Opinion
3:21-cv-00086-YY
10-25-2021
AMANDA COOPER, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OREGON, WASHINGTON COUNTY, JASON JONES, Personally; JANICE MONTES, Personally; CHRISTINA STEPHENS, Personally; and JOHN & JANE DOES 1-5, Personally, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Youlee Yim You United States Magistrate Judge
FINDINGS
Plaintiff Amanda Cooper (“Cooper”) brings this action for monetary relief against defendants the State of Oregon and Washington County, and Jason Jones, Janice Montes, Christina Stephens, and John and Jane Does 1-5 in their individual capacities. Am. Compl., ECF 4. Against all defendants, Cooper asserts common law tort claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) (First and Third Claims). Against Washington County and the individual defendants, Cooper brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of her Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights (Second and Fourth Claims). Cooper's claims arise out of her 2017 sentence for a probation revocation in Washington County Circuit Court and the subsequent reversal of this sentence by the Oregon Court of Appeals in 2019.
This court has federal question jurisdiction over the federal law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
The State of Oregon has filed an Answer with nine affirmative defenses, and now moves for summary judgment on all of Cooper's claims. See Answer, ECF 5; Mot. Summ. J. (“State Mot.”), ECF 6. Washington County has filed a motion to dismiss all of Cooper's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss (“County Mot.”), ECF 10. The court has considered the parties' briefing, as well as oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the State of Oregon's motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED, Washington County's motion to dismiss should be GRANTED, and this case should be remanded to Washington County Circuit Court to resolve the remaining state law tort claims against the county.
I. Background Facts
Sometime in late 2016, Washington County Community Corrections (“WCCC”) department employee Christina Stephens (“Stephens”) signed an arrest warrant for Cooper for alleged probation violations, namely (1) failure to reside in clean and sober housing, and (2) changing residences without giving notice. Am. Compl. 2-3, ECF 4. On December 18, 2016, WCCC probation officer Jason Jones (“Jones”) arrested Cooper pursuant to the arrest warrant signed by Stephens, and Cooper was detained in Washington County Jail. Id. at 3. The following day, Cooper was arraigned and held over for her probation violation hearing. On January 19, 2017, Washington County Circuit Court Judge Charlie Bailey found Cooper in violation of the terms of her probation, revoked her probation, and sentenced her to 44-months in the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”). Id; State Mot. 3-4, ECF 6. Sometime in 2019, Cooper was released by ODOC after serving some number of months less than her 44-month sentence. Id. On July 10, 2019, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed Cooper's revocation and sentence holding that “the record does not provide a basis on which the trial court could revoke [Cooper's] probation.” State v. Cooper, 298 Or.App. 445, 448 (2019).
State v. Amanda Cooper, Washington County Circuit Court No. C151368CR, Docket Entry December 19, 2016.
The Amended Complaint states that Cooper was sentenced for the probation revocation on January 17, 2017. However, Washington County's motion to dismiss states that, according to Oregon eCourt Case Information, the correct date is January 19, 2017. County Mot. 1 n.2, ECF 10. In Cooper's response, she agrees that she was sentenced on January 19, 2017. Resp. County Mot., ECF 15. Accordingly, that date is used here.
The length of Cooper's detention in Washington County jail and in the custody of ODOC is not clear from Cooper's Amended Complaint. Cooper does not provide the start and end dates for her period of detention, and the Amended Complaint contains unclear references to Cooper serving “33-months, and 26 months after January 25, 2017, ” “Washington County's twenty-six month wrongful detention, ” and a “twenty-two month wrongful detention.” Am. Compl. 2-5, ECF 4. In Cooper's proposed second Amended Complaint contains similar language. Resp. County Mot., Ex. A, ECF 15-1. Cooper, however, makes several references to serving less than her full, 44-month sentence with ODOC; thus, that general reference is used here.
