Opinion
A161343
01-24-2022
In re TYLER S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. ANDREA W., Defendant; CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, Plaintiff and Respondent, TYLER S., Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J20-00578
Jackson, P. J.
Tyler appeals from an order dismissing a juvenile dependency petition filed under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The juvenile court dismissed the petition at the contested jurisdiction hearing, which was held the day before Tyler turned 18 years old. Tyler contends the dismissal was based upon the juvenile court's erroneous conclusion that because the 1 dispositional hearing could not be held before Tyler turned 18 years old, the petition should be dismissed. Because Tyler is now over 18 years old, the juvenile court cannot initiate dependency jurisdiction over him. (§§ 300, 355.) Thus, we are unable to grant effective relief and we dismiss the appeal as moot.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
BACKGROUND
I. Juvenile Dependency Law Overview
We provide a brief overview of the stages of a juvenile dependency proceeding relevant to this appeal."' "A dependency proceeding under section 300 is essentially a bifurcated proceeding." [Citation.] First, the court must determine whether the minor is within any of the descriptions set out in section 300 and therefore subject to its jurisdiction.' [Citation.]' "The petitioner in a dependency proceeding must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child who is the subject of a petition comes under the juvenile court's jurisdiction."' [Citation.] 'The basic question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.'" (In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 243-244, disapproved on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, 1010, fns. 4 & 7.)" 'After the juvenile court finds a child to be within its jurisdiction, the court must conduct a dispositional hearing. [Citation.] At the dispositional hearing, the court must decide where the child will live while under the court's supervision.'" (In re A.S., at p. 247.) 2
Prior to the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court holds an initial hearing (also referred to as a detention hearing) to determine whether the evidence establishes a prima facie showing that the minor comes within section 300 and whether the minor should be detained pending the jurisdiction hearing. (§ 319, subd. (c).)
Additionally, the California Fostering Connections to Success Act (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.); Assem. Bill No. 212 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.)) (Assem. Bill 12) extended the California foster care program to apply to eligible nonminor dependents up to age 21. (In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 645, fn. 5 (David B.).) Under Assem. Bill 12, after January 1, 2012, the juvenile court "shall have within its jurisdiction any nonminor dependent, as defined in [§ 11400, subd. (v)]." (§ 303, subd. (b).) Section 11400, subdivision (v) defines nonminor dependent as "a foster child . . . who is a current dependent child or ward of the juvenile court . . . who satisfies all of the following criteria: [¶] (1) The nonminor dependent has attained 18 years of age while under an order of foster care placement by the juvenile court . . . . [¶] (2) The nonminor dependent is in foster care under the placement and care responsibility of the county welfare department . . . . [¶] (3) The nonminor dependent has a transitional independent living case plan . . . as described in Section 11403." Nonminor dependents who satisfy certain educational and vocational conditions listed in section 11403, subdivision (b) are eligible to receive financial support, potentially up until they reach 21 years of age. (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 645 & fn. 5.)
II. Prior Dependency Proceedings in Alameda County
In December 2012, when Tyler was 10 years old, Alameda County filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging, in part, that mother physically disciplined Tyler with a belt. The incident occurred after Tyler ran away 3 from mother while she was picking up her younger child at day care. Mother reported Tyler missing, and the police located him later that evening. Mother admitted hitting Tyler with a belt because she was angry. Mother was arrested, but criminal charges were not filed. Tyler was placed in foster care through 2013. During that time he and mother received therapeutic visitation. Tyler was also treated for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and insomnia. Tyler was reunified with mother in January 2014.
Tyler was born on October 30, 2002.
The prior petition is not part of the record, but certain allegations are summarized in the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau's (Bureau) October 27, 2020 detention/jurisdiction report.
