Opinion
Argued May 5, 2000.
July 26, 2000.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.), entered August 2, 1999, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Michael H. Singer, P.C., Great Neck, N.Y. (The Breakstone Law Firm, P. C. [Jay L.T. Breakstone] of counsel), for appellants.
Fiedelman McGaw, Jericho, N.Y. (Andrew Zajac of counsel), for respondent.
Before: THOMAS R. SULLIVAN, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, ANITA R. FLORIO, LEO F. McGINITY, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff Margaret Cormack allegedly tripped and fell on a raised iron hinge cover plate as she descended a ramp leading away from the defendant's ferry to the dock. After depositions were completed, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that it had no notice of the alleged defect. The Supreme Court granted the motion on the ground that the plaintiffs would not be able to make out a prima facie case since they could not state exactly what caused the injured plaintiff's fall. Although the motion to dismiss the complaint was properly granted, we disagree with the Supreme Court's reason for doing so. A plaintiff could make out a prima facie case showing the existence of negligence and causation by way of circumstantial evidence. Thus, the Supreme Court should not have granted the motion merely because neither of the plaintiffs would be able to testify exactly how the accident occurred (see generally, Bradish v. Tank Tech Corp., 216 A.D.2d 505).
The defendant, however, met its burden of showing a lack of notice of the allegedly defective condition, and that it did not create the condition complained of. The burden therefore shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of a question of fact. Since the proof offered by the plaintiffs was insufficient, the defendant's motion was properly granted (cf., Napoli v. Mazza, 262 A.D.2d 466; O'Hanlon v. Bodouva, 251 A.D.2d 474; see generally, Dwoskin v. Burger King Corp., 249 A.D.2d 358; see generally, Van Skyock v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Co., 265 A.D.2d 545).
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.