II. State's Motion for Summary Judgment
The state moves for summary judgment on Cooper's tort claims based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. State Reply 5, ECF 17. Additionally, the state moves for summary judgment on Cooper's section 1983 and tort claims against the state Doe defendants based on lack of personal involvement and causation. State Mot. 5, ECF 6.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party does so, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. at 324 (citing Fed.Rule.Civ.P. 56(e)).
In determining what facts are material, the court considers the underlying substantive law regarding the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Otherwise stated, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49. The court “does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Balint v. Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). “Reasonable doubts as to the existence of material factual issue are resolved against the moving parties and inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Addisu v. Fred Meyer, 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
B. Claims Against the State
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” The Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against a non-consenting state by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. See Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). “State sovereign immunity also proscribes federal suits against state agencies and state departments.” Atwood v. Strickler, No. 3:19-CV-01699-IM, 2020 WL 3549662, at *3 (D. Or. June 29, 2020) (citing Papason v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276-78 (1986)); see also Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is well established that agencies of the state are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from private damages or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court.”). “[T]he Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of relief sought[.]” Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Papason, 478 U.S. at 276); see also Brooks v. Sulpher Springs Valley Elec. Co-Op, 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.1991) (“[t]he Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional bar . . . applies whether the relief sought is legal or equitable in nature”).
Here, there is no question that Cooper has asserted negligence, IIED, and NIED claims against the state, and there is no question that the state has not consented to be sued. Because the state has not waived its immunity, the state is entitled to summary judgment, and Cooper's claims against the state must be dismissed. See McCall v. Oregon, No. 3:12-cv-00465-PK, 2013 WL 6196966, at *8 (D. Or. Nov. 13, 2013) (finding that the state of Oregon did not waive its immunity and dismissing the plaintiff's claims).
To the extent Cooper seeks to hold any state agency liable, those claims are equally barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Cooper does not name any specific state agency as a defendant in this case, but the Amended Complaint refers to the “Parole Board” and the state's “post-prison supervision department, ” and alleges that the agency or agencies “wrongfully violated plaintiff” by causing-in some unspecified manner-Cooper's initial arrest and subsequent detention. Am. Comp. 2-3, ECF 4. However, it is clear under the Eleventh Amendment that “agencies of the state are immune from private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court.” Brown v. California Dep't of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Sato v. Orange Cty. Dep't of Educ., 861 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2017) (under the Eleventh Amendment, state agencies are immune from suits for damages or injunctive relief). Thus, summary judgment must be granted with respect to any claims Cooper seeks to assert against the Parole Board or any other state agency. See Muhammad v. Kelly, No. 6:21-CV-107-SI, 2021 WL 3493474, at *7 (D. Or. Aug. 9, 2021) (granting the state's motion for summary judgment based on Eleventh Amendment immunity).
C. Claims Against State “Doe” Defendants
The state moves for summary judgment on Cooper's section 1983 and tort claims against the state Doe defendants on the basis that Cooper has not and cannot demonstrate that they caused any of her alleged injuries. State Mot. 2, ECF 6. In her Amended Complaint, Cooper identifies these Doe defendants as “state Parole Board members and/or Justice Department employees, ” and alleges that they, among others, were responsible for her arrest, detention in Washington County, and detention with ODOC. Am. Compl. 2-3, ECF 4. In her proposed Second Amended Complaint, Cooper expands the Doe defendants to include “state Judicial, Justice, CCCF [Coffee Creek Correctional Facility] and or Corrections Department employees.” Resp. County Mot., Ex. A, at 2, ECF 15-1.
