Opinion
No. 1:01cv01
June 27, 2002
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
In accordance with the opinion filed this date,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket # 23) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendant, and this case is dismissed with prejudice.
OPINION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This action, originally filed pro se, alleges race discrimination in hiring, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e). The claim initially was filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which issued a right-to-sue letter to plaintiff on October 2, 2000. Plaintiff filed the instant action on January 2, 2001.
Plaintiff subsequently obtained legal representation and the matter now is before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
I.
Plaintiff Huey Copeland began working for General Motors in 1971 as an hourly employee. In 1973, he obtained the position of Manufacturing Supervisor with Delphi Automotive Systems ("Delphi"), which was then owned by General Motors. Copeland worked at the Alpine Trim Plant. Copeland was a Manufacturing Supervisor for Delphi for thirteen years.
Beginning in 1986, Copeland held the position of Statistical Process Control Trainer and Coordinator. His job responsibilities included training personnel on how to use statistical process control ("SPC") and problem-solving processes to work through problems and to reduce the number of defects in their particular areas.
Between 1992 and 1996, Copeland was employed in the Quality Systems Engineering area. He was promoted to Senior Quality Analyst in 1992, and to General Supervisor of Quality Systems Engineering in 1995, where he was responsible for assisting manufacturing with outgoing quality improvement, data collection, SPC training, problem solving and production part approval process.
From 1996 to September 1998, Copeland was the Quality Systems-9000 ("QS-9000") General Supervisor. In this role, he was assigned to QS 9000 coordination, implementation and maintenance and was the QS 9000 lead auditor.
In 1998, while Copeland held the QS-9000 Supervisor position, certain business groups owned by Delphi were sold to Lear Corporation, including the Alpine Trim Plant where Copeland worked. Copeland remained with the facility under the ownership of Lear. He continued to hold the same position until May 2000, when he became a Statistical Quality Analyst. As part of the sale to Lear, General Motors advised employees that if they were to accept employment with Lear and were subsequently involuntarily terminated within three years for reasons other than cause, they would be given preferential hiring consideration for open positions at a General Motors employing unit.
Defendant argues that to the extent plaintiff raises a claim under the preferential hiring provision, no genuine dispute exists that plaintiff not was involuntarily terminated by Lear (indeed, he continues to be employed by Lear to this day). As a consequence, defendant asserts, it is undisputed that plaintiff is not eligible for preferential hiring.
The complaint raises no claim under the preferential hiring provision and plaintiff has raised no such claim in his brief in opposition to summary judgment. The issue, therefore, is not presented in this litigation.
In May 1999, Delphi's Burlingame facility advertised for three positions: Quality Engineer, Manufacturing Supervisor and Maintenance Supervisor. Plaintiff submitted a cover letter and resume for two of the three positions, Quality Engineer and Manufacturing Supervisor. The Supervisor of Personnel Administration, Ken Van Solkema, received and reviewed all applications for the three positions. After reviewing plaintiffs application, Van Solkema did not forward it to the department head for the Manufacturing Supervisor position. Van Solkema has testified that he determined that Copeland's floor supervisory experience, last obtained fourteen years previously, was not sufficiently recent.
Van Solkema did forward plaintiffs resume and cover letter to the head of the department, James Palma, on the Quality Engineer position. Palma testified that plaintiff was not selected for an interview because his resume and cover letter did not demonstrate an established skill set in the particular aspect of Quality Engineer that was needed in the department, that is, sophisticated statistical problem solving methodologies. As a result, Copeland was not interviewed for either position.
Plaintiff acknowledges that nothing in his cover letter or his resume indicates his race. Both Van Solkema and Palma testified that they were unaware of plaintiffs race at the time of their review. Plaintiff offers no competing evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to suggest that either Van Solkema or Palma knew his race. Indeed, Van Solkema testified that even though Copeland was a former employee of Delphi, no one at the Burlingame plant had access to Delphi employee information for any employee employed at any facility other than Burlingame. He testified that he had no access to Copeland's Delphi employment record. (Van Solkema dep. at 24-28.)
