Cook v. Chase Home Finance, LLC

Full title: LILLIAN F. COOK, Plaintiff, v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

Date published: Dec 28, 2010

CASE NO. 10-15108 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2010)

Opinion

CASE NO. 10-15108.

December 28, 2010

ORDER

LAWRENCE ZATKOFF, District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. #2), filed on December 23, 2010.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b), the Court may issue a temporary restraining order if "specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition." The Court is to consider the following four factors in determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to a temporary restraining order or other preliminary injunctive relief:

(1) whether the movant has shown a strong or substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits;

(2) whether the movant has shown that he or she would suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary relief is not issued;

(3) whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction will not cause substantial harm to third parties; and

(4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Assoc., Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995); UASCO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1982); Mason County Med. Ass'n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977).

II. FINDINGS OF THE COURT

In her motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Plaintiff requests that the Court stay the expiration of her March 14, 2011, redemption period for real property located in Troy, Michigan. Having reviewed Plaintiff's Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order. In particular, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she would suffer an immediate injury if the Court were to deny her requested relief because her redemption period does not expire until March 14, 2011. Additionally, Plaintiff's conclusory analysis and references to the factual allegations in her complaint fail to demonstrate a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her claims.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. #2) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 28, 2010