1. Section 1983 Claims
To state a section 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.” Benavidez v. Cty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). A section 1983 claim also requires proof of causation, and allegations regarding causation “must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Menefee v. Washington Cty. Cir. Ct., No. 3:20-CV-01647-AC, 2020 WL 7212564, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2020) (citing Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988)). Thus, a plaintiff “‘must plead that each government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the constitution.'” Smith v. Meyer, No. 6:21-CV-00997-IM, 2021 WL 3172921, at *3 (D. Or. July 26, 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Here, Cooper does not plausibly claim that any Parole Board member was involved in any alleged violation of her constitutional rights under the Fourth or Eighth Amendments. Cooper claims that the Doe “Parole Board defendants . . . drafted[, ] effectuated[, ] and approved her arrest and detention.” Am. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF 4. However, the state correctly points out that “[t]he [Parole] Board has no authority over the supervision of people on supervised probation to the court.” Arthur Decl. 2, ECF 8. Additionally, “[t]he Board . . . has no authority over the actions of the court in making [a] revocation determination for people on supervised probation.” Id.
Additionally, Cooper does not allege how any Doe defendants broadly identified as “Justice Department employees, ” Am. Compl. 2, ECF 4, could be liable for her allegedly wrongful arrest. In her response to the state defendants' motion, Cooper broadly argues that “Oregon agencies and personnel were involved in the actions that caused her wrongful arrest and imprisonment.” Resp. State Mot. 6, ECF 14. However, that allegation is not in her Amended Complaint. And even if it were, without more, it is insufficient to show that any state employee engaged in any wrongful conduct against her. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Cooper's unsubstantiated and vague claims that “Justice Department employees” were somehow “involved in her wrongful prison sentence, ” Resp. State Mot. 5, does not show the kind of “personal participation by the defendant” necessary for section 1983 liability. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).
To the extent plaintiff alleges in her proposed Second Amended Complaint that some of the Doe defendants “were state Judicial . . . Department employees, ” her claim also fails. Resp. County Mot., Ex. A, ECF 15. As the state points out, if this is an attempt to assert claims against the Washington County Circuit Court judge who revoked her probation, that claim would fail on the basis of judicial immunity. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Judges are immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts.”); Benjamin v. Stevens Cty., No. 2:18-CV-204-RMP, 2018 WL 4935448, at *6 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2018) (citing Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075-76, and dismissing the plaintiff's claims against a state judge with prejudice on the basis of judicial immunity). Furthermore, any claims against clerk's office employees fail on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr.Court for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987).
Finally, in her proposed Second Amended Complaint, Cooper blames additional state employees from ODOC and CCCF for her “twenty-two month wrongful detention . . . [that] constituted a reckless and wanton disregard for the health, pain, suffering, freedom and well-being of plaintiff.” Resp. County Mot., Ex. A, at 2, ECF 15-1. Again, those nonspecific allegations, without more, are insufficient to show that any ODOC or CCCF employees engaged in wrongful conduct against her. As the Ninth Circuit has emphasized, “[i]n order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation[.]” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Cooper's bare allegation that unidentified state employees were somehow “involved in [her] wrongful prison sentence, ” Resp. State Mot. 5, ECF 14, simply fails to demonstrate that any Doe defendants “were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights.” Peyton v. Cates, No. 121CV00740DADEPGPC, 2021 WL 4206432, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021) (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, Cooper has not plausibly alleged the kind of “personal participation by the defendant” necessary for section 1983 liability. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.
For all of these reasons, plaintiff's section 1983 claims against the state Doe defendants fail.
2. Tort Claims
Cooper's tort claims also fail to allege any causal link between her purported injuries and the state Doe defendants. Under Oregon law, to prevail on a claim for negligence, IIED, or NIED, the plaintiff must establish a causal relationship between the alleged injuries and the defendant's conduct. A negligence claim, for example, requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) Defendants owed her a duty, (2) they breached that duty, and (3) the breach was the cause in fact of some legally-cognizable damage to Plaintiff.” D.E. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3:18-CV-01649-IM, 2020 WL 877812, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 21, 2020) (citations omitted). A plaintiff asserting a claim for IIED “must prove that (1) the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress on the plaintiff, (2) the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress, and (3) the defendant's actions transgressed the bounds of socially tolerable conduct.” Thames v. City of Portland, No. 3:16-CV-1634-PK, 2018 WL 2749630, at *16 (D. Or. Mar. 6, 2018), findings and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2749570 (D. Or. June 7, 2018) (citations omitted). To recover damages for NIED, the plaintiff must establish that “a defendant negligently caused her to: (1) suffer a physical injury, or (2) suffer foreseeable, serious emotional distress coupled with the infringement of ‘some legally protected interest.'” Am. Airlines, 2020 WL 877812, at *6 (citing Philibert v. Kluser, 360 Or. 698, 702 (2016)).
