Opinion
B323305
01-16-2024
In re Marriage of SAMUEL COOLEY and MICHAEL ARMANIOUS. v. MICHAEL ARMANIOUS, Appellant. SAMUEL COOLEY, Respondent,
Holstrom, Block & Parke and Ronald B. Funk for Appellant. Samuel Cooley, in pro. per., for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 21STFL03839 Anne Richardson, Judge. Affirmed.
Holstrom, Block & Parke and Ronald B. Funk for Appellant.
Samuel Cooley, in pro. per., for Respondent.
FEUER, Acting P. J.
In this marital dissolution proceeding, Michael Armanious appeals from the family court's order requiring him to pay his husband Samuel Cooley $20,000 in pendente lite, need-based attorneys' fees pursuant to Family Code section 2030.Armanious contends the family court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees because the court previously entered a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Cooley, and Armanious should not be required to support his abuser. Armanious also contends the court erred by adopting as its final order a tentative decision reached before the court received evidence concerning the reasonableness of the fees billed by Cooley's lawyer.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
The family court properly considered the statutory factors under section 2030, and it did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Dissolution Petition and DVRO Requests
The facts are taken from the petition, response, and undisputed statements in the parties' declarations in connection with their 2021 requests for orders.
Cooley and Armanious were married on March 11, 2017. During the marriage, they lived in a condominium in West Hollywood with their dog, Wyatt. Armanious, who has master's degrees in biochemistry, logistics, and business administration, is a senior executive and part owner of his family's logistics company, Datex Corporation. Cooley is an attorney admitted to practice law in Florida and California who worked as general counsel of Datex from February 2020 through April 30, 2021, after working for several years in government and private practice in Florida and then California.
Cooley and Armanious separated on March 30, 2021, and on April 13 Cooley filed a petition for dissolution. In mid-April Cooley moved out of the couple's condominium while Armanious was on a business trip in Florida. On April 27 Cooley, represented by attorney Ari Levy, filed a request for DVRO against Armanious, in which he stated Armanious had physically and emotionally abused him during the relationship, including numerous occasions when Armanious pushed him, berated him, and threatened to take Wyatt away. The family court entered a temporary restraining order and set a hearing on Cooley's request for DVRO.
On May 3, 2021 Armanious filed a response to the petition for dissolution, and on May 12 he filed a request for DVRO against Cooley. In support of his request, Armanious stated, among other things, that in February 2021 Cooley locked himself in a bedroom while under the influence of alcohol and drugs and threatened to kill himself and Wyatt; in March 2021 Cooley threw a laptop computer at Armanious's head during an argument; and in April 2021, when moving out of the condominium, Cooley ransacked the home, stealing $20,000 cash from the safe and other valuables and destroying property and appliances. The family court entered a temporary restraining order and set the request for DVRO for a hearing.
Armanious declared that Wyatt was a gift from his parents and was registered as his service dog. Cooley declared Wyatt was registered as Cooley's service dog and emotional support animal.
While the parties' respective DVRO requests were pending, on June 1, 2021 Cooley notified Armanious's lawyer that he was no longer represented by Levy and was representing himself. Cooley then subpoenaed eight witnesses for deposition and filed two ex parte applications and three motions in limine, all in connection with the hearing on the DVROs. The family court denied all of Cooley's applications and motions. On July 20 Armanious's lawyer filed a declaration attesting that Cooley made "incessant" calls to her law firm and harassed and insulted her and a paralegal.
After a two-day evidentiary hearing on the DVROs at which Cooley, Armanious, and three other witnesses testified, the family court on July 27, 2021 denied Cooley's request, finding he "did not sustain the applicable burden of proof." The court granted Armanious's request for a DVRO and entered a three-year retraining order requiring Cooley to stay away from Armanious and Wyatt, and to surrender possession of and not to return to the condominium. The court also ordered Cooley to pay $1,500 in attorneys' fees and costs to Armanious's lawyer.
Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki presided over the hearing on the DRVOs, entered the orders denying Cooley's request and granting Armanious's request, and signed the DVRO against Cooley.
