"Cooper stopped using the CPU when he entered a nursing home, but the suit has continued on behalf of three intervenors who are similarly aggrieved." Cooper v. United States Postal Service, 577 F.3d 479, 484 (2d Cir. 2009). In the court's April 18, 2007 decision on the parties' motions for summary judgment, the court determined that religious displays at the Manchester CPU violated the Establishment Clause and issued a permanent injunction ordering the removal of religious displays from the Manchester CPU and further ordering the Postal Service to ensure compliance with the court's injunction prohibiting CPUs from acting in a manner that proselytizes or advances religion.

Nearly every court of appeals has held that standing in this context “requires only direct and unwelcome personal contact with the alleged establishment of religion.”Red River Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 679 F.3d 1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 2012) ; see also Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 491 (2d Cir. 2009) (plaintiff who had “direct contact with religious displays that were made a part of his experience using the postal facility nearest his home” had standing); Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1253 (“[S]piritual harm resulting from unwelcome direct contact with an allegedly offensive religious ... symbol ... suffices to confer Article III standing.”); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Found., Inc. v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff had standing to challenge display in courtroom because he had “direct, unwelcome contact with the Ten Commandments display”); Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[D]irect contact with an unwelcome religious exercise or display works a personal injury distinct from and in addition to each citizen's general grievance against unconstitutional government conduct.”); Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989) (“allegations of direct, personal contact” with religious icon in city logo gave rise to stan

Rather, there are a host of factors that can bear on the fairness of an attribution of a challenged action to the State.” Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 491 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Three main tests have emerged:

’ ” Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass'n, FA, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir.2005) (additional quotation marks omitted); see also Fabrikant, 691 F.3d at 206 (“A plaintiff pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is ... required to show state action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 491 (2d Cir.2009) (“The Fourteenth Amendment, and, through it, the First Amendment, do not apply to private parties unless those parties are engaged in activity deemed to be state action.” (alterations, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Next, it is unclear whether plaintiff has standing to seek relief from the alleged wrongs committed by defendants. For a plaintiff to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution requires that a person have standing. Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 489 (2d Cir. 2009). A plaintiff does not have standing when he raises only a "generalized grievance" that is "shared equally by all of a large class of citizens."

This limitation is effectuated through the requirement of standing." Cooper v. U.S. Postal Service, 577 F.3d 479, 489 (2d Cir. 2009). The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing," rooted in Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, consists of three elements: (1) an "injury in fact," by which is meant "an invasion of a legally protected interest"; (2) "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of"; and (3) a likelihood that "the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."

To satisfy this jurisdictional requirement, “(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct at issue; and (3) the injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 489 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have found standing in the Establishment Clause context for a plaintiff who alleged that he “was made uncomfortable by direct contact with religious displays.”

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs lack standing under Article III, which limits the judicial power of the United States to the resolution of cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To satisfy this jurisdictional requirement, “(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct at issue; and (3) the injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.”Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 489 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have found standing in the Establishment Clause context for a plaintiff who alleged that he “was made uncomfortable by direct contact with religious displays.”

That imprecision is manifest in the Establishment Clause context. Courts regularly have noted that it can be difficult to determine whether an Establishment Clause plaintiff has alleged an "injury in fact" for purposes of Article III standing. See, e.g., Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 489-90 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[S]o far the [Supreme] Court has announced no reliable and handy principles of analysis. . . . Lower courts are left to find a threshold for injury and determine somewhat arbitrarily whether that threshold has been reached. . . .

Unlike those stores, Zazzle both issued postage and determined what content was appropriate to appear on that postage. The Second Circuit's decision in Cooper v. USPS, 577 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2009), supports the Court's conclusion. Cooper held that a private postal facility operated by a church acted as the state when it sold postal products and processed mail pursuant to a contract with the Postal Service, such that the facility's display of religious material violated the Establishment Clause.