Here, Cooper alleges that “[a]ll Does” were negligent in “failing to properly hire, train, . . . supervise, . . . [and] select” Washington County “probation staff” in general and the probation officers involved in Cooper's initial arrest in particular. Am. Compl. 4, ECF 4. Cooper, however, fails to allege or show that any state employees were responsible for or involved in any aspect of her arrest and detention in Washington County. Cooper's conclusory allegations regarding her IIED and NIED claims fare no better as she asserts only that “[t]he Does['] . . . wrongful violation of plaintiff constituted intentional infliction of several emotional distress, ” or, “[i]n the alternative, the Does['] . . . wrongful violation of plaintiff constituted negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Am. Compl. 5, ECF 4. Neither statement comes close to showing how any state employee “was the cause of some legally-cognizable damage” to Cooper. Am. Airlines, 2020 WL 877812, at *3. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to Cooper's claims for negligence, IIED, and NIED against all state Doe defendants.
III. County's Motion to Dismiss
Cooper asserts section 1983 claims against Washington County and the individual county defendants, Jones, Montes, and Stephens, alleging violations of her Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment rights. Am. Compl. 3-6, ECF 4. To the extent Cooper seeks to hold the county and individual county defendants liable for her allegedly wrongful arrest, they argue that such a claim is barred by the statute of limitations. County Mot. 14-15, ECF 10. To the extent Cooper alleges violations of her Eighth Amendment rights for the time she spent in the custody of ODOC, the county argues that Cooper has failed to allege that any county defendant caused her harm during that period of incarceration. Id. at 16-17, ECF 10.
County defendants assert other potentially viable arguments in their motion to dismiss, but the court finds it is unnecessary to reach them.
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether there is a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Taylor v. Yee, 780 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2015). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the complaint must allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).
When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 971 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010)); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
B. Fourth Amendment Claim Against County Defendants
Cooper's Fourth Amendment claim is based on her “wrongful arrest . . . on December 18, 2016.” Am. Compl. 6, ECF 4. The parties do not dispute that section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. The county defendants argue that Cooper's wrongful arrest claim accrued on December 18, 2016, the date of her arrest, but she failed to initiate this action until January 7, 2021, more than two years later. County Mot. 14-15, ECF 10. Cooper counters that her claim did not accrue until the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed her conviction on July 10, 2019. Resp. County Mot. 3, ECF 14.
Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, “federal law looks to the law of the State in which the cause of action arose . . . for the length of the statute of limitations . . . [based on] that which the State provides for personal-injury torts.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Oregon, the statute of limitations for a section 1983 lawsuit is two years. Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (section 1983 claims are “characterized as personal injury suits for statute of limitations purposes, ” and “Oregon's statute of limitations for such suits is two years”) (citing O.R.S. § 12.110(1)).
The original complaint is dated January 6, 2021, see Notice Removal, Ex. 2, ECF 1-2, but court records show it was entered in Washington County Circuit Court on January 7, 2021. Amanda Cooper v. State of Oregon, et al, Washington County Circuit Court No. 21CV00510, Docket Entry January 7, 2021.