B. Cooley's Request for Order for Spousal Support, Attorneys' Fees, and Other Relief
On January 24, 2022 Cooley filed a request for order (RFO) seeking pendente lite spousal support of $1,400 per month, attorneys' fees and costs, termination of the DVRO, temporary joint custody of Wyatt, and sanctions relating to Armanious's alleged cancellation of Cooley's health insurance coverage. In the attorneys' fees and costs attachment to the RFO, Cooley requested $75,000 in fees, comprising $10,000 to hire an attorney, $35,000 for fees and costs previously incurred, $30,000 in estimated fees and costs going forward, and $5,000 in other costs. He declared Armanious had "plentiful resources," including ownership with his siblings of Datex, recently valued at $45 million with $6 million in a cash balance.
Cooley declared that after he filed the dissolution petition, Armanious denied him access to the community funds, and Cooley was unemployed for three months after he left Datex at the end of March 2021. He relied on his parents for the $10,000 retainer fee to hire Levy; he put $2,000 on a credit card to replenish the retainer; and multiple friends contributed a total of $25,000 to proceed with the DVRO and continue to replenish the retainer. Cooley proceeded as a self-represented litigant when he ran out of money to replenish the retainer. He obtained employment in early July 2021, but by this time the debts he accrued to cover the costs of litigation and living expenses made it impossible for him to hire a new attorney.
Cooley averred that after the separation, he struggled to find employment in California, and ultimately he secured a job at a law firm in Tampa. In his new job he worked 60 hours per week, but his salary ($120,000 per year) was approximately half of Armanious's salary, and he had no job security. His separate property assets included personal property worth less than $4,000, and he owed $50,000 in credit card debt, $20,000 in unsecured private loans, and $32,000 to friends and family for their payment of his attorneys' fees.
In a supplemental declaration, Cooley stated that at the hearing on the DVROs he had been "self-represented, overwhelmed, and working long hours at a new job." Further, prior to the divorce, Cooley "had absolutely no experience" in family law, he was unable to represent himself effectively, and without an attorney it would be impossible for him "to continue the discovery process and engage in motion practice to seek a proper distribution of assets to finalize this divorce[.]"
On April 15, 2022 Armanious filed a responsive declaration requesting the court deny the RFO in its entirety. Armanious averred that Cooley's period of unemployment was self-imposed because Cooley voluntarily resigned from Datex on March 31, 2021, claiming he had more lucrative offers. Cooley's financial condition was also self-induced in that after the separation Cooley maxed out his credit cards and purchased liquor, airline tickets, expensive clothing, and a vehicle, and Cooley "simply refused to live within his means." Armanious denied cancelling Cooley's health insurance, and he declared Cooley violated the protective order by messaging Armanious's co-employees at Datex about the proceeding and "purposefully select[ing] an apartment across the street" from one of Armanious's intimate friends in Tampa "to keep watch on me and prevent me from going there in the future." Armanious submitted an income and expense declaration showing his monthly salary was $19,718; his monthly investment income was $2,200; his monthly expenses were $19,847; he had cash and security assets of about $95,000; and he had debts of about $167,000, including $130,000 borrowed from his parents.
On April 20, 2022, Cooley, represented by attorney Evan Braunstein, filed a reply declaration in support of the RFO. Cooley stated he had used his tax refund and additional money from his parents to retain Braunstein, and he had incurred more than $44,000 in attorneys' fees to date. He was paying $5,300 per month to service his debts, and "it would be appropriate for the Court to order [Armanious] to pay $25,000 toward my attorney's fees at this time." Cooley stated he would need additional attorneys' fees in the future "to contest the premarital agreement, and to protect my interests in the family residence, retirement accounts, and Datex." Cooley stated he left Datex because he was preparing to file for divorce, and he only told Armanious he had received other job offers in Los Angeles so Armanious would allow him to resign. Cooley denied violating the DVRO, stating he moved into his Tampa apartment without considering Armanious's nearby friend; he contacted Armanious's Datex employees while self-represented to schedule depositions; and he did not send harassing messages to opposing counsel or witnesses. Cooley withdrew his request for joint custody of Wyatt in light of the DVRO requiring him to stay away from Wyatt.
The week before their wedding, Cooley and Armanious executed two prenuptial agreements in which Cooley purportedly disclaimed any interest in Datex and Armanious's separate property interest in the West Hollywood condominium. The agreements included a provision for payment of prevailing party attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing the validity of and compliance with the agreement.
