Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 04AS04309
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
This products liability case arises from a very sad situation. In February 2004, Mark and Colette Contois took their son Caleb and his friends to play paintball at Realstar Outdoor Adventures (ROA) in celebration of Caleb’s 10th birthday. Mark and Colette stood nearby as the children, finished with the game, disassembled their paintball equipment in the area designated for that purpose. Paintball equipment consists of a cylinder, valve and paintball marker or gun with an air source adapter (ASA). (See appendix.) The paintball marker fires only when the valve/cylinder assembly is screwed into the marker’s ASA.
Tyler Faria, who was not with the Contois party, was disassembling his paintball equipment at the same time. Faria inadvertently detached the CO2 cylinder from the valve which connected it to the paintball marker, causing the cylinder to fly off at high speed. It hit Colette Contois in the back of the head and killed her.
Mark Contois and his children Caleb and Leia (collectively the Contoises) filed a products liability/wrongful death action. The named defendants are alleged to have some connection with the paintball equipment involved in Colette’s death: Aluminum Precision Products, Inc., Aluminum Precision Products, Inc. doing business as Catalina Cylinders, and Catalina Cylinders - West (collectively Catalina), Kingman International Corporation and the Kingman Group Corporation (collectively Kingman), The Sports Authority, Inc. (TSA), and others who are not parties to this appeal.
Catalina manufactured the CO2 cylinder, Duffin Manufacturing Company manufactured the valve, and National Paintball Supply, Inc. assembled those two components into the valve/cylinder assembly. Kingman imported the Spyder Victor paintball marker (paintball gun). The paintball gun was sold by TSA equipped with the ASA. As to Catalina, Kingman and TSA, the Contoises sought damages for negligence, strict liability, failure to warn and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted Catalina’s motion for summary adjudication of the third cause of action for failure to warn. It also granted Kingman and TSA’s motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication on all four causes of action against them. The Contoises appeal. We shall affirm the judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Kingman and TSA, but reverse the judgment granting summary adjudication of the third cause of action in favor of Catalina.
Duffin Manufacturing Company remains a party but is not involved in this appeal.
National Paintball Supply, Inc. settled with plaintiffs for $6 million.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We begin with a description of the paintball equipment. The cylinder, which contains pressurized CO2, supplies the force necessary to fire paintballs. It is connected to the paintball gun by means of a valve that screws into the ASA at one end and into the cylinder at the other. The Duffin valve has male threads, on each end. The valve must be connected to the cylinder with the proper amount of torque to prevent accidental detachment. The label on the Catalina cylinder warned “Do not alter this cylinder in any way” and “Valves must be installed or removed only by trained personnel.” It was generally agreed that the connection required at least 40 foot-pounds of torque. In this case, National Paintball Supply, Inc., screwed the valve to the cylinder by machine with approximately 42 foot-pounds of torque.
The valve/cylinder assembly connects to the Kingman paintball gun and ASA. The open end of the valve is screwed into and out of the ASA of the paintball gun every time the gun is used or when the cylinder needs to be recharged with CO2. The manual which accompanied the gun warned: “The paintball marker is NOT a toy. It can cause injury or death. Caution: do not unscrew the tank valve from the tank. Doing so may cause serious injury or death.”
A variety of after-market equipment is available to modify paintball guns, including anti-siphon devices (ASDs). The ASD is installed in the cylinder to improve the efficiency of the CO2 and thereby increase the performance of the paintball gun. Installation necessarily requires removal of the valve from the cylinder and reconnection of the valve to the cylinder when the modification is completed. It is common for end-users, that is, paintball players, to install their own ASDs.
Faria’s mother purchased the Kingman paintball gun for him at TSA as a present for his 15th birthday. Faria initially used a 14-ounce cylinder of CO2 to power the gun. When Faria was no longer able to refill it, he purchased the 20-ounce Catalina cylinder at ROA. Sometime later, Faria’s teenaged friend Josh Brady, who volunteered at ROA, agreed to install an ASD in Faria’s cylinder. Using parts Faria purchased for a few dollars at Hangtown Ace Hardware, Brady removed the valve from the cylinder and installed the ASD. He then applied thread adhesive to the valve and cylinder before screwing the two parts together by hand.
ROA settled with plaintiffs for $1 million.
Hangtown Ace Hardware settled with plaintiffs for $10,000.
Brady did not read the warnings on the Catalina cylinder before modifying Faria’s cylinder. However, Brady knew that the cylinder was under pressure and that if the valve were removed, the cylinder could become a projectile capable of injuring or killing someone. Faria read the warning but only remembers it saying something about not putting the cylinder in extreme heat and storing it in certain conditions. Sometime before the fatal incident, Faria covered the warning label on his cylinder with an ROA sticker.
