Opinion
CIV-22-1027-D
06-09-2023
AARON LEMEAL COOPER, Plaintiff, v. OKLAHOMA COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY, et. al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GARY M. PURCELL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, appearing with counsel, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Before the Court is Defendant Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority's Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 30, to which Plaintiff has filed a Response. Doc. No. 31. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the following reasons, it is recommended the Motion to Dismiss be denied.
I. Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff was previously confined at the Oklahoma County Detention Center (“OCDC”) as a pre-trial detainee. Doc. No. 26 (“Am. Comp.”) at 3. Plaintiff's brother was a member of the Panic Zone Crips street gang. Id. at 4. Plaintiff's connection to the Panic Zone Crips was known throughout the OCDC and specifically, by Defendant Michael Thomas Hughes. Id. Members of a rival Bloods gang were also confined at the OCDC at that time. Id. Defendant Hughes was aware of this rivalry and also aware that the Bloods “had a vendetta against Plaintiff's brother and wanted him dead.” Id.
On December 3, 2020, Defendant Hughes moved Plaintiff to “David pod,” which Defendant Hughes knew housed several members of the Bloods gang. Id. Plaintiff was subsequently severely beaten by members of the Bloods gang. Id. at 4-5. Afterward, rather than calling for medical aid for Plaintiff, Defendant Hughes attempted to clean up Plaintiff's blood. Id. at 5. Defendant Hughes never notified medical staff of Plaintiff's injuries and Plaintiff did not receive such attention for one hour. Id. Following this incident, Defendant Hughes was charged with one count of felony assault and battery in connection with the attack on Plaintiff and ultimately entered a plea of nolo contendere to an amended charge of “willful neglect of duty.” Id.
By this action, Plaintiff has asserted Fourteenth Amendment claims against Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority (“OCCJA”), the Board of County Commissioners for Oklahoma County (“BOCC”), and Defendant Hughes. Plaintiff's claims are based on a failure to protect and a delay in medical care. Defendant OCCJA has filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing the Court should dismiss it from this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because it is not an entity capable of being sued, the allegations fail to state a plausible claim, and Plaintiff failed to assert that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Doc. No. 30.
Although Plaintiff cites to both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Am. Comp.
II. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss may be granted when the plaintiff has “failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In applying this standard, the Court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Leverington v. City of Colo. Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 723 (10th Cir. 2011); Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2005). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must present factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This review contemplates the assertion of “enough facts to state at 13, as a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff's constitutional rights were protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Turner v. Okla. Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 804 Fed.Appx. 921, 925 (10th Cir. 2020). In evaluating this claim, “an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases” is applied. Id. (quotations omitted). a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Thus, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a [plausible] claim of entitlement to relief,” the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558.
A court evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may consider the complaint as well as any documents attached to it as exhibits. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 1991). Additionally, “[a] district court may consider documents (1) referenced in a complaint that are (2) central to a plaintiff's claims, and (3) indisputably authentic when resolving a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.” Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1197 (10th Cir. 2014).
III. Capacity to be Sued
As stated, Plaintiff has sued Defendant Hughes, whose actions allegedly allowed the attack on Plaintiff to occur, as well as the BOCC and the OCCJA as the entities liable for Defendant Hughes' actions. See, supra. The OCCJA has filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that it is an entity legally incapable of being sued. Doc. No. 30 at 2-4. The Court should reject this argument.
The OCCJA asserts that it is a public trust created by the BOCC under Okla. Stat. tit. 60, § 176 to assist Oklahoma County in managing and operating the OCDC. Doc. No. 30 at 2. Under Oklahoma law, a public trust such as the OCCJA is a distinct legal entity, and its activities and obligations are determined by the written instrument under which it was created. Okla. Stat. tit. 60, § 176, et seq. The OCCJA argues that it is an entity legally incapable of being sued, stating that the OCCJA is nothing more than “an agency of Oklahoma County and the BOCC for purposes of liability.” Doc. No. 30 at 3.