Cooley filed an income and expense declaration showing his monthly salary was $10,000 and his average monthly expenses were $11,611, including monthly payments of $5,316 toward $53,929 in debt (including credit card bills). He listed as assets $229 and real and personal property of $500,000 (including his asserted interest in the condominium). Cooley paid $44,500 in attorneys' fees to date and owed his lawyer $3,500.
The family court held a hearing on the RFO on April 28, 2022 at which Cooley and Armanious testified. The court denied Cooley's request for spousal support "pursuant to Family Code § 3600 and § 4320(i) and considering all relevant factors including the three year DVRO granted against [Cooley]." The court issued "a tentative ruling that [Armanious] is ordered to pay directly to [Cooley's] Counsel the sum of $20,000 in attorney fees pursuant to FC §2030 to litigate the issues relating to the Dissolution through trial." The court ordered that "Keech Declarations may be filed no later than June 15, 2022 and [the] Court will make final ruling as to attorney's fees at the next hearing date." The court set a trial setting conference for June 22, 2022 and ordered the parties to serve their trial briefs and final declarations of disclosure.
Judge Anne Richardson presided over the April 28, 2022 hearing on the RFO and the June 22, 2022 continued hearing on the request for attorneys' fees. The parties did not designate the transcript of the April 28 hearing in their notice designating the record on appeal.
In In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 870 the court reversed an attorneys' fees award that was made without proper inquiry into whether the fees awarded were reasonably necessary. To conduct a proper inquiry, the family court should consider "'"the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney's efforts, his learning, his age, and his experience in the particular type of work demanded [citation]; the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed."'" (Ibid.)
Armanious's June 1, 2022 income and expense declaration and Cooley's June 2, 2022 income and expense declaration were substantially the same as their prior declarations, except that Cooley stated he owed his lawyer $10,000.
On June 13, 2022 Braunstein filed a declaration in support of Cooley's request for attorneys' fees. Braunstein stated he had agreed to represent Cooley on a fixed fee basis through trial and judgment, but his hourly rate for similar services would be $450. The fixed fee included two phases: a fee of $10,000 for the first phase from February 16 through May 26, 2022. This included, among other things reviewing the case file and discovery (six hours); phone calls with Cooley (four hours); reviewing Cooley's RFO and Armanious's responsive declaration (four hours); preparing Cooley's reply declaration, DissoMaster, income and expense declaration, and declarations of disclosure (four hours); communicating with opposing counsel (one hour); preparing for and appearing at the hearing on the RFO (three hours); and legal research concerning the prenuptial agreements (three hours). A second-phase fee of $10,000 for the period from May 26 to July 15, 2022 included 12 hours already spent preparing disclosures, the Keech declaration, and a request for order re bifurcation of the prenuptial agreement issues (among other items), as well as 11.5 hours Braunstein anticipated he would spend drafting the trial briefs, preparing for and attending the trial setting conference and hearing on attorneys' fees, and, as necessary, discussing formal and informal discovery with opposing counsel. According to Braunstein, Cooley had agreed to pay him $2,500 after July 15, which did not include preparing or filing motions, the trial, or third party discovery, which would be subject to a supplemental agreement. Braunstein estimated he would incur costs in the range of $3,000 to $5,000, including filing fees and discovery costs.
Braunstein also addressed the factors enumerated by the court in In re Marriage of Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at page 870, including that the litigation was "potentially complex" depending on the scope of litigation regarding the prenuptial agreements, the litigation would require ordinary skill, the litigation was of "significant importance" due to the hundreds of thousands of dollars at stake, and setting forth the time and fees expended so far and expected to be incurred ($53,000 so far and more than $75,000 in the future if the case goes to trial).
On June 15, 2022 Armanious's attorney, Chandra Moss, filed a declaration stating Armanious had spent $24,306 for her to prepare for and attend the hearing on the DVRO. The case was "not complex," and resolution of the prenuptial agreements and characterization of community property "are not difficult issues." However, Cooley's conduct, including his prosecution of a "frivolous" DVRO request, his harassment and unprofessional treatment of opposing counsel, his overbroad discovery and discovery violations, and his violation of the DVRO had made the litigation much more costly. Moss concluded, "To reward [Cooley's] conduct by ordering attorney fees to be paid by [Armanious] (who is the domestic violence victim in this case) is unreasonable under [section 2032]."
On February 2, 2022, the family court granted two motions to compel Cooley to provide further discovery responses and ordered him to pay $5,000 in discovery sanctions.
