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considering the sufficiency of the evidence where the domestic abuse action was tried at law and reviewed for correction of errors at law
Summary of this case from Clemens v. ClemensOpinion
No. 3-808 / 03-0324.
Filed January 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A. Hutchison, Judge.
Husband appeals from entry of Iowa Code chapter 236 (2001) protective order. AFFIRMED.
Alexander Rhoads of Babich, Goldman, Cashatt Renzo, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Roger Hudson and Andrew Howie of Hudson, Mallaney Shindler, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Durward Cooper appeals from the district court's entry of a protective order, under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2001), which found he had engaged in domestic abuse against his wife, Leslie Cooper. Durward contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that he committed domestic abuse. We review the district court's ruling in this law-tried action for the correction of errors at law. See Bacon ex rel. Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997). In doing so, we conclude the record contains substantial evidence to support the conclusion Durward engaged in domestic abuse as defined in Iowa Code section 236.2. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( a) ("Findings of fact in a law action . . . are binding upon the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence.").
About one month prior to the incident which gave rise to the protective order, Leslie had commenced an action for dissolution of marriage. Durward came to the marital home to ask Leslie to exchange vehicles. An argument ensued. Leslie and her mother testified that when Leslie turned away from Durward, he reached out and "grabbed" or "put his hand on" Leslie's shoulder, to stop her from walking away. Leslie maintained she was startled and scared by the contact. She stated Durward broke contact quickly and backed away, but contends it was only because he realized her mother was witnessing the altercation. Leslie maintained Durward had "raised his hand" to her in the past, but admitted he had never struck her or verbally threatened her with physical harm. Durward denied any contact occurred, and indicated it was only Leslie who was upset and agitated that day.
Although Durward impugns Leslie's credibility, the trier of fact has a better opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and thus the prerogative to determine what evidence to believe. See Tim O'Neill Chevrolet, Inc. v. Forristall, 551 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1996). Upon review we must liberally construe the court's findings to uphold, rather than defeat, its ruling. Id. The question before this court is not whether the evidence might support different findings, but whether it supports the findings the court actually made. Id. Under such a standard, the record contains substantial evidence to support a finding that the contact, as described by Leslie and her mother, in fact occurred.
We also concur with the district court's conclusion that this contact was sufficient to constitute domestic abuse. Under section 232.2, Durward committed domestic abuse if he committed an assault against Leslie, as the term is defined by section 708.1. That section includes within the definition of assault any act, done without justification, "which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act." Iowa Code § 708.1(1). The parties were involved in an action for dissolution of marriage. A contested hearing on temporary matters had been held just four days earlier. The parties were engaged in an argument that Leslie described as "heated." Under such circumstances the contact testified to by Leslie and her mother falls within this definition, and thus within the definition of domestic abuse.
The outcome in this appeal is largely controlled by our scope of review. The district court's findings of fact, including its implicit credibility findings, are supported by substantial evidence and thus binding upon this court. We find no error in the district court's conclusion that the physical contact in question, under the circumstances of this case, constitutes an assault and thus domestic abuse. We therefore affirm the district court's determination that domestic abuse occurred, and its entry of a protective order.
AFFIRMED.
ZIMMER, J. (concurs specially)
I concur in the majority opinion because I share the view that the outcome of this appeal is largely determined by the district court's implicit credibility findings regarding Leslie's testimony. I write specially to express my concern that the overall record suggests Leslie's petition for relief from domestic abuse had much more to do with her unhappiness with having to share the marital home with Durward during the pendency of an action to dissolve the parties' marriage than genuine fear for her physical safety. Leslie's testimony confirms that there were no acts of physical violence by her spouse during the parties' marriage. Upon review of the record, I am skeptical that the incident which occurred on December 20 was the real motivation for the request for a no contact order which Leslie filed on December 31, 2002.