The question of when a section 1983 claim accrues “is a question of federal law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). An accrual analysis begins with identifying “‘the specific constitutional right'” alleged to have been infringed. Manuel v. Joliet, 137 S.Ct. 911, 920 (2017) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)). Under Wallace, “the statute of limitations upon a section 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.” 549 U.S. at 397. The Supreme Court explained that, “once [a plaintiff] . . . is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges, ” any unlawful detention that follows “forms part of the ‘entirely distinct' tort of malicious prosecution[.]” Id. at 389-90. The plaintiff in Wallace, like Cooper here, asserted a Fourth Amendment claim for a wrongful arrest after a state appellate court found no probable cause for his arrest and reversed his conviction. Id. at 387. The city of Chicago argued that the plaintiff's lawsuit had been filed too late, but the plaintiff insisted that his wrongful arrest claim accrued when he was released from custody and was therefore timely. Id. at 391. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's wrongful arrest claim “commenced to run when the plaintiff appeared before the examining magistrate and was bound over for trial.” Id.
Prior to Wallace, the rule in the Ninth Circuit for a section 1983 action “alleging illegal search and seizure of evidence upon which criminal charges are based” was that such a claim “did not accrue until the criminal charges have been dismissed or the conviction overturned.” Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1166 n.1 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000)). In Mills, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the deferred accrual rule we previously announced in Harvey for Fourth Amendment claims . . . is ‘clearly irreconcilable' with Wallace's holding[.]” Id. Thus, the court held, the “deferred accrual rule has been ‘effectively overruled' and is no longer good law.” Id.
However, the Ninth Circuit in Mills interpreted Wallace as holding that a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest accrues on the date of the arrest, see Mills, 921 F.3d at 1166, not, as the Supreme Court stated in Wallace, when “the plaintiff appeared before the examining magistrate and was bound over for trial.” 549 U.S. at 384. Relying on other language in Wallace, the Ninth Circuit held in Mills that a false arrest or imprisonment claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, . . . that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Id. at 1166 (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388). Thus, the court held, because the plaintiff in Mills “had complete and present causes of action” for his false arrest and other claims “when he was subjected to a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . those claims accrued at that time.” Id.
In Wallace, the Supreme Court's accrual date analysis started with the broad observation that, “[a]spects of § 1983 . . . are governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort principles.” 549 U.S. at 388. Further, the Court noted, “[u]nder those principles, it is ‘the standard rule that [accrual occurs] when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action.'” Id. The Court also commented, “[t]here can be no dispute that petitioner could have filed suit as soon as the allegedly wrongful arrest occurred, . . . so the statute of limitations would normally commence to run from that date.” Id. (emphasis added). Ultimately, however, the Court held that a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest is most analogous to the tort of false imprisonment and held that the plaintiff's § 1983 claim for false arrest “commenced to run when he appeared before the examining magistrate and was bound over for trial.” Id. at 391. As the Court explained, “[r]eflective of the fact that false imprisonment consists of detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process-when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.” Id. at 389 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, Cooper insists that her wrongful arrest claim is not time-barred because she did not know she had a cause of action or legal “injury” until her sentence had been reversed. Resp. County Mot. 3, ECF 15. Relying on the so-called “discovery rule” under Oregon law, Cooper argues that she could not have “discovered” or “appreciated” the “wrongful nature of her probation revocation and prison term until the Oregon Court of Appeals issued its opinion on July 10, 2019.” Id. (citing Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or. 247, 255 (1994)). Again, however, “federal law determines the accrual date of § 1983 claims, ” not state law, Camarata v. Portland Cmty. Coll., No. 3:19-CV-00738-HZ, 2019 WL 4723769, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 26, 2019) (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388), and Cooper cites no federal authority to support her arguments concerning the date of accrual.
