In this case there is the clear-cut principle that it is an employer's duty to protect its employee against the employer's own negligence. See Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago St. Louis Railway Co. v. Gossett, (1909) 172 Ind. 525, 87 N.E. 723; Conway v. Park, (1941) 108 Ind. App. 562, 31 N.E.2d 79. Although typically used in reference to physical injuries suffered in such master-servant relationships, we find no reason not to apply the general principle to economic injury as occurred here.Id. at 629.

See, e.g., Bath Mills v. Odom, 168 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1948) (holding that the purpose of a South Carolina Workmen's Compensation law that penalized non-insurance was "to make the negligence of the employer the sole test of his liability"); Hossack v. Metzger, 156 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1946) (noting that because of the employer's non-compliance with the South Dakota's Workmen's Compensation Act requiring insurance, "appellee is subject to an action for damages for the injury of death of an employee resulting from negligence attributable to appellee"); Robles v. Preciado, 79 P.2d 504 (Ariz. 1938) (holding that an injured employee's action at law against and uninsured employer "still remains in its essence an action in which liability is based upon the negligence of the employer, and, unless such negligence exists, there can be no recovery"); Conway v. Park, 31 N.E.2d 79 (Ind.Ct.App. 1941) (stating that where an employer did not carry compensation insurance, "[t]he Workmen's Compensation Act does not relieve the injured employee from the responsibility of alleging and proving facts sufficient to constitute an action at law in negligence if he elects to pursue his remedy at law); Tonioli v. Hilbert, 781 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 2004) (stating that an injured employee who exercises the right to sue an uninsured employer for damages under the Workers' Compensation Law "must demonstrate negligence on the part of the employer"). See also J.T.W., Annotation, Workmen's compensation: civil and criminal consequences of failure to insure, or otherwise secure compensation, 21 A.L.R. 1428 (1922).

The City properly notes that knowledge "or opportunity by the exercise of reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge" of the condition which results in injury is an essential element necessary to establish liability. Conway v. Park (1941) 108 Ind. App. 562, 572, 31 N.E.2d 79, 83. The record is replete with testimony concerning the complaints made about Engine No. 2. Brian Etchison testified that he complained several times to then Chief Warner about Engine No. 2 and that he further told both Chiefs Owen and Summer that he thought Engine No. 2 was unsafe.

In this case, there is the clear-cut principle that it is an employer's duty to protect its employee against the employer's own negligence. See Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago St. Louis Railway Co. v. Gossett, (1909) 172 Ind. 525, 87 N.E. 723; Conway v. Park, (1941) 108 Ind. App. 562, 31 N.E.2d 79. Although typically used in reference to physical injuries incurred in such master-servant relationships, we find no reason not to apply the general principle to economic injury as occurred here. Thus, having found a duty, we add the facts alleged by the Ebys and find they could constitute a breach thereof in conformance with the tort of negligent misrepresentation. Because these facts are in dispute, summary judgment was inappropriate.