Opinion
NO. 01-16-00232-CV
04-11-2017
ANTOINETTE COOKSEY, Appellant v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Appellee
On Appeal from the 405th District Court Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 14-CV-0768
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of a plea to the jurisdiction. Appellant Antoinette Cooksey sued the Texas Department of Criminal Justice based on injuries she sustained in a car accident. TDCJ filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that Cooksey had failed to provide it with notice of her claims. The trial court granted the jurisdictional plea.
In her sole issue on appeal, Cooksey argues that the trial court erred by granting TDCJ's plea to the jurisdiction because it had actual notice of her claims. Because Cooksey's evidence did not raise a fact issue regarding whether TDCJ had actual subjective awareness of its alleged fault in causing her injuries, we affirm.
Background
Two employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Officer Amanda Dewalt and Officer Paulette Bryant, were assigned to transport an inmate, Antoinette Cooksey, from the Lane Murray Unit to the Carole Young Medical Facility. Cooksey was wheelchair bound, which required the officers to transport her in a special wheelchair-accessible van. After strapping Cooksey and her wheelchair into the van, the officers departed for the medical facility. On the way, a drunk driver hit the back of the van, causing it to swerve into the median of the highway. After the accident, the officers found Cooksey lying on the floor in the back of the van, complaining of chest pains. Emergency Medical Services personnel transported Cooksey to a hospital for assessment.
Cooksey filed a suit for damages based on injuries she sustained during the accident. In her original petition, she asserted claims against the drunk driver, the owner of the vehicle driven by the drunk driver, TDCJ, and the seller of the van driven by TDCJ officers. Cooksey later amended her petition to claim that TDCJ was responsible for her injuries caused by Officer Dewalt's alleged failure to "maintain a proper lookout or take proper evasive action to avoid the collision." Cooksey also alleged that Officer Dewalt failed to properly secure her in the van.
In response to these allegations, TDCJ filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which it contended that Cooksey had failed to provide notice of her claims as required by the Texas Tort Claims Act. As a result, TDCJ claimed that it had not waived governmental immunity and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Cooksey's claims against it. Cooksey filed a response, contending that formal notice was not required because TDCJ had actual notice of her claims. She attached several exhibits, consisting of documents created during the course of TDCJ's investigation.
The evidence that Cooksey relied upon to demonstrate TDCJ's actual notice of her claims consisted of deposition testimony from Officer Dewalt, witness statements regarding the accident from Officer Dewalt and Officer Bryant, and other documents created during the course of TDCJ's investigation.
In her deposition, Officer Dewalt testified that she received most of her training "on the job," and she never had been to any formal training on how to transport an inmate in a wheelchair. The officers' witness statements described the events of the day of the accident, and both officers' versions of events were similar. They both discussed how Officer Dewalt followed all of the correct procedures in strapping Cooksey into the van, and they described how their van was rear-ended as they were traveling down the highway. Both witness statements described the events that transpired after the accident, including finding Cooksey lying on the floor of the van.
Cooksey's remaining exhibits consisted of documents created during the investigation of the accident. These documents included several summaries of the accident. None of these documents discussed the procedures the officers followed in strapping Cooksey into the van in as much detail as the witness statements.
After a hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court granted the plea and signed a take-nothing judgment in favor of TDCJ. Cooksey appealed.
Analysis
In her sole issue on appeal, Cooksey contends that the trial court erred by granting TDCJ's plea to the jurisdiction because she raised a fact issue regarding whether it received actual notice of her claim. Cooksey does not contend that she provided formal written notice to TDCJ.
Governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id. at 226. In reviewing a trial court's jurisdictional ruling, we construe the pleadings in the plaintiff's favor. Id. A plaintiff bears the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the case. Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003). We consider only the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. To survive a plea to the jurisdiction, Cooksey must "show that there is a disputed material fact regarding the jurisdictional issue." Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. We take as true all evidence favorable to Cooksey and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in her favor. See id. "[T]his standard generally mirrors that of a summary judgment." Id.