Cooper's argument also lacks force because Wallace and Mills clearly dictate that her false arrest claim accrued either at the time of her arrest on December 18, 2016, see Mills, 921 F.3d at 1166, or on the date she was arraigned, December 19, 2016, see Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391. While the apparent variation between Wallace and Mills could impact a statute of limitations analysis under different facts, any difference here as to the date of accrual is inconsequential because Cooper's claims are barred under both Mills and Wallace. See Contreras v. City of Compton, No. CV 17-8834-R, 2018 WL 5086635, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2018) (citing Wallace and Mills, holding the “Plaintiff's claims accrued when he was falsely arrested-at the time of injury” not “when his conviction was overturned, ” and finding the claims time-barred); see also Dunbar v. Cty. of Maui, No. CV 07-00107DAEBMK, 2008 WL 2622814, at *4 (D. Haw. July 2, 2008) (applying Wallace, holding the plaintiff's false arrest claim accrued at the time of the plaintiff's “initial court appearance, ” and finding the claim time-barred). Cooper filed her complaint on January 7, 2021, which was well past the applicable two- year statute of limitations-regardless of whether her false arrest claim accrued on December 18, 2016, under Mills, or on December 19, 2016, under Wallace. Cooper's false arrest claim, therefore, is time-barred. See Wesbrock v. Ledford, 464 F.Supp.3d 1094, 1098 (D. Ariz. 2020) (holding the plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim accrued at the time of arrest, and dismissing the claim as time-barred); Salazar v. City of Adelanto, No. ED CV 19-2333-PA-SP, 2020 WL 5778122, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5764404 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2020) (holding that a “‘cause of action for illegal search and seizure accrued when the wrong act occurs'” and dismissing a Fourth Amendment claim as time-barred) (quoting Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2015)).
There also was no impediment to Cooper filing her Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful arrest prior to her hearing in Washington County Circuit Court on January 19, 2017. In Wallace, the Supreme Court addressed some of the practical and legal implications of the accrual rule it articulated and commented, “[i]f a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been convicted . . . it is within the power of the district court . . . to stay the civil action until the criminal case . . . is ended.” 549 U.S. at 393-94 (citations omitted). Further, the Court noted, “[i]f the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck [v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)] will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed absent some other bar to suit. Id. at 394 (citations omitted).
In her proposed Second Amended Complaint, Cooper drops her wrongful arrest claim and, as an apparent substitute, adds a claim for false imprisonment. See Resp. County Mot., Ex. A, ECF 15-1. But the Supreme Court in Wallace used “the term false imprisonment to include false or unlawful arrest, ” Dunbar, 2008 WL 2622814, at *4, and neither Cooper's response nor her proposed Second Amended Complaint acknowledges or addresses case law regarding the date of accrual for any claim arising under the Fourth Amendment. See Resp. County Mot., Ex. A, ECF 15-1. Because plaintiff cannot overcome the statute of limitations bar to a section 1983 claim arising out of her arrest on December 18, 2016, allowing further amendment of this claim would be futile. See Salazar, 2020 WL 5778122, at *5 (holding that “the untimeliness and other flaws of his Fourth Amendment claims are not defects that can be cured by amendment” and dismissing the claims without leave to amend); see also Wesbrock, 464 F.Supp.3d at 1105 (declining to grant leave to amend a time-barred claim “because amendment would be futile”).
C. Eighth Amendment Claims Against County Defendants
Cooper alleges that “Washington County's twenty-six month wrongful detention of plaintiff constituted a reckless and wanton disregard for the health, pain, suffering, freedom and well-being of plaintiff, and cruel and Unusual Punishment.” Am. Compl. 4, ECF 4. She also alleges that “Jones, Montes, and Stephens' twenty-two month wrongful detention of plaintiff constituted a reckless and wanton disregard for the health, pain, suffering, freedom and well-being of plaintiff, and cruel and Unusual Punishment.” Id. These incarceration periods do not square up. See, supra, p. 3, n.4. Nor is it clear whether Cooper is referring to her incarceration in the Washington County Jail or CCCF. Nevertheless, because Cooper asserts an Eighth Amendment claim, the court assumes she is referring to her incarceration as a result of her probation revocation sentence. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979) (recognizing that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies to sentenced inmates). As the county defendants contend, Cooper's claims fail because she has not alleged that the county or any individual county defendant took any action that might constitute a violation of her Eighth Amendment rights. County Mot. 17, ECF 10.