C. June 22, 2022 Hearing and Order on Attorneys' Fees
At the June 22, 2022 hearing, the court continued the trial setting conference and invited argument regarding Cooley's request for attorneys' fees, stating, "I did make a tentative, but I didn't have the Keech declaration and I am aware that I need to look at all of the issues under [section] 2030 as well as [section] 4320, given that this is a marriage case." Moss argued on behalf of Armanious that Braunstein's declaration was deficient, and "we have no idea what first phase is and what second phase is" and "[i]t's very difficult to determine what . . . the reasonableness of the fees are." She also argued the section 2032 factors governing a need-based attorneys' fees award did not support Cooley's request because it was Cooley's unreasonable conduct during the litigation (resulting in discovery sanctions and a complaint to the State Bar) that had driven up the fees. She noted Armanious recovered only $1,500 in attorneys' fees in connection with his successful DVRO despite expending far greater fees.
Braunstein argued that while he represented Cooley for a flat fee, and his invoices therefore did not reflect his time expended and specific tasks, he had provided detailed descriptions and time estimates in his declaration. Braunstein disputed that Cooley engaged in misconduct during his period of self-representation and defended Cooley's contacts with opposing counsel and prospective witnesses. However, Braunstein pointed out that Cooley needed an attorney "so he's not left in the situation where he's forced to call and try to get opposing counsel on the phone." Further, Cooley's request was for need-based attorney's fees, which therefore did not involve sanctions under section 271, and "[t]here is not a bar that says that if someone has a restraining order against them they can't get [need-based] attorney's fees."
After hearing argument from counsel, the family court ordered Armanious to pay Cooley $20,000 in attorneys' fees, explaining, "I do think that I'm still going to order the $20,000 in fees. I recognize that there [have] been some allegations of conduct and I decreased . . . the number substantially from the original request, but I do think that there is a basis to try to get this matter concluded. I do think there is disparity and ability to pay by [Armanious]."
On August 9, 2022 the family court signed and filed a statement of findings and order after hearing, finding "there is a disparity in income and ability to pay attorney's fees between the parties" and ordering Armanious pursuant to section 2030 to pay $20,000 in attorneys' fees in $5,000 monthly installments to be paid directly to Braunstein. Armanious timely appealed from the August 9, 2022 order.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
"The purpose of an attorney fees award in a marital dissolution proceeding is to provide, as necessary, one of the parties with funds adequate to properly litigate the matter." (In re Marriage of Bendetti (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 863, 868 (Bendetti); accord, In re Marriage of Falcone &Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 974 ["the trial court is empowered to award fees and costs between the parties based on their relative circumstances in order to ensure parity of legal representation in the action"].) Sections 2030 and 2032 govern an award of need- based attorneys' fees and costs. Section 2030, subdivision (a)(1), provides: "In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation . . . to preserve each party's rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay to the other party, or to the other party's attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney's fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding." Section 2030, subdivision (a)(2), states, "When a request for attorney's fees and costs is made, the court shall make findings on whether an award of attorney's fees and costs under this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties. If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney's fees and costs." "The court must make explicit findings on the issues listed in section 2030, subdivision (a)(2)." (In re Marriage of Hearn (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 380, 393 (Hearn); In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1050.)
Section 2032, subdivision (a), further requires the family court to consider whether the award is "just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties." (Accord, Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 393-394; Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 867.) This determination includes consideration of "the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party's case adequately." (§ 2032, subd. (b); accord, Bendetti, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 868 ["In deciding whether to award attorney fees, the trial court considers the parties' respective needs and incomes, including their assets and liabilities."].) The determination also includes, "to the extent relevant," consideration of the factors enumerated in section 4320 for determining spousal support. (§ 2032, subd. (b); In re Marriage of Falcone &Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 975 ["In assessing a party's relative need and the other party's ability to pay, [the family court] is to take into account '"'all evidence concerning the parties' current incomes, assets, and abilities.'"'"].) Thus, "[f]inancial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances." (§ 2032, subd. (b).) "[T]he record must reflect that the trial court considered the factors set forth in sections 2030 and 2032." (In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1056; accord, Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 238, 242.)
Section 4320 provides that in ordering spousal support, the court "shall consider" a nonexclusive list of 14 factors, including, among those relevant here, the parties' earning capacity (§ 4320, subd. (a)), their ability to pay (id., subd. (c)); their assets and liabilities (id., subd (e)); any documented history of domestic violence (id., subd. (i)); and "[a]ny other factors the court determines are just and equitable" (id., subd. (n)).
"'"On appeal, we review an attorney fee award under section 2030 for an abuse of discretion."'" (Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 394; accord, Bendetti, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 868 ["A motion for attorney fees is left to the trial court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse."].) "'"[T]he abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court's ruling under review. The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious."'" (In re Marriage of Lim &Carrasco (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 768, 774; accord, Hearn, at p. 394 ["'we consider de novo any questions of law raised on appeal but will uphold any findings of fact supported by substantial evidence'"].) An attorneys' fees order "'"will be overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order made."'" (Hearn, at p. 394; accord, In re Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 529, 532.)
B. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding Cooley $20,000 in Attorneys' Fees
Armanious contends the family court abused its discretion in awarding fees to Cooley because the court granted Armanious's petition for a DVRO against Cooley and Armanious should not be required to support his abuser. He also contends the court erred in adopting its April 28, 2022 tentative decision- reached before the court received Braunstein's declaration-as its final fees order without modification. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion.
Armanious also seeks review of the family court's July 27, 2021 order awarding him $1,500 in connection with the parties' DVRO requests, which he argues was inadequate in light of his total attorneys' fees incurred and the $20,000 subsequently awarded to Cooley under section 2030. However, an award of fees under section 6344 is immediately appealable as a collateral order (see In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368369; In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119), and we therefore lack jurisdiction to consider Armanious's contention absent a timely appeal from the award.
As the family court found, the record demonstrates "a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel." (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).) Indeed, Armanious does not specifically challenge the court's express finding that "there is disparity and ability to pay by [Armanious]." The parties' income and expense declarations and other evidence submitted in connection with Cooley's RFO demonstrate that Armanious's monthly income was roughly twice Cooley's (about $20,000 compared to $10,000), and Cooley presented uncontroverted evidence Armanious has significant wealth in connection with a substantial ownership share in Datex, such that paying $20,000, spread over four months, would not unduly burden Armanious. Cooley also submitted largely uncontroverted evidence he was unemployed and his finances were in disrepair following the separation, and he averred that at the time he filed the RFO he could not afford an attorney (and only later retained Braunstein with borrowed funds and a tax refund); he could not effectively represent himself; and his case would be substantially compromised without an attorney. (See Bendetti, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 868 [purpose of fees award is to provide funds "adequate to properly litigate the matter"].)
The record also demonstrates the family court considered the requisite factors in section 2032 and, as relevant, section 4320. In addition to the parties' relative need and ability to pay, the court received evidence regarding Cooley's role in protracting the litigation, the DVRO against Cooley, and the reasonableness of Braunstein's fees. And in its oral ruling the court recognized "there [have] been some allegations of conduct" and it had "decreased . . . the number substantially from the original request." On this record we cannot say that no judge could have reasonably granted Cooley's request under the circumstances. (In re Marriage of Cryer, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056; Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 394.)
Armanious presents no support for his contention that the family court categorically cannot award need-based attorneys' fees under section 2030 to a party who has been restrained by a DVRO. He cites section 6344, subdivision (a), of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), which, as recently amended, provides that "[a]fter notice and a hearing, a court, upon request, shall issue an order for the payment of attorney's fees and costs for a prevailing petitioner." But here, the family court awarded Cooley attorneys' fees under section 2030 for work performed after the DVRO hearing; Armanious's prior request for fees in connection with his request for a DVRO was not at issue (and, as noted, that award is now final).
Effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 2369 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022, ch. 591, § 2) amended section 6344, subdivision (a), to specify the court "shall" (formerly, "may") award attorneys' fees and costs to a prevailing DVPA petitioner.