DISCUSSION
I.
Motions For Summary Judgment And Summary Adjudication
A party may move for summary judgment or summary adjudication if it is contended that the action or one or more causes of action within the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (a) & (f)(1).) “A defendant . . . has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The court shall grant a motion for summary judgment “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
“‛The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues: the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.’ [Citations.]” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381.) On appeal, we review the trial court’s ruling de novo, applying the same three-step analysis used by the trial court to: (1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue. (Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 256, 261.) Although summary judgment is no longer considered a disfavored procedure, we continue to apply the rule that the moving party’s evidence must be strictly construed, while the opposing party’s evidence must be liberally construed. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 838.)
II.
Catalina’s Motion For Summary Adjudication
The Contoises argue that the court erred in granting summary adjudication in favor of Catalina because it owed a duty of care to Faria as the end-user and there was a triable issue of material fact whether Catalina breached its duty to warn Faria. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that Catalina failed to address the scope of its duty to warn Faria, and the court in ruling that Catalina’s duty to warn was limited to Brady failed to address the issue of the adequacy of Catalina’s warning to Faria. Thus, the burden never shifted to the Contoises to present evidence that might raise triable issues regarding Catalina’s warnings. We therefore reverse the judgment on the motion for summary adjudication and remand the matter to permit the court to properly address the question of duty to warn.
Strict products liability applies to products that are dangerous because they lack adequate warnings or instructions. (See, e.g., Wright v. Stang Mfg. Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1230.) Ordinarily, a manufacturer has a duty to warn the foreseeable consumer or end-user of the risks of using its product. (Finn v. G. D. Searle & Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 691, 699-700 (Finn); Rest.2d Torts, § 402A.) The manufacturer’s duty of care, including the scope of its duty to warn –- that is, who must be warned -- is a question of law. (Ramirez v. Plough, Inc. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 539, 546 (Ramirez).) There are two types of warnings. “First, the manufacturer may be required adequately to instruct the consumer as to how the product should be used. . . . A second distinctive form of warning is that which informs a consumer . . . of potential risks or side effects which may follow the foreseeable use of the product. . . . ‘In some circumstances a warning or directions would have reduced the risk. In other circumstances the warning would simply have afforded the consumer an opportunity to make an informed choice.’ [Citation.]” (Finn, supra, at pp. 699-700.) However, a manufacturer has no duty to warn against a use that is not reasonably foreseeable. “[T]he foreseeability of the misuse of a product is a question for the trier of fact. [Citation.]” (Dosier v. Wilcox-Crittendon Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 74, 78.)
Causation is a necessary element of a cause of action for strict products liability. (Garman v. Magic Chef (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 634, 637 (Garman).) Thus, where plaintiff claims that the warnings were missing or inadequate, it must appear that the failure to warn was a legal cause of plaintiff’s injury. (Torres v. Xomox Corp. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 (Torres).) “[A]s a general rule, the imposition of liability depends upon a showing by the plaintiff that his or her injuries were caused by the act of the defendant or by an instrumentality under the defendant’s control.” (Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588, 597; see, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968-969.)
There is no causation when the person to whom the warning is directed did not read the warning. (Ramirez, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 555-556; see also Motus v. Pfizer, Inc. (9th Cir. 2004) 358 F.3d 659, 661 (Motus).) Nor is there a causal connection between an allegedly deficient warning and the injury when the person to whom the warning is directed already knew of the danger. (Rosberg v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 726, 735 (Rosberg).)
The Contoises’ third cause of action for failure to warn was premised on the manufacturers’ duty of care to “the consuming public” not intermediaries. The complaint specifically alleged that defendants, including Catalina, “failed to provide any warning, instructions, guidelines or admonitions to members of the consuming public, including Defendant TYLER FARIA, of the design and manufacturing defects, which defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, to have existed in the Spyder Victor paintball gun, the Catalina Cylinders 20 oz. Aluminum CO2 canister, after-market parts, including but not limited to anti-siphon devices, and their component part[].”
Catalina’s notice of motion for summary adjudication listed two grounds for relief: (1) no causation due to Brady’s failure to read the warnings; and (2) no duty to warn because Catalina was a component part manufacturer. Because Catalina failed to discuss the latter issue in its points and authorities, it forfeited further consideration of that defense. However, Catalina did rely on the learned intermediary cases in its causation argument, suggesting that Catalina’s duty to warn went no further than Brady and arguing that Brady’s failure to read the warnings ended the matter as to Catalina’s liability on the third cause of action. (See Ramirez, supra, 6 Cal.4th 539; Rosburg, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d 726; and Motus, supra, 358 F.3d 659.) The Contoises challenged Catalina’s limited view of its duty to warn, citing the general rule that a manufacturer has a duty to directly warn the consumer/end-user/foreseeable user -– here Faria -- of the risks of using its product. (See Finn, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 699-700; Rest.2d Torts, § 402A.) Maintaining that there was no legal support for limiting the duty to warn to Brady, the Contoises argued that there remained a triable issue whether “an adequate warning would have prevented Tyler from inadvertently detaching the cylinder from the valve, thereby sparing Colette Contois’ life.”
In granting Catalina’s motion for summary adjudication, the court agreed with Catalina that the adequacy of Catalina’s warning to Faria was not at issue because Brady did not read this warning before disassembling and reassembling the valve/cylinder assembly. It stated that “the warning here is clearly directed to whomever is going to disassemble and reassemble the cylinder” and “[t]hat person was Brady and not Faria.” The court continued: “While other warnings may be directed to end users such as Tyler Faira [sic] (e.g., do not expose paint ball gun to extreme temperatures), the warning here is clearly directed to whomever [sic] is going to disassemble and reassemble the cylinder to the paint ball gun apparatus.”
The court put the proverbial cart before the horse. The Contoises’ pleadings set the outer boundaries of the duty issue by alleging Catalina had a duty to warn Faria, the end-user. The pleadings also alleged that Catalina breached its duty to warn. The warnings on Catalina’s cylinder are evidence of the adequacy of its warnings. Here, it appears the court allowed the language of those warnings to define the scope of Catalina’s duty in the first instance. Focusing on warnings that stated “Do not alter this cylinder in any way” and “Valves must be installed or removed by trained personnel,” the court ignored the Contoises’ argument that Faria was the end-user to whom Catalina owed a duty to warn along with evidence that the modification was a foreseeable use or misuse by end-users of the Catalina CO2 cylinder. The relevant question is whether Catalina owed Faria a duty to warn of the danger of electing to modify his CO2 cylinder. Because Catalina and the court failed to properly address this question of Catalina’s duty to Faria, the burden never shifted to the Contoises to present evidence that might create a triable issue on the foreseeability of misuse of the cylinder and the adequacy of the warnings.
III.
Kingman’s and TSA’s Motion For Summary Judgment
The Contoises’ complaint alleged four causes of action against Kingman and TSA: (1) negligence in, among other things, the manufacturing, testing, distribution and sale of the Spyder Victor paintball marker; (2) strict liability based on the defective, dangerous and hazardous component part, including the paintball marker, which were manufactured, sold and used without adequate warning of the dangers; (3) failure to warn of design and manufacturing defects in the paintball marker which Kingman and TSA knew or should have known; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress on Mark and Caleb Contois from their witnessing the accident that killed Colette. The complaint further alleged that these acts and omissions were the proximate cause of Colette Contois’s death and the damages sustained by Mark, Caleb and Leia Contois.
Kingman and TSA moved for summary judgment and, in the alternative, summary adjudication. They argued that the claims for negligence and strict liability failed as a matter of law because there was no evidence that the paintball gun was the legal or proximate cause of Colette’s death. Kingman and TSA asserted that there was no evidence they were the designers or manufacturers or sellers of the combination of parts alleged to have been defective -- specifically, the valve/cylinder assembly. They maintained that there was no failure to warn as a matter of law because Kingman had no duty to warn about another manufacturer’s product. Lastly, they argued that in the absence of any breach of duty toward the Contoises, the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress failed as a matter of law.
The Contoises argued in their points and authorities in opposition to summary judgment that the threads on the paintball gun, valve and cylinder were all defectively designed because the threads at the ASA end of the valve were larger in diameter than the threads on the cylinder end of the valve. Citing Tellez-Cordova, they assert that “a product may be defective in design when a consumer foreseeably uses or misuses the product in conjunction with other products.” The Contoises’ theory of liability is premised on the court viewing the paintball gun with the ASA and the valve/cylinder assembly as one finished product. As the Contoises argued at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, “It’s not a situation where this [the paintball gun] is one product that is self-contained and functional in and of itself and the cylinder is a totally separate product that happens to be used in the same game. The gun doesn’t function without the valve and cylinder assembled.” Further, the Contoises asserted that “the Kingman Spyder [paintball gun] was designed to be used with the valve and cylinder in one ‘ultimate’ finished product,” was defective as designed, and its modification by an untrained user was foreseeable.
The Contoises appear to have abandoned their claim that the Spyder Victor paintball gun and ASA also suffered from a manufacturing defect.
The trial court rejected the Contoises’ arguments and granted the summary judgment motion in its entirety. Citing Zambrana v. Standard Oil Company (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 209 (Zambrana), a case resolved under the component part doctrine, the court found that the evidence showed there was no defect in the paintball gun and impliedly found that the component part defense applied. Thus, said the court, Kingman and TSA were entitled to summary adjudication of the causes of action for negligