104U), seeing that he “was directed by Floor Officer L. Martinez to open cell 209.” (See Exhibit A [ ]). Further, prior to Defendant unsecuring [sic] cell 104, he was monitoring the shower program of mainline prisoners with Inmate Ramirez (B59653 B5-226L) and Inmate Melendez (B59649 B5-226U) in the possession of potential weapons, a mop and a broom, in which they utilized, as he enabled them to enter cell 104, accompanied with Inmate Sliders (B59527 B5-208L), with the intent to maliciously and sadistically attack unsecured protective custody prisoners. (See Exhibit B: Rules Violation Report Log No. 1217571, page 1.).(Id. at pp. 6-7.)
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges:
As the acting control booth officer, it was Defendant Scott's responsibility to be astute and vigilant of the particular identifiable dangerous conditions of allowing violent prisoners, documented as a security threat group to be allowed free reign with access to tools and other items that can be used as weapons, without proper supervision; and simultaneously, failing to maintain locks in working order to secure the safety and protection of group risk prisoners that are targeted by active gang members; notwithstanding, sufficient knowledge of the substantive risk factors of his careless and reckless actions was deliberate indifference to the reasonable safety he is required by the Constitution to provide to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Plaintiff was viciously assaulted and has sustained injuries omitted from the prison's medical report.(Id. at p. 7.)
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
III. Discussion
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, no matter where they are housed, prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference . . .” Labatad v. Corrs. Corp. of Amer., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners because being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34; Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). However, prison officials are liable under the Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate indifference occurs when an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841; Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040. Mere negligent failure to protect an inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983 . Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (explaining “deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence”).
Although the Court found that Plaintiff's original complaint stated a cognizable claim, Plaintiff's amended complaint no longer includes sufficient factual allegations demonstrating that Defendant Scott's actions rose the level of deliberate indifference. Rather, according to the amended complaint, Defendant Scott “inadvertently” or “carelessly” opened the cell door, which amounts to negligence, not deliberate indifference. (ECF No. 15 at pp. 6, 7 and p. 11 [Ex. A]). Plaintiff alleges “reckless disregard,” (id. at p. 6), but this is not sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Rather, for purposes of an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, “the prison official must subjectively have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). “The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation when: (1) the deprivation alleged is “objectively, sufficiently serious” and (2) the prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” acting with deliberate indifference.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). In the circumstances presented here, Plaintiff does not adequately allege that Defendant Scott knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety or that he acted with the requisite culpable state of mind.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons stated, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief under § 1983. Despite being provided with the relevant legal standard applicable to his claim, Plaintiff has been unable to state a claim. Further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, the Court HEREBY DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a district judge to this action.
Further, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted. These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate's factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
IT IS SO ORDERED.