II.
B. Standard of Review
On a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The court, however, "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Michigan Paytel Joint Venture v. City of Detroit, 287 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of pointing the court to the absence of evidence in support of some essential element of the opponent's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). Once the moving party has made such a showing, the burden is on the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id.
In order to prove that a triable issue exists, the nonmoving party must do more than rely upon allegations, but must come forward with specific facts in support of his or her claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2002). After reviewing the whole record, the court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Booker v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). "[D]iscredited testimony is not [normally] considered a sufficient basis" for defeating the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512 (1984)). In addition, where the factual context makes a party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87; Street, 886 F.2d at 1480.
B. Race Discrimination
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court set forth the framework for analyzing cases alleging intentional workplace discrimination based on indirect evidence. Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case by demonstrating: (1) that he belongs to a racial minority; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite his qualifications he was rejected; and (4) that after his rejection, the position remained open or was filled by someone from a non-protected group. See id. at 802; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n. 6 (1981). As the Supreme Court has observed, this test may be summarized as requiring that plaintiff demonstrate that he "applied for an available position for whichhe was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
Once plaintiff has come forward with evidence of a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's actions. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Should the defendant carry its burden of production, plaintiff must have the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered were a mere pretext for discrimination. Id.
Defendant asserts that plaintiff has failed to prove a prima facie case or to rebut defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its hiring decision because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the individuals making the employment decision were aware of plaintiffs race.
Few cases have addressed the question whether the employer must be aware of the race of the applicant in order to be guilty of discriminatory conduct. However, as the court noted in Jackson v. Kenney, 762 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Mo. 1991),
common sense dictates that a plaintiff must also establish as part of [his] prima facie showing not simply that he is a member of a racial minority but, in addition, that the defendant knew [his] race. Under circumstances where it cannot reasonably be inferred that the defendant knew the plaintiffs race, then the plaintiff cannot prove as a matter of simple logic — what he must ultimately prove: that the defendant discriminated against [him] on the basis of [his] race.
Id. at 866. Such a conclusion is consistent with what the Supreme Court has held is the "ultimate question" in a disparate treatment case — "whether plaintiff has proved that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him] because of his race . . ." St.Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). A defendant cannot be said to have intentionally discriminated unless the defendant had the knowledge necessary to form that intent.
Indeed, in Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 884 (6th Cir. 1996), the Sixth Circuit has addressed the knowledge question in the context of applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to a disability case. The Kocsis court held that "the defendant cannot discriminate because of a disability if it has no knowledge of the disability." Id. (citing Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir. 1993) (under Rehabilitation Act of 1973, employer cannot discriminate on the basis of a mental disability when employer had no knowledge of such disability). Similarly here, defendant may not be said to have discriminated on the basis of race if it had no knowledge of plaintiffs race. See also Palmer v. Health Care Retirement, Inc., No. 96-3378, 1997 WL 135451(6th Cir. Mar. 24, 1997) (applying knowledge requirement of Kocsis to race discrimination case).
It unquestionably is true that mere denials on the part of decision makers will not necessarily establish that a defendant was unaware of the applicant's race. Circumstantial evidence such as the fact that decision makers had access to information about a plaintiffs race through prior employment records or references on the resume — may raise a genuine issue of fact on the question. See Jackson, 762 F. Supp. at 866. Nevertheless, plaintiff must provide some factual basis to support a legitimate inference that defendant was aware of plaintiffs race at the time it was making the decision in question.
Here, defendant has expressly denied knowledge of plaintiffs race and plaintiff has introduced no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that any decision maker was aware of plaintiffs race at the time the employment decisions were made. Although plaintiff previously was employed by a division of Delphi, it is undisputed that the decision makers at the Burlingame facility had no access to plaintiffs employment records because he worked at a different facility. As a consequence, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on his claim of intentional race discrimination in hiring.
I therefore conclude that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim of race discrimination.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket # 23) is granted.