Armanious relies on Darab Cody N. v. Olivera (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1134, in which the Court of Appeal affirmed an order denying a mother's request for need-based attorneys' fees under section 7605 in a child-custody action where the father prevailed on his request for a DVRO against the mother and obtained custody of their daughter. Darab does not support Armanious's position. There, the mother sought $100,000 in attorneys' fees, but her papers did "'not clearly state how much of the total is allocated to the DVRO proceedings, the non-DVRO proceedings, and future proceedings.'" (Id. at p. 1143.) Despite this deficiency, the Court of Appeal analyzed separately the mother's DVRO-related and non-DVRO-related fees. With respect to the mother's attorneys' fees requested for the DVRO, the court explained a fee award to a restrained party "for fees incurred in connection with that domestic violence proceeding" was contrary to the DVPA. (Id. at pp. 1144.) But with respect to "fees incurred in connection with other issues" (including, for example, custody, visitation and child support), the trial court was required "to exercise its discretion based on a consideration of all the relevant factors." (Id. at p. 1144.) As to these fees, the trial court properly "considered the domestic abuse, [mother's] litigation tactics, and the reasonableness and necessity of [her] actions in the trial court, and came to a conclusion" to deny her fees. (Id. at p. 1145.) The Court of Appeal concluded, "Based on the record before us, and considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in support of the trial court's order, [the mother] has not shown 'that no judge could reasonably have made the order' denying attorney fees." (Ibid.) As discussed, the family court here likewise considered the DVRO against Cooley, Cooley's litigation tactics, and the reasonableness and necessity of his actions, but determined in its broad discretion that in light of the disparity of income and Armanious's ability to pay, an award of attorneys' fees was appropriate to address work performed after the DVRO hearing.
Armanious's contention the family court erred by adopting as its final order the tentative ruling it made before receiving Braunstein's declaration is likewise meritless. Although the parties have not provided a transcript of the April 28, 2022 hearing on the RFO, the minute order states the court denied Cooley's request for spousal support "considering all relevant factors including the three year DVRO granted against [Cooley]," while it tentatively ruled that Armanious should pay $20,000 to Braunstein "pursuant to FC § 2030 to litigate the issues relating to the Dissolution through trial." It is evident the court deferred a final determination of Cooley's fees request precisely because the court recognized its obligation to consider the reasonableness of Braunstein's fees in addition to the factors set forth in sections 2030 and 2032 (which had already been briefed). As the court stated at the beginning of the June 22 hearing, "I did make a tentative, but I didn't have the Keech declaration and I am aware that I need to look at all of the issues under 2030 as well as 4320." Moreover, prior to the court's final ruling, the parties submitted attorney declarations and made extensive arguments concerning the reasonableness of the fees and adequacy of Braunstein's declaration. We therefore infer the trial court found that Braunstein's fees were indeed reasonable when it entered its final order without changing the amount proposed in the tentative order.
We reject Armanious's argument that the fact the court denied Cooley's request for spousal support shows an abuse of discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. Although a request for pendente lite spousal support under section 3600 and a request for attorneys' fees under section 2030 both require the court to consider similar factors, including those enumerated in section 4320, the purposes of the statutes are different. "The purpose of pendente lite spousal support is to maintain the parties' standards of living in as close as possible to the preparation status quo." (In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 103.) The purpose of an award of attorneys' fees under section 2030 is, as discussed, to ensure each party has "funds adequate to properly litigate the matter." (Bendetti, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 868.) The family court's disparate resolution of the two issues shows a measured exercise of its discretion, not an abuse.
Finally, Armanious did not argue below and does not contend on appeal that Braunstein's fees were excessive or the legal services were unreasonable under the circumstances. He argues only that Braunstein's declaration was not sufficiently detailed for the family court to make a proper order. He points to Braunstein's statement that after July 15, 2022 Braunstein would begin to charge Cooley a fixed fee of $2,500 per month, but this fee would not include any necessary "motions, trials or third party discovery." However, Braunstein provided the court with ample detail to support a determination that the $20,000 in fees he billed for the prior period from February 16 through July 15, 2022 was reasonable (including specific estimates of the time needed for tasks including legal research, preparing declarations, disclosures, trial briefs, and pretrial motions). Whether the fees awarded will carry Cooley through the trial, and whether additional fees are warranted or reasonably incurred are not before us. (See In re Marriage of Cryer, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056 ["'No single fees and costs order is an "all or nothing" proposition. Need-based awards may be augmented or modified as necessary during the entire pendency of the case, consistent with the parties' "relative circumstances"'"]; § 2030, subd. (c) ["The court shall augment or modify the original award for attorney's fees and costs as may be reasonably necessary for the prosecution or defense of the proceeding, or any proceeding related thereto, including after any appeal has been concluded."].)
DISPOSITION
The family court's August 9, 2022 order is affirmed. Cooley is to recover his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: MARTINEZ, J., EVENSON, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.