The Texas Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity. Id. at 224 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.001-.109). It requires that a plaintiff give timely formal notice to a governmental unit that reasonably describes: "(1) the damage or injury claimed; (2) the time and place of the incident; and (3) the incident." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(a). But this notice provision does "not apply if the governmental unit has actual notice . . . that the claimant has received some injury." Id. § 101.101(c). "Statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity." TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.034.
Actual notice in this context "requires knowledge of (1) a death, injury, or property damage; (2) the governmental unit's alleged fault producing or contributing to the death, injury, or property damage; and (3) the identity of the parties involved." Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Tex. 2004). Actual notice is a fact question when the evidence is disputed, but it can be determined as a matter of law if no disputed fact issue exists. Id. at 348; Harris Cty. v. Luna-Prudencio, 294 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). TDCJ concedes that it knew Cooksey was injured in the accident and that it knew the identity of the parties involved in the accident. But it argues that the evidence did not raise a fact issue about whether it had knowledge of its alleged fault in causing the injury, and therefore it contends it did not have actual notice of her claim. Thus, our review of the trial court's decision to grant the plea to the jurisdiction focuses on whether TDCJ had knowledge of its alleged fault in causing Cooksey's injuries.
Knowledge of the alleged fault requires the governmental unit's "subjective awareness of its fault, as ultimately alleged by the claimant, in producing or contributing to the claimed injury." Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 347. "It is not enough that a governmental unit should have investigated an incident as a prudent person would have, or that it did investigate, perhaps as part of routine safety procedures, or that it should have known from the investigation it conducted that it might have been at fault." Id. at 347-48. Subjective awareness of fault ensures that the governmental unit will have "the same incentive to gather information that the statute is designed to provide." Id. at 348.
In her petition, Cooksey alleged that Officer Dewalt was at fault in causing her injuries by failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to take evasive action, or failing to properly strap her into the van. She contends that the officers' written statements regarding the accident, Officer Dewalt's deposition testimony, and other documents created by TDCJ as a result of the investigation demonstrate that it had actual subjective awareness of its alleged fault. To support her contention that TDCJ had actual subjective awareness of its alleged fault, Cooksey relies upon several cases including Ortiz-Guevara v. City of Houston, No. 14-13-00384-CV, 2014 WL 1618371 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 22, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.), Harris County v. Luna-Prudencio, 294 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.), University of Texas Health Science Center. at San Antonio v. Stevens, 330 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.), and Parsons v. Dallas County, 197 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).
In Ortiz-Guevara, a City of Houston police officer rear-ended a stopped car causing Ortiz-Guevara to suffer injuries. 2014 WL 1618371 at *1. The trial court granted a plea to the jurisdiction in favor of the City. Id. The court of appeals reversed the plea to the jurisdiction because there was a fact issue regarding whether the City had actual notice of the claims. Id. at *2-4. The court held that the City had actual subjective awareness of its alleged fault because of an accident report listing the police officer's "failure to control speed" as a cause of the accident. Id. at *4. Thus, the court's holding regarding a fact issue was based in part on evidence that directly attributed fault to the City employee. See id.
In Luna-Prudencio, Harris County filed suit against Sonia Luna-Prudencio alleging that she ran a red light causing an accident involving her and a Harris County employee. 294 S.W.3d at 694-95. Luna-Prudencio counterclaimed against Harris County, alleging that the employee ran the red light. Id. The passengers in Luna-Prudencio's vehicle at the time of the accident intervened in the lawsuit. Id. They also alleged that the employee ran the red light. Id. The trial court denied a plea to the jurisdiction filed by Harris County based on lack of notice of the claims against it. Id. On appeal, this court held that both Luna-Prudencio and the intervenors had given written notice to Harris County within six months of the accident. Id. at 696-700. The court also held that by initiating the lawsuit, Harris County had waived immunity with respect to Luna-Prudencio's compulsory counterclaim. Id. at 698.
In Stevens, a doctor incorrectly injected Kyra Stevens with anesthetic causing her to suffer chemical burns. 330 S.W.3d at 336. As a result, Stevens filed suit against the hospital at which the doctor worked. Id. at 337. The hospital filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on lack of notice of Stevens's claims against it. Id. The trial court overruled the hospital's jurisdictional plea because an agent of the hospital conducted an investigation into the doctor's actions and discovered that the doctor had made a mistake. Id. at 336-37. In fact, the agent had used the mistake as teaching tool. Id. On appeal, the court held that the trial court had not erred when it denied the hospital's plea to the jurisdiction because one of the hospital's agents knew of the hospital's alleged fault in causing Stevens's injuries. Id. at 339-41.