In support of this theory, the OCCJA cites this Court's decisions in Chichakli v. Samuels, Case No. CIV-15-687-D, 2016 WL 2743542 (W.D. Okla. May 11, 2016) and Folts v. Grady Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, Case No. CIV-15-996-M, 2017 WL 11557921 (W.D. Okla. July 25, 2017). Doc. No. 30 at 3-4. In Chichakli and Folts, however, the issue was whether the County, through the board of county commissioners, not the relevant jail trust authority, was a proper party to the lawsuit. Chichakli, 2016 WL 2743542, at *3-4 and Folts, 2017 WL 11557921, at *3-5. In both cases, the Court ultimately concluded that the County, through the board of county commissioners, could not exempt itself from liability by placing liability on the jail trust authority because the latter entity was created in furtherance of the County itself. Folts, 2017 WL 11557921, at *3-5
Here, however, unlike in Chichkali and Folts, the legal issue raised by the OCCJA is not which entity - the BOCC or the OCCJA - represents Oklahoma County for purposes of liability, but instead, whether the OCCJA is an entity that is even legally capable of being sued. Doc. No. 30 at 2-4. This Court has affirmatively stated, “There are five ways to establish an official policy or custom sufficient to impose § 1983 liability on a municipal jail trust: (1) actions of the municipal legislative body; (2) policies of the board pursuant to authority delegated by the legislative body; (3) actions by those with final decision-making authority; (4) policies of inadequate training or supervision; and (5) custom.” Hickey v. Okla. Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. CIV-20-1291, 2022 WL 945319, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 2022) (citing Smith v. Rogers Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth., No. 05-CV-0138-CVE-SAJ, 2005 WL 3298981, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2005)). Plaintiff has set forth specific allegations of policies, practices, and/or customs of the BOCC/OCCJA that resulted in the violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Am. Comp. at 6-13.
Additionally, this Court recently rejected the same arguments the OCCJA raises herein. In Bond v. Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority, No. CIV-23-05-D, 2023 WL 2878772 (W.D. Okla. April 10, 2023), the OCCJA argued that it was not an entity capable of being sued. Id. at *1. The Court explained:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3) provides that a defendant's capacity to sue or be sued is determined “by the law of the state where the court is located.” Under Oklahoma law, “any person, corporation, partnership, or unincorporated association shall have capacity to sue or be sued in this state.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2017(B). Relying on this statute, the OCCJA argues that it lacks the capacity
to be sued because it is not a person, corporation, partnership, or unincorporated association. Rather, as a public trust created by the Board of County Commissioners, the OCCJA contends that it is an agency of Oklahoma County (at least for the purposes of liability) and the County is therefore the proper defendant.
Although § 2017(B) identifies certain entities that have the capacity to be sued, the OCCJA cites no conclusive authority establishing that a public trust does not also have the capacity to be sued. Numerous courts have entertained claims by and against a public trust, including § 1983 claims against a jail trust. See Rife v. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety, 854 F.3d 637, 641 (10th Cir. 2017) (resolving a § 1983 municipal liability claim against a jail trust); Folts v. Grady Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, No. CIV-15-00996-JD, 2021 WL 1224915, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2021) (resolving a § 1983 municipal liability claim against both the Board of County Commissioners and the jail trust); Taylor v. Comanche Cnty. Facilities Auth., No. CIV-18-55-G, 2020 WL 6991010, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 25, 2020) (resolving § 1983 claims against a jail trust); Hill v. Okmulgee Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth., No. CIV-18-394-SPS, 2019 WL 11000375, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 18, 2019) (finding that the Board of County Commissioners could be separately liable for § 1983 claims brought against Board and jail trust); Chichakli v. Samuels, No. CIV-15-687-D, 2016 WL 2743542, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 11, 2016) (declining to dismiss § 1983 claim against the County where the jail trust was also a defendant); Myers v. Leflore Cnty. Det. Ctr. Pub. Tr., No. CIV. 07-223-FHS, 2009 WL 87599, at *7 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 12, 2009), aff'd sub nom. Myers v. James, 344 Fed.Appx. 457 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the jail trust was the appropriate defendant for a § 1983 municipal liability claim); Lee v. Wyatt, No. CIV-07-773-W, 2009 WL 3401277, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 21, 2009), aff'd, 382 Fed.Appx. 697 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that a jail trust “is a governmental entity for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because it was created under Oklahoma law as a public trust”); see also Oklahoma City Zoological Tr. v. State ex rel. Pub. Emps. Rels. Bd., 158 P.3d 461, 463 (Okla. 2007); Lawson v. Sequoyah Cnty. 911 Tr. Auth., 521 P.3d 827, 828 (Okla.Civ.App. 2022). Further, as even the OCCJA concedes, a public trust is presumed to be a separateand distinct legal entity under Oklahoma law. Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 60, § 176.1(A)(2); Def.'s Br. at 4 (“. . . the OCCJA is a distinct legal entity from Oklahoma County . . .”). Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, the Court should deny the OCCJA's request for dismissal based on its contention that it is not a legal entity capable of being sued.