It is well-settled that “[t]he Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment in penal institutions.” Purbeck v. Wilkinson, No. 1:21-CV-00047-BLW, 2021 WL 1550563, at *6 (D. Idaho Apr. 20, 2021) (citing Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012)). It is also “undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). To state a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to him or her. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (“a prison official may be held liable if he acted with ‘deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm”). Under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, “prison officials . . . may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners, ” and “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates[.]'” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citations omitted).
Here, Cooper does not allege that any person-county defendant, prison official, or anyone else-subjected her to any wrongful actions while she was detained in Washington County Jail or during her incarceration in the custody of ODOC. Instead, Cooper broadly alleges that the county and individual county defendants subjected her to “wrongful detention” that “constituted a reckless and wanton disregard for [her] health, pain, suffering . . . and cruel and unusual punishment.” Am. Compl. 4, ECF 4. Cooper's counsel made it clear during oral argument that Cooper is not claiming she suffered any injury or experienced unsafe conditions while she was detained or imprisoned, and he explained that Cooper bases her “wrongful detention” claim only on the “harm” of her being incarcerated as an “otherwise innocent person.” However, Cooper cannot assert an Eighth Amendment violation without alleging that the conditions of her confinement-and not the mere fact of her confinement-caused her to suffer a legally cognizable injury or something else that might constitute “cruel and unusual punishment.” Even if Cooper were able to allege that she had been subject to harmful or unsafe conditions while in jail or prison, she has not and cannot allege that any county defendant was responsible for, or had any authority regarding, the conditions of her confinement in Washington County Jail or ODOC. Cooper's Eighth Amendment claim therefore fails as a matter of law.
Again, Cooper has submitted a proposed Second Amended Complaint, but it does not address or cure any of the defects in her Eighth Amendment claim. Therefore, allowing Cooper to amend this claim further would therefore be futile. See Perkins v. Saipher, No. 19CV02096TLNCKDP, 2021 WL 949587, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2038320 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2021) (recommending dismissal of the action with prejudice after finding “further amendment would be futile because plaintiff's factual allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation even after several opportunities to amend”).
D. State Law Claims Against County Defendants
With the dismissal of Cooper's section 1983 claims, this court must sua sponte examine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims in the case. See Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 657 F.3d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting the court's obligation to determine sua sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983) (“lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and the court is under a continuing duty to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court lacks jurisdiction”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). The county removed this action from Washington County Circuit Court based on federal question jurisdiction. See Notice Removal, ECF 1 (noting Cooper's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447, “[if] at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”
The court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state-law] claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”). However, this case is in its early stages. Moreover, “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of the factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Therefore, remand is appropriate.
In Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker Int'l Inc., the Ninth Circuit observed:
Here is how we reconcile the “may decline to exercise” language of the supplemental jurisdiction statute with the “shall be remanded” language of the procedure after removal statute: if state law claims are asserted as part of the same case or controversy with a federal claim, the district court has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and the mandatory remand provision of the procedure after removal statute does not apply. Under the plain language of the statutes, logically it cannot “appear[ ] that the district court lacks jurisdiction” under 1447(c) if it “shall have” jurisdiction under 1367.344 F.3d 931, 937-38 (9th Cir.), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 350 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2003).
RECOMMENDATIONS
The state's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 6) should be GRANTED, and those claims should be dismissed with prejudice. The county's Motion to Dismiss (ECF 10) Cooper's section 1983 claims against county defendants should be GRANTED, and those claims should be dismissed with prejudice. Cooper's remaining state law claims against county defendants should be remanded back to Washington County Circuit Court.
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due Monday, November 08, 2021. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.
NOTICE
These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of a judgment.