In Parsons, an inmate brought suit against Dallas County after suffering injuries from a fall that occurred after he leaned against an unanchored table in a prison. 197 S.W.3d at 917. The county filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of notice. Id. at 917-18. On appeal, the court held that the county had actual subjective awareness of its alleged fault simply because they knew of the "unanchored table's role in the injuries." Id. at 919. Essentially, the court determined that the only cause of his fall was the table, and the county controlled the table. Further, the court held that the county failed to prove the inmate did not give them formal written notice. Id.
This case is distinguishable in several respects from these cases relied upon by Cooksey. Cooksey has produced no evidence that directly identified Officer Dewalt's alleged failures to keep a proper lookout, to take evasive action, or to properly strap her into the van as a cause of her injuries. Cooksey also did not produce any evidence indicating that she sent formal notice to TDCJ within six months of the accident, and TDCJ did not file suit against her. In addition, Cooksey has no evidence that any TDCJ agents knew that Officer Dewalt was at fault in causing her injuries. Finally, TDCJ demonstrated that Cooksey did not give it formal written notice, and she does not dispute that she failed to do so.
We conclude that this case is more similar to that of City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. 2010). In that case, Olivia Carbajal sued the City of Dallas for injuries she sustained after driving onto an excavated road. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d at 538. A Dallas police officer who responded to the accident filed a written report describing the accident, in which he determined that the road where the accident occurred had not been blocked properly. Id. After Carbajal filed suit, the city filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on lack of notice of her claims. Id. The trial court denied the plea. Id. On appeal, the city claimed that it was not subjectively aware of its fault based on the police report which stated that the street had not been blocked properly. Id. The court held that the police report "did not provide the City with subjective awareness of fault because it did not even imply, let alone expressly state, that the City was at fault." Id. at 539. The court then concluded that the report was no more than a routine safety investigation, which is insufficient to provide actual notice, and it rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
In this case, Cooksey suggests that the documents she relies upon contained circumstantial evidence that provided TDCJ with subjective awareness of its fault. Subjective awareness can be proved by circumstantial evidence. Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 348. Cooksey specifically points to the officers' statements regarding the incident in which they said that they strapped her into the vehicle. Cooksey relies upon those statements and the other investigative documents which indicate that she was found on the floor of the van after the accident. Cooksey thus attempts to draw from this evidence an inference that the officers must have acted improperly when they placed her in the van.
Although Cooksey suggests that Officer Dewalt's failure to properly strap her into the van could have caused her to end up on the floor of the van, there could be other explanations. We cannot deduce that the City subjectively acknowledged that Officer Dewalt failed to properly strap Cooksey into the van based solely on the reported facts that the officer strapped her in before the accident, and after the accident she was found on the floor of the van.
None of the documents suggest that Officer Dewalt improperly secured Cooksey into the van. To the contrary, the officers expressly stated that Officer Dewalt properly strapped Cooksey into the van. Additionally, none of the documents suggest that Officer Dewalt failed to keep a proper lookout or take evasive action. The documents discussed how a drunk driver hit the van from behind, causing it to swerve. The documents also discussed how the drunk driver was charged with DUI and reckless endangerment as result of the accident. We conclude that the documents Cooksey relies upon reflected routine investigation into the accident, and they are insufficient to establish that TDCJ had actual notice of claims against it. See Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d at 537-39; Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 347-48.
Because the evidence produced by Cooksey consisted of documents created as part of a routine investigation into the accident, and none of the documents implied or stated that Officer Dewalt or TDCJ was at fault for her injuries, we hold that she did not raise a fact issue regarding whether TDCJ had actual subjective awareness of its alleged fault. See Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d at 537-39; Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 347-48. Thus, the trial court did not err by granting TDCJ's plea to the jurisdiction. We overrule Cooksey's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Michael Massengale
Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Massengale.