IV. Failure to Protect Claim
Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fourteenth Amendments based on Defendants' failure to protect him and failure to provide adequate medical care. Am. Comp. at 13-15. With regard to the former, the Amended Complaint asserts a single cause of action contending that Defendants, including the OCCJA, violated Plaintiff's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him from harm or provide adequate conditions of confinement. The OCCJA contends the allegations fail to state a plausible claim for relief. Doc. No. 30 at 69.
Again, the OCCJA raised a similar argument in Bond, supra, in which the plaintiff had also asserted a failure to protect claim. The Court explained:
The Complaint asserts a single cause of action contending that the OCCJA (and the other defendants) violated Mr. Lane's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him from harm or provide adequate conditions of confinement. The OCCJA contends the allegations fail to state a plausible municipal liability claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Constitution imposes a duty on prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quotation omitted). Indeed, “[h]aving incarcerated persons [with] demonstrated proclivit[ies] for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct, having stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original).
Of course, the mere fact that a prisoner suffered injury at the hands of another prisoner does not “translate[ ] into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Id. at 824. Rather, to prevail on a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must show “that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and the defendant acted with deliberate indifference, meaning the defendant “was aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk.” Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Turner, 804 Fed.Appx. 921, 925. And where (as here) a plaintiff seeks to hold a local governmental entity liable under § 1983, he must also show that a municipal policy or custom “was the ‘moving force' behind the injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl[a]. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Deliberate indifference in the municipal liability context “may be satisfied when the [defendant] has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Layton v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Oklahoma Cnty., 512 Fed.Appx. 861, 871 (10th Cir. 2013) [].Bond, 2023 WL 2878772, at *3 (footnotes omitted).
Applying these standards to the present case, the undersigned concludes Plaintiff has clearly set forth a plausible failure to protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Amended Complaint alleges Defendant Hughes knowingly placed Plaintiff in a pod with members of a gang that had a serious vendetta against Plaintiff's brother. Am. Comp. at 3. Plaintiff was subsequently brutally beaten by those gang members. Id. at 3-5. Plaintiff also sets forth numerous policies, practices, and customs that he alleges resulted in Defendant Hughes' actions. Id. at 6-13. Taking these allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, these facts are sufficient to show that Plaintiff was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. See, cf., Pendleton v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs for Okla. Cnty., No. CIV-18-707-G, 2019 WL 4752269, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2019) (finding allegations of “inadequate staffing, insufficient monitoring of inmates, and failure to segregate or otherwise restrain inmates with known violent tendencies” was sufficient to state a failure to protect claim); Morgan v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Okla. Cnty., No. CIV-08-1317-R, 2010 WL 11508854, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 11, 2010) (finding that pretrial detainee housed with violent offender was held under conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm).
The OCCJA also argues Plaintiff's claim is deficient because there are no allegations showing that Plaintiff complained of safety concerns or that previous threats were made indicating he was in danger. However, Plaintiff specifically alleges that not only was the Bloods gang's vendetta and desire to kill Plaintiff's brother known throughout the facility, but Defendant Hughes was specifically aware of this circumstance prior to placing Plaintiff in a pod with said gang members. Additionally, the OCCJA's argument “ignores relevant case law, which provides that knowledge of specific threats or an inmate's individual risk is not necessarily required.” Bond, 2023 WL 2878772, at *4 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (“[I]t does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.”); Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The official's knowledge of the risk need not be knowledge of a substantial risk to a particular inmate, or knowledge of the particular manner in which injury might occur.”)).