Alameda County's investigation included an interview with the principal of Tyler's elementary school, who reported that Tyler frequently ran off campus and that local merchants had provided video showing Tyler stealing from their stores. The principal described Tyler as a" 'charming young man, [who] is manipulative, lies and steals.' "
In June 2014, mother requested voluntary placement for Tyler because she did not believe she could meet his specialized needs. Mother stated a concern for her personal safety due to false allegations by Tyler and reported that his stealing behavior was worsening. Tyler was placed with his prior foster family, and then in February 2015 he was placed with his maternal grandmother (grandmother). Mother visited him frequently, and they participated in family therapy. Tyler acknowledged to his social worker that he made a false accusation that caused him to be removed from mother's care. He regretted not being truthful and being separated from mother. In July 2015, Tyler returned to mother's home with family maintenance services. In January 2016, the Alameda juvenile court dismissed the dependency case to informal supervision. In April 2016, when Tyler was 13 years old, Alameda County reported that mother and Tyler had made substantial progress, the family situation had stabilized, and the case was closed. 4
The record does not state the nature of the false accusation.
III. 2020 Investigations
Neither Alameda County nor the Bureau had contact with mother or Tyler for approximately four years. During this time, Tyler was not under the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Then, in March 2020, when Tyler was 17 years old, the Bureau conducted an investigation into an incident in which mother allegedly threatened Tyler with a knife during an argument about housecleaning, and allegations that mother harassed Tyler for being gay. Tyler reported mother yelled at him and when he yelled back mother" 'held up this big knife and threatened [him] . . . .'" He said mother" 'touched'" him with the knife and forced him to" 'back up.'" Tyler stated that his relationship with mother was" 'up and down'" and that he no longer wanted to live with her. He had moved in with the family of a school friend and planned to stay there until he graduated from high school.
According to the Bureau's October 27, 2020 detention/jurisdiction report, mother was living in Contra Costa County in March 2020.
The Bureau social worker interviewed Tyler's nine-year-old brother, Nico, who said he heard yelling and saw Tyler push mother" 'a little'" and that Tyler and mother argue often. Mother was also interviewed. She stated that when she chastised Tyler for not doing his chores, Tyler tried to force her out of his room by pushing her. She pushed him back. She denied threatening Tyler with a knife and could not believe that he made that accusation. She explained that she understands the possible consequences of physically disciplining Tyler from her prior experience with Child Protective Services in 2012. Mother acknowledged she was still" 'adjusting'" to Tyler's being gay because it was" 'not something you want for your child [because 5 it's so hard], but he's my son and I love him . . . .' " The social worker concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate safety concerns warranting the court's jurisdiction under section 300.
Tyler reported he told his mother he was gay when he was 14 years old and she became angry and harassed him about it.
On May 8, 2020, a reporting party reported mother threatened Tyler with a screwdriver during an argument. Mother reportedly then hurt herself, causing her nose to bleed. According to the reporting party, mother called 911 and claimed Tyler hurt her because he is bipolar and aggressive. Tyler was placed on a psychiatric hold on the night of May 6th and released the next day. Mother picked him up from the hospital and took him to his friend's home. The reporting party stated mother harassed the friend's parents and they were no longer willing to have Tyler live there. The Bureau interviewed mother, who denied she threatened Tyler with a screwdriver. She said Tyler elbowed her in the face and caused her nose to bleed. Mother believed Tyler was telling lies so he could live with his friend's family. Mother was concerned about Tyler's living with his friend's family because they moved frequently and Tyler and his friend smoked marijuana. Mother stated that the friend's siblings threatened her. Although mother did not approve of Tyler's living with his friend's family, she said she decided to allow it because he continued running away.
The social worker's report regarding the incident refers to a police report stating that Tyler wielded the screwdriver. The police report is not included in the record.
When the social worker interviewed Tyler, he said he could not stay with mother because" 'she is too much.'" He wanted a relationship with her, but he could not be around her all the time. Tyler denied elbowing mother's face and said he did not touch her. He also denied having any marks or 6 bruises, and he provided no other information about the incident. The mother of Tyler's friend told the social worker that she allowed Tyler to live with her because he told her his mother abused him and that he was welcome to stay with her until he turned 18.
