Opinion
2:21-CV-01538-JAM-KJN
09-19-2022
PATRICIA V. COOPER, individually as Guardian Ad Litem for minors Z.R.; Z.R., JR.; and D.R., successors-in-interest to ZACHARY T. ROBINSON, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF FAIRFIELD; FAIRFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT AND ITS OFFICERS; OFFICER KENNAN SIEVERS; OFFICER MATTHEW THOMAS, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
JOHN A. MENDEZ, JUDGE.
Plaintiff Patricia V. Cooper (“Plaintiff”) sued in her individual capacity, as a successor-in-interest to Zachary T. Robinson (“Decedent”), and as Guardian Ad Litem for minors Z.R., Z.R., Junior and D.R., to recover punitive and compensatory damages from the City of Fairfield, Kennan Sievers, and Matthew Thomas (“Defendants”) for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First Amended Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 21. Defendants moved to dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 24. Plaintiff opposed the motion. Opp'n, ECF No. 28. Several months before the filing of the FAC, Defendants moved to dismiss the initial complaint on separate grounds and Plaintiff moved for a 30-day extension of time to file a motion in opposition. First Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 3; Mot. for Ext. of Time, ECF No. 16.
Plaintiff's amended complaint is properly referred to as the “FAC” and not, as Defendants contend, the “SAC.”
For the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS Defendants' second motion to dismiss and DISMISSES AS MOOT Defendants' first motion to dismiss and Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On or around January 31, 2022, Decedent was operating a Harley Davidson motorcycle going eastbound on Travis Boulevard and stopped at an intersection before the on-ramp to I-80 East. FAC ¶ 16. Defendant Officer Kennan Sievers was positioned in his police car at the entrance of the on-ramp, where he saw Decedent accelerate through the red light at the intersection and make a left turn onto the freeway, passing Sievers' car. Id. Sievers positioned his car behind Decedent's motorcycle to conduct a traffic stop, where he observed the motorcycle quickly accelerate. Id. Sievers activated his emergency lights and siren as Decedent entered onto the freeway. Id. Decedent did not yield to Sievers' attempts to conduct a traffic stop and continued to accelerate to a speed of approximately 105 miles per hour. Id. Between the Lagoon Valley Road and Cherry Glen exits, Decedent quickly decelerated, made a U-turn, and began driving west on I-80 East into oncoming traffic. Id. At this point, Sievers discontinued pursuit and provided a description to dispatch of Decedent and his motorcycle. Id.
Due to safety concerns, no other officer started pursuit of Decedent, instead providing observation updates. Id. Officers observed Decedent exit I-80 at the Manuel Campos off-ramp and continue south on North Texas Street. Id. Decedent then passed through a red light at the intersection of North Texas Street and Travis Boulevard, travelling approximately 70 miles per hour. Id. Moments later, an officer reported they heard a collision on North Texas Street as it curved into West Texas Street. Id. Responding officers reported to the site and observed Decedent had been in a collision and was unconscious. Id. Responding officers provided medical assistant to Decedent, but Decedent succumbed to his injuries at the scene. Id. Sievers noted extensive damage to Decedent's motorcycle, including sliding damage to both sides and a severely deformed front wheel, and damage to a portion of the cement sidewalk. Id. Sievers filed a police report with these findings that was later reviewed by Defendant Officer Matthew Thomas. Exhibit A, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that there was also extensive damage to the back of the motorcycle that made the vehicle inoperable. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff attributes this damage to the alleged use of the PIT (Pursuit Intervention Technique) maneuver, where unnamed, DOE officers rear-ended Decedent's motorcycle during pursuit. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.
On August 26, 2021, this action was removed from state court. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. One week later, Defendants moved to dismiss the initial complaint. First Mot. to Dismiss. On March 21, 2022, Plaintiff moved for a 30-day extension of time to file a motion in opposition. Mot. for Ext. of Time. Two months later, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC, bringing causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) detention and arrest, (2) excessive force, (3) substantive due process, (4) ratification, (5) inadequate training, (6) unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, and (7) civil conspiracy. See FAC.
Defendants move to dismiss the FAC under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mot. at 4. Plaintiff opposes the motion. See Opp'n.
II. OPINION
A. Legal Standard
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under FRCP 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the allegations in the FAC as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The FAC must possess more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain non-conclusory, factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007).
B. Analysis
1. Claim One: Detention and Arrest
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's first claim alleging Decedent's unlawful detention and arrest under the Fourth Amendment should be dismissed because Plaintiff's pleading is insufficient to establish Defendants Sievers and Thomas were involved in the alleged conduct. Mot. at 5. Defendants note the FAC makes no reference to Sievers or Thomas, instead solely referring to the alleged actions of unnamed, DOE officers as the perpetrators of both the high-speed chase of Decedent and the later PIT maneuver on Decedent's motorcycle. Id.
Plaintiff argues that the motion to dismiss concedes that unnamed officers committed the alleged constitutional violation against Decedent and that these uncontested facts are sufficient to maintain the action against Defendant City of Fairfield and, by extension, Officers Sievers and Thomas. Opp'n, at 9. Plaintiff further states that Sievers and Thomas coordinated with the unnamed officers and were at the scene of the collision, which is enough for the Court to reasonably infer that Sievers and Thomas committed the alleged constitutional violation. Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to maintain this claim against Sievers and Thomas. The FAC must contain non-conclusory, factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, at 554. Here, in opposing this motion, Plaintiff's contention that Sievers and Thomas were involved in the alleged constitutional violation fails to rise beyond speculation. The FAC attributes the conduct at issue, namely the high-speed chase and the execution of the PIT maneuver, entirely to DOE officers. FAC ¶¶ 30-34. At no point does the FAC mention Sievers or Thomas or allege any non-conclusory facts that could lead to a reasonable inference that they were involved. In the absence of these facts, the Court dismisses this claim against Defendants Sievers and Thomas without prejudice.
The Court further notes that the Fairfield Police Department is not a properly named defendant for Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. See Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding the county was a proper defendant but that suing an agency of the county was improper). It has also been established that a municipal defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory. Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts under this first claim nor under claims two, three, and seven to support liability against Defendant City of Fairfield outside of respondeat superior, which also makes the City of Fairfield an improper defendant for these claims. The Court also dismisses Defendants Fairfield Police Department and City of Fairfield from these claims with prejudice.
2. Claim Two: Excessive Force
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's second claim alleging the use of excessive force against Decedent in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be dismissed for the same reasons as the first claim, i.e., because Plaintiff's pleading is insufficient to establish that Sievers and Thomas were involved in the alleged conduct. Mot. at 5-6. Defendants note the complaint makes no reference to Sievers or Thomas, instead attributing the conduct at issue, the alleged use of the PIT maneuver on Decedent's motorcycle, entirely to unnamed officers. Id.
Plaintiff argues that Sievers and Thomas worked together with the unnamed officers to “corner and cause [D]ecedent to run off the road.” Opp'n at 9. So, Plaintiff argues that the motion fails to cast doubt on the culpability of Sievers and Thomas alongside the unnamed officers. Id.
Once again, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to maintain this claim against Sievers and Thomas. The FAC must contain non-conclusory, factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, at 554. Here, Plaintiff's argument that Sievers and Thomas worked with unnamed officers to coordinate a PIT maneuver on Decedent's motorcycle is entirely conclusory and unsupported by the facts; Plaintiff offers no evidence that Sievers resumed pursuit of Decedent and then coordinated with DOE officers after Decedent made a U-turn on I-80 or that Matthews was ever physically present at any of the events relevant to this case. Plaintiff's argument is also inconsistent with the allegations in the FAC, which attribute the use of excessive force entirely to the conduct of DOE officers. In the absence of the non-conclusory, factual allegations necessary to sustain this claim, the Court dismisses this claim against Defendants Sievers and Thomas without prejudice.
3. Claim Three: Substantive Due Process
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's third claim alleging due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment should be dismissed because the pleading is insufficient to (1) establish that Sievers and Thomas were involved in the alleged conduct and (2) meet the heightened “shock the conscience” pleading standard required for a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Mot. At 6. Defendants contend that this third claim fails to attribute any of the alleged wrongful conduct to either named officer, instead attributing the conduct entirely to DOE officers. Id. Also, Defendants point out that the alleged use of the PIT maneuver was associated with a legitimate law enforcement objective and not for the purpose of harming Decedent outside of that context. Plaintiff's claim therefore fails to meet the requisite pleading standard under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 6-7.