Finally, the OCCJA vaguely argues that Plaintiff fails to allege adequate facts to state a claim for municipal liability against the OCCJA and to show that the OCCJA acted with deliberate indifference. In his Amended Complaint, however, Plaintiff set forth relatively detailed allegations that the OCCJA has been historically and consistently understaffed, its staff is inadequately trained and/or supervised, the OCCJA has been aware of these deficiencies and the risks they pose to inmate safety following a 2008 report by the Department of Justice, the OCCJA has not remedied these deficiencies, and that said deficiencies resulted in Plaintiff's attack and injuries. Doc. No. 26 at 6-13. See Layton, 512 Fed.Appx. at 871 (“The failure to remedy ongoing constitutional violations may be evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of a municipality.”). Assuming the truth of these allegations, Plaintiff has satisfied his burden to plead facts showing that the OCCJA maintained a custom of inadequate training, understaffing and inadequately supervising the jail, was on notice that these deficiencies posed significant risks to inmate safety, and consciously disregarded those risks. Accordingly, the Court should deny the OCCJA's request to dismiss Plaintiff's failure to protect claim.
V. Inadequate Medical Care Claim
The OCCJA also requests dismissal of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim based on failure to provide adequate medical care. It argues that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that the delay of one hour in medical care, caused by Defendant Hughes spending that time cleaning up Plaintiff's blood rather than securing medical care for him, resulted in substantial harm. Doc. No. 30 at 9-10. In his Response, Plaintiff did not address the OCCJA's challenge to this claim.
A confined individual advancing a claim based on inadequate provision of medical care must establish “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard has two components: “an objective component requiring that the pain or deprivation be sufficiently serious; and a subjective component requiring that the offending officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1569 (10th Cir. 1991). With respect to the subjective component, a prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless that official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Additionally, a delay, rather than an outright denial, of medical care constitutes a constitutional violation only if deliberate indifference by the defendants results in substantial harm. Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993)). Significant to the present case, the “substantial harm” element may be based on “an intermediate injury, such as the pain experienced while waiting for treatment and analgesics.” Al-Turki v. Robinson, 762 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).
The OCCJA did not challenge whether Plaintiff had set forth sufficient facts to establish the subjective component of this Fourteenth Amendment claim.
As a result of the attack on Plaintiff, he suffered the loss of two teeth, a gash above his left eye that later required seven stitches, bruising to his left shoulder, bruising above his right eye, swelling on his right ear, and bruising from shoe tread on his neck. Am. Comp. at 4-5. Because Defendant Hughes did not seek medical attention for Plaintiff, attempting to clean up Plaintiff's blood instead, Plaintiff did not receive medical attention for one hour after the attack. Id. at 5. The OCCJA relies on Al-Turki to imply that Plaintiff's claim is deficient because he alleged he was in untreated pain for one hour rather than “several hours.” Doc. No. 30 at 10. The OCCJA does not cite to any legal authority indicating that untreated pain for one hour cannot be the basis for a delay in medical care claim.
Al-Turki recognizes that “substantial harm” may be based on “the pain experienced while waiting for treatment and analgesics.” Al-Turki, supra. Given the nature and degree of Plaintiff's injuries, the undersigned concludes that the substantial pain incurred by a one-hour delay in receiving medical care is sufficient to successfully allege a delay in medical care claim at this stage of litigation. Accordingly, the Court should deny the OCCJA's Motion to Dismiss with regard to Plaintiff's inadequate medical care claim.
VI. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Finally, the OCCJA contends the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's lawsuit because he failed to allege in his Amended Complaint that he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit. Doc. No. 30 at 12-13. Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which provides that a prisoner cannot bring an action “with respect to prison conditions under [§] 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 640 (2016) (“[T]he history of the PLRA underscores the mandatory nature of its exhaustion regime.”); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.”).
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court held that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. That law remains unchanged. Thus, the Court should deny the OCCJA's Motion to Dismiss with regard to Plaintiff's failure to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended Defendant Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 30) be DENIED. The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by May 30th, 2023, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.”).
This Report and Recommendation does not dispose of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.