Opinion
No. 2:16-CV-2951-KJM-CMK
07-30-2018
FERNANDO REGGIE COOK-MORALES, SR., Plaintiff, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SISKIYOU, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the court is plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court is also required to screen complaints brought by litigants who have been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under these screening provisions, the court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B) and 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this court must dismiss an action if the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Because plaintiff, who is not a prisoner, has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court will screen the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), the court will also consider as a threshold matter whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) the Siskiyou County Superior Court; (2) Siskiyou County Superior Court Commissioner Bicego; and (3) Brian Honskins, an officer with the California Highway Patrol. According to plaintiff's complaint and documents attached thereto, plaintiff was issued a traffic citation by officer Honskins on April 11, 2016, for violating the posted speed limit. Specifically, plaintiff was charged with exceeding 50 miles per hour in a zone marked with a maximum speed limit of 35 miles per hour. Plaintiff signed the citation and agreed to appear before the Siskiyou County Superior Court on June 6, 2016, to answer the citation. While plaintiff references a "Statement of Truth Sworn Affidavit" and "Attached Evidence" when asked to state the facts underlying his claim, nothing provided with the complaint alleges any facts with respect to the April 11, 2016, citation or any of the named defendants.
Under the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine, federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear matters already decided in state court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine applies in cases "brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). In this case, it appears that plaintiff is challenging whatever action the state court took against him based on the April 11, 2016, traffic citation, in which case the court should abstain. However, because it is not clear what the exact contours of plaintiff's claim are, the court cannot conclude with certainty that it should abstain. Plaintiff will, therefore, be given an opportunity to amend the complaint to allege in specific terms the factual basis for liability as to each named defendant. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between each defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply with Rule 8 may, in the court's discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. DATED: July 30, 2018
/s/_________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE