Cook v. United States

6 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Johnson

    475 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1973)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that purse on table immediately in front of visitor was not in visitor's possession

    The record will not support that assertion either, for the few facts that were developed at the hearing tended to negate any inference that she had knowledge of the nature of the establishment she was in, see Jones v. United States, 271 A.2d 559, 560 (D.C.App. 1970), or that she was chargeable with such knowledge by reason of the obviousness of the situation. See Cook v. United States, 272 A.2d 444, 446 (D.C.App. 1971). The record is deficient in these respects because the trial judge focused exclusively on whether the search preceded a formal arrest.

  2. Rivas v. U.S.

    783 A.2d 125 (D.C. 2001)   Cited 149 times
    Reversing the conviction of an automobile passenger for constructive possession of narcotics in the vehicle, stating: “There must be something to prove that the individual was not merely an incidental bystander. It may be foolish to stand by when others are acting illegally, or to associate with those who have committed a crime. Such conduct or association, however, without more, does not establish the offenses here charged.”

    See also Bernard, 575 A.2d at 1195 ("mere proximity to an illegal item is not enough"; apartment); Jefferson v. United States, 558 A.2d 298, 303 (D.C. 1989); Curry, 520 A.2d at 263 ("mere proximity to an illegal item does not of itself prove knowledge coupled with dominion or control"; apartment); Wheeler, 494 A.2d at 172 ("Mere proximity to an illegal substance will be insufficient to uphold a conviction on a theory of constructive possession when an individual is one of several people found by authorities together with the substance"; hotel room). See also Cook v. United States, 272 A.2d 444, 447 (D.C. 1971) (inference that visitor-appellant constructively possessed contraband "strained" when "tenant or lessee of the apartment was present at the time of the raid"). Thus, for example, in In re T.M., 577 A.2d 1149 (D.C. 1990), we reversed the adjudications of delinquency for possession of a firearm and ammunition in a case in which the appellants were found in a bedroom "roughly equidistant from the contraband" when the police arrived.

  3. Speight v. U.S.

    599 A.2d 794 (D.C. 1991)   Cited 13 times

    Similarly, in this case, the evidence indicated that appellant was nothing more than a visitor in someone's residence where contraband was discovered. See Cook v. United States, 272 A.2d 444, 447 (D.C. 1971) (concluding that presence of tenant and others strains inference that non-tenant appellant possessed contraband found within apartment). The government contends, however, that by giving a false name to the arresting officers appellant "[attempted] to conceal his involvement in this drug distribution group."

  4. Wheeler v. United States

    494 A.2d 170 (D.C. 1985)   Cited 30 times
    In Wheeler, we explained that if several people are in a room in which contraband is found, then "[e]ven where the government proves that the defendant is a resident of the place where illegal items are seized, the courts are wary of imputing possession to the defendant absent proof of [her] involvement in some criminal enterprise."

    Mere proximity to an illegal substance will be insufficient to uphold a conviction on a theory of constructive possession when an individual is one of several people found by the authorities on the premises together with the substance. Cook v. United States, 272 A.2d 444, 447 (D.C. 1971) (conviction for possession of narcotics paraphernalia reversed where the government did not show appellant to be a resident of the premises and the actual tenant and other occupants were also present on the scene at the time of the raid); United States v. Holland, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 225, 227, 445 F.2d 701, 703 (1971) (conviction for possession of heroin reversed where drugs were found in codefendant's apartment, and although appellant was present when drugs were found the government did not show that he was residing there); see United States v. Pardo, 204 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 277, 636 F.2d 535, 549 (1980) (conviction for possession with intent to distribute narcotics reversed where appellant was merely present while a drug transaction was consummated between other individuals); United States v. Watkins, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 162, 519 F.2d 294, 298 (1975) (conviction for possession of narcotics reversed even though police found appellant and narcotics in the same room, where two other indiv

  5. Geddie v. United States

    284 A.2d 668 (D.C. 1971)   Cited 1 times
    Stating that the court “adhere[d] to th[e] precedent” of McClough that D.C.Code § 22–1515 was not unconstitutional

    For the foregoing reasons we hold that, in the instant case, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of a license. The other substantive points raised by appellants have previously been dealt with by this court and we adhere to those precedents: (1) D.C. Code 1967, § 22-1515(a) is not unconstitutional, United States v. McClough, D.C. App., 263 A.2d 48 (1970), and (2) paraphernalia in plain view supports inference of knowledge of illegal activity, Wells v. United States, D.C. App., 281 A.2d 226 (1971); Cook v. United States, D.C. App., 272 A.2d 444 (1971). Affirmed.

  6. Wells v. United States

    281 A.2d 226 (D.C. 1971)   Cited 11 times
    In Wells, we held that simply asking a group of persons about the ownership of a coat during the execution of a warrant did not amount to custodial interrogation as contemplated by Miranda.

    A useable quantity of heroin was found along with narcotics paraphernalia, some of which were still in plain view after the officers entered. See Cook v. United States, D.C.App., 272 A.2d 444 (1971). The fact that some narcotics and paraphernalia were found under the couch suggests that they may have been placed there hurriedly upon the arrival of the police.