Plaintiff's argument in opposition does not address Defendants' insufficient pleading argument and instead cites federal case law regarding the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests that exist for familial relations of decedents. Opp'n at 9-10. Plaintiff notes the facts of Zion v. County of Orange, 874 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2017), stating that the circumstances of that case are similar to this case as grounds for denying Defendants' motion. The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to maintain this third claim against Sievers and Thomas. The FAC must contain non-conclusory, factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, at 554. Neither the FAC nor the opposing motion makes any mention of Sievers or Thomas or any alleged actions by them that could allow the Court to reasonably infer that they were involved in the alleged substantive due process violation. The FAC states that DOE officers violated Plaintiff's substantive due process rights and that DOE officers are the “direct and proximate cause” of Plaintiff's suffering, not Sievers or Thomas. FAC ¶¶ 46-47. In the absence of the factual allegations necessary to sustain this claim, the Court dismisses this claim against Defendants Sievers and Thomas without prejudice.
4. Claims Four Through Six: Monell Liability
In claims four, five, and six, the FAC alleges Monell liability against Defendant City of Fairfield on three separate grounds: (1) ratification, (2) inadequate training, and (3) unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy. FAC ¶¶ 50-80. Defendants argue that these claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support any of the possible theories of liability. Mot. at 7 (citing Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992)). Defendants argue that the FAC only lists the legal elements of each Monell theory without supporting them with underlying facts. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff's argument in opposition recites case law regarding the imposition of liability on a municipal defendant, particularly how inadequate training can result in liability; but Plaintiff does not directly address Defendants' arguments or point to any factual support in the complaint for a Monell claim. Opp'n at 11-12.
For all three claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to maintain its municipal liability claims against City of Fairfield. To establish municipal liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show (1) they possessed a constitutional right and were deprived of that right, (2) the municipality had a policy, (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right, and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Sweiha v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. 19-CV-03098-LB, WL 48482227 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff must go beyond recitation of the Monell elements and must allege sufficient allegations of underlying facts to support her claim. Starr v. Bacca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has failed to do so in this case. The FAC lacks the factual allegations that would support any of the possible theories of liability. As Defendants note, reciting a formula without providing any underlying facts is insufficient to maintain a legal claim. In the absence of the factual allegations necessary to sustain these claims, the Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff's § 1983 municipal liability claims under Monell against Defendant City of Fairfield.
5. Claim Seven: Civil Conspiracy Defendants argue that Plaintiff's seventh claim alleging a civil conspiracy to use unreasonable and excessive force against Decedent should be dismissed because Plaintiff's pleading is insufficient to establish an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights; the FAC simply states that officers intentionally used the PIT maneuver on Decedent's motorcycle. Mot. at 8, FAC ¶ 82. Plaintiff argues in opposition that officers coordinated with each other to perform the maneuver, which is sufficient to show a meeting of the minds and, as a result, a conspiracy to use unreasonable and excessive force against Decedent. Opp'n at 12-13.
Once again, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to maintain this claim against Defendants Sievers and Thomas. In order to allege a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must show “an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002). To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Id. at 441. This agreement or meeting of the minds may be inferred based on circumstantial evidence, such as the actions of the defendants. Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999). The only fact alleged by Plaintiff to support this claim is the conclusory statement that officers “acted in concert to perform the PIT maneuver.” Opp'n at 12-13. Plaintiff offers no non-conclusory facts in the FAC that could lead the Court to the reasonable inference that either the named or DOE officers acted together to perform the PIT maneuver on Decedent. On the contrary, the facts suggest that (1) Officers Sievers and Thomas were not involved in the pursuit that led to the alleged use of the PIT maneuver and (2) that there was no coordination between DOE officers outside of relaying updates on Decedent's route and location after Decedent exited I-80. FAC ¶ 16. In the absence of factual allegations necessary to sustain this civil conspiracy claim, the Court dismisses the claim against Defendants Sievers and Thomas without prejudice.
6. Prior Motions
On September 9, 2021, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's initial complaint and Plaintiff moved for a 30-day extension of time to file a motion in opposition. See First Mot. to Dismiss; Mot. for Ext. of Time. On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed her FAC in this Court, thereby rendering moot the initial motion to dismiss and the motion for extension of time. Accordingly, the Court dismisses these motions as moot.
III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, this Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Claims one, two, three, and seven against Defendants City of Fairfield and Fairfield Police Department are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. However, because amendment is not futile on the remaining claims, this Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend the remaining claims. Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.”).
If Plaintiff elects to amend her complaint, she shall file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty days of this Order. Defendants' responsive pleading is due twenty days thereafter.
Defendants' September 9, 2021 motion to dismiss and Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time are dismissed as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.