The social worker also interviewed grandmother, who reported that the conflict between Tyler and mother was mostly about chores. Additionally, grandmother reported that Tyler was upset because mother would not allow him to go to Los Angeles by himself. According to grandmother, mother worked hard to provide for Tyler and his brother; they both did well in school; and although mother is a "yeller," she does not hit Tyler. Grandmother explained that mother had learned from her prior child welfare case.
On June 24, 2020, the Bureau received a referral from a reporting party summarizing the March 2020 and May 2020 incidents and reporting that Tyler was currently staying at an emergency youth shelter because he felt unsafe at mother's home. The Bureau social worker spoke with a case manager at the youth shelter who reported that Tyler was doing well at the shelter and could remain there beyond the 90-day maximum if necessary. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact mother, the social worker spoke with her on July 21, 2020. Mother was surprised to learn Tyler was at a youth shelter. She had not heard from him and believed he was still living with his friend's family. Mother reported she moved to Fairfield on June 30. She tried to contact Tyler through his friend's mother, but her calls did not go through and she believed her number had been blocked. Mother told the social worker that Tyler could always come home or live with grandmother.
The social worker interviewed Tyler at the youth shelter, and he reported that he left his friend's home because the" 'situation did not work out and there was no reason other than that.'" He said he wanted to" 'be 7 somewhere that would help him.'" Tyler said that he neither contacted mother nor had her phone number. He said he did not feel safe with mother because of her past behaviors and her failure to accept him. Further, he said he did not feel safe with grandmother because she allows mother into the home. The social worker provided Tyler with the current addresses and phone numbers of both mother and grandmother.
On July 27, 2020, the Bureau received another referral, in which the reporting party repeated some of the prior allegations of abuse and stated that Tyler sustained severe cuts and bruises from mother's throwing a PlayStation and a can of beans at him. The reporting party further said that during Tyler's prior stay in foster care, he had been sexually abused and that when he told mother about the incident, she blamed Tyler. On July 31, 2020, mother was interviewed by the social worker regarding these allegations. Mother reported that when Tyler was in the 10th grade, he told her that while he was in foster care, his court-appointed special advocate (CASA) exposed him to pornography and assaulted him. Tyler did not provide mother with further details. Mother reported the information to an Alameda County social worker and was told that nothing could be done because Tyler was no longer in foster care. Mother said Tyler told her he was gay because of the assault, and mother acknowledged that she had difficulty understanding his reasoning for being gay. Nevertheless, she accepted that Tyler was gay.
On August 11, 2020, Tyler was again interviewed by a Bureau social worker while at the youth shelter. He reiterated that he and mother argued about chores. He said he felt safe at his friend's house and her family agreed he could stay there until he was 18, but his high school therapist suggested that he move to the youth shelter where he would be provided resources and 8 assistance working with the Bureau. When asked about the severe cuts and bruises Tyler alleged he received from mother, he pointed to a scar on his knee and said it was caused by mother's throwing a PlayStation at him. Tyler did not tell anyone about the incident or seek any medical attention.Tyler stated that in December 2019 mother threw a can of beans at him, which hit him in the head. He did not previously tell anyone about this incident. Nor did he seek any medical attention. Regarding the sexual assault allegation, Tyler said that he was abused by his CASA and by a foster brother when he was 12 years old, while living in foster care. He told mother about it when he was in the 9th grade, and she reported it to his Alameda County social worker. Tyler said mother blamed him for the assault.
The record does not state when the incident with the PlayStation occurred.
Tyler stated that he had graduated high school and had been accepted to two colleges. He had applied for grants to pay for college and was hoping to hear back from the Bureau regarding entering foster care. He continued to decline to live with mother or grandmother. He understood that mother and his friend's mother agreed he could live at his friend's home until he was 18, but he chose to leave.
Tyler's brother Nico was interviewed on August 11, 2020. He said mother disciplined him by yelling or taking away privileges. Nico did not remember Tyler's having a scar on his leg and had no knowledge of mother's throwing a PlayStation or can of beans at Tyler. Nor did he remember an incident with a knife or screwdriver. Nico reported that mother and Tyler yelled during an argument about chores. Nico said he wished Tyler would listen to mother. He also said that Tyler lies and becomes involved in bad 9 situations. Nico denied that mother called Tyler names or used demeaning language toward him other than telling him not to be "stupid."
The Bureau social worker concluded there were no safety threats or risks of future abuse and recommended that the referral be closed. The social worker concluded that Tyler ran away in March 2020 to his friend's home. Both mother and the friend's mother agreed he could remain there until he was 18 years old. Further, mother and grandmother were each willing to have Tyler live with them. However, Tyler chose to live at the youth shelter based on the advice of his school therapist. The social worker noted that during the multiple 2020 investigations, Tyler provided additional information to the reporting party and to the social worker that he did not report during prior investigations. The social worker believed that some of the information provided was false.
IV. Application to Review Decision by Social Worker Not to Commence Proceedings
Pursuant to section 311, a person requesting that a social worker commence proceedings in juvenile court may file an application with the juvenile court to review a decision not to commence proceedings.
No later than September 24, 2020, Tyler filed an application to review decision by social worker not to commence proceedings. On October 9, 2020, the juvenile court began a four-day hearing on the application. On October 20, 2020, after the close of testimony and argument of counsel, the juvenile court summarized the parties' positions as follows: The Bureau's position was that Tyler ran away because of conflict with mother, but mother did not pose a danger to Tyler. Tyler's position was that he has been 10 continually physically and emotionally abused by mother and had no other option than to live at the youth shelter. Although the juvenile court noted there were credibility issues and "a lot of discrepancies," it found that Tyler made a prima facie showing that he fell under section 300, subdivision (a), and ordered the Bureau to file a petition.
The application in the record does not contain the trial court's filed-endorsed date stamp, but the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities in support of the application is stamped filed September 24, 2020.
Section 300, subdivision (a) states: "A child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: [¶] (a) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child's parent or guardian. For purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child's siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian that indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm. For purposes of this subdivision, 'serious physical harm' does not include reasonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks if there is no evidence of serious physical injury."
V. Petition
On October 23, 2020, the Bureau filed a petition alleging Tyler came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (a). Specifically, it alleged Tyler was at risk of physical harm in the care of mother due to her throwing a can of beans and a PlayStation at him, holding a knife to his throat, and causing Tyler to be placed on a psychiatric hold.
VI. Detention Hearing
On October 27, 2020, the Bureau filed a 71-page detention/jurisdiction report summarizing the prior Alameda County history and the 2020 referrals to the Bureau. The same day, a detention hearing was held before a different juvenile court judge. The Bureau recommended that Tyler remain in the custody of mother and that the case be closed. Tyler's counsel argued he should be detained because the allegations and evidence established a 11 prima facie case that he was at risk if returned to mother. Mother denied the allegations of the petition and objected to detention of Tyler. The juvenile court judge referred to the Bureau's lengthy report and stated, "It's hard for me to know what portions are true and what are not because there have been some changes in descriptions of what occurred and some retractions in the past." The judge stated the case was "a close call," but ultimately, he found that there was a prima facie showing that Tyler came within section 300 and should be detained. Tyler's counsel asked that the jurisdiction hearing be scheduled prior to Tyler's 18th birthday, October 30, 2020. Mother's counsel stated mother would be contesting jurisdiction and presenting evidentiary testimony. The court scheduled the contested jurisdiction hearing for October 29th but acknowledged that it might not be possible to complete hearing that day.
VII. Jurisdiction Hearing
At the October 29, 2020 jurisdiction hearing, the Bureau and mother moved to dismiss the petition. Among other issues, the Bureau stated there was insufficient time to hear the contested matter before the juvenile court would lose jurisdiction the next day. Counsel for the Bureau and mother's counsel both asserted that even if the court completed the jurisdiction hearing that day, the dispositional hearing could not be completed prior to Tyler's 18th birthday. The juvenile court dismissed the petition, stating: "[A]s a practical matter, I have a full calendar today . . . . And even if we were to start testimony today, it is clearly not possible to complete the testimony today based on what I've reviewed. I have read the whole detention and jurisdiction report as well as the pleadings filed by all of the parties. [¶] So as a practical matter, I would lose jurisdiction without completing the jurisdiction hearing, and I would not get to this disposition 12 today under any circumstances. And, therefore, I will lose jurisdiction before I would have the ability to get to disposition. [¶] So for all of those reasons, I am going to grant the [Bureau's] motion to dismiss the petition."
Tyler appealed the dismissal order. The Bureau filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, which Tyler opposed. Amicus curiae National Network for Youth also filed a brief arguing this court should rule on the merits.
DISCUSSION
Tyler argues the juvenile court erroneously concluded that because it could not complete the dispositional hearing before Tyler's 18th birthday, it should not proceed with the jurisdiction hearing. Leaving aside whether this is an accurate statement of what occurred, we agree with the Bureau that the appeal is moot because Tyler is now over 18 and the juvenile court cannot" 'take jurisdiction for the first time of a person older than 18.'" (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.)
I. Appeal is moot because this court is unable to provide effective relief .
"In general, it is a court's duty to decide '" 'actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.'"' [Citation.] '[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide relief if it finds reversible error.'" (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.)
David B., supra, explains: "A child becomes a dependent of the juvenile court only if (1) the court finds at the jurisdiction hearing that the child is a person described by section 300 (§§ 300, 355, subd. (a), 356), and (2) the court then adjudges the child a dependent at the disposition hearing (§§ 300, 358, subd. (a), 360, subd. (d); 13 [citations].)" (12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 645-646.) Further, under juvenile dependency law, dependency jurisdiction "may only be 'retain[ed],' 'continu[ed]' or 'resum[ed]' for nonminors in certain circumstances until age 21." (Id. at p. 638; §§ 303, subds. (a), (c), 388, subd. (e), 391, subd. (c).) However, "the statutory scheme reflects a clear recognition by the Legislature that, while dependency jurisdiction may continue to age 21, it must be initiated before age 18." (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 649.)
In David B., supra, the appellant sought review of the juvenile court's order dismissing his dependency petition after the juvenile court determined the evidence presented at the jurisdiction hearing did not support the allegation. (12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 643-644.) The appellant was 18 at the time the appeal was filed. (Id. at p. 650.) The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, explaining that even "[i]f we were to find the court erred in finding David B. was not described by section 300, we could not grant effective relief, i.e., we could not remand for the court to initiate dependency jurisdiction over David B., who is now over age 18 (and, indeed, turned 18 before he filed his notice of appeal). In short, we cannot direct the juvenile court to take an action that is beyond the scope of its legislatively conferred power." (Ibid.)
As in David B., the juvenile court here dismissed the dependency petition at the jurisdiction hearing and did not make a finding that Tyler was a person described by section 300. (§ 355, subd. (a); David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.) Because Tyler is now over 18, this court has no ability to provide effective relief and the appeal is moot. (David B., at p. 650.) 14
Tyler argues that the juvenile court erroneously believed it had to reach disposition before Tyler turned 18 but that under a recent amendment to section 358, the disposition hearing may be held after a youth turns 18. While the record contains comments by the juvenile court judge and counsel suggesting they may have believed it was necessary to reach disposition, as well as make a jurisdiction finding, before Tyler turned 18, this does not alter the fact that the appeal is moot. The amendments to section 358, which became effective on January 1, 2020, provide that under certain conditions, a juvenile court shall hold a disposition hearing for a youth who is 18 years old. (§ 358, subd. (d), as amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 682, § 1.) The first requirement is that "[t]he youth was found to be a minor described in Section 300 at a hearing pursuant to Section 355 prior to the youth attaining 18 years of age, and was continuously detained pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 319." (Ibid., italics added.) Here, the juvenile court did not make the prerequisite jurisdictional finding before Tyler turned 18.
After a juvenile court determines a minor is as described by section 300, it then proceeds to determine the appropriate disposition for the minor, which may include adjudging him or her a dependent, dismissing the petition, ordering informal supervision under section 301, or appointing a legal guardian. (§§ 360, subds. (a)-(d).)
"(A) The youth was found to be a minor described in Section 300 at a hearing pursuant to Section 355 prior to the youth attaining 18 years of age, and was continuously detained pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 319. "(B) The youth has provided informed consent to the dispositional proceeding." Section 358, subdivision (d)(1) states: "The court shall hold a dispositional proceeding for a youth 18 years of age if both of the following requirements are met:
II. Discretionary exceptions to mootness do not apply.
Although Tyler's appeal is moot, we have discretion to reach the merits if (1) a case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur 15 while evading appellate review, (2) there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or (3) when a material question remains for the court's determination. (In re M.R. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 49, 56.) Tyler argues we should exercise our discretion to reach the merits because the dismissal of the dependency petition deprived him of resources available under Assem. Bill 12. As discussed ante, Tyler, who is now an adult, cannot be the subject of any future dependency proceedings, and therefore a ruling on the merits cannot affect any future proceedings involving him. There can be no recurrence of this controversy between the parties. Nor are there any material questions for the court to determine.
Next, Tyler argues the appeal should be decided on the merits because it involves an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur while evading review. Tyler asserts that his "experience-an error of law made on the eve of his 18th birthday, when there is no meaningful access to appellate review if the holding of David B. is interpreted to mean that all appeals by eighteen-year-olds become moot on their 18th birthday-is one that appears all too common in the Bay Area, where juvenile courts and the trial bar lack understanding of the applicable law." Tyler's argument presumes that the juvenile court's dismissal was based solely on the court's erroneous belief that it was required to reach disposition before Tyler turned 18. Based on the record, it is not clear this was the sole reason for the dismissal order. At the contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court stated that "even if we were to start testimony today, it is clearly not possible to complete the testimony today based on what I've reviewed . . . . [¶] So as a practical matter, I would lose jurisdiction without completing the jurisdictional hearing, and I would not get to this disposition today under any circumstances." 16
Regardless of the juvenile court's reasoning, we are not persuaded that any alleged legal error is likely to recur. Tyler's reply brief acknowledges that his counsel at the jurisdictional hearing did not object when the juvenile court dismissed the petition allegedly because of the court's "mistaken impression that dispositional orders cannot be [made] after a child's eighteenth birthday." We trust that in the event other youth are in similar procedural situations, their counsel will bring to the juvenile court's attention the 2020 amendments to section 358, which allow for dispositional hearings to be held for youths who are 18 years old in certain situations. (§ 358, subd. (d).)
Finally, Tyler overstates the holding of David B. when he suggests it may be interpreted to mean all appeals by a person 18 years of age are moot. David B. specifically acknowledges that "when a juvenile court has assumed jurisdiction over a person, the person's 18th birthday does not divest the court of jurisdiction and does not necessarily render moot an appeal from an order entered in the dependency proceedings." (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 651-652.) The issue here, as in David B., is that when a juvenile court has not assumed jurisdiction before a minor turns 18, there is no statutory authority for it to do so either on remand or otherwise. David B. recognized, "While the Legislature has sought to facilitate the transition to adulthood of persons who entered the dependency system before age 18, there is no indication the Legislature contemplated or authorized the initiation of dependency jurisdiction over adults." (Id. at p. 650.) We are bound by the juvenile dependency statues and "cannot direct the juvenile court to take an action that is beyond the scope of its legislatively conferred power." (Ibid.)
Tyler and amicus curiae argue the problem of youth homelessness is a public concern that justifies invoking a discretionary exception to mootness. 17
While we agree that youth homelessness is a serious public concern, for the reasons discussed ante, we do not find that deciding the merits of this case would provide any needed guidance for future cases. (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 654.)
DISPOSITION
The motion to dismiss is granted, and the appeal is dismissed as moot.
WE CONCUR: Needham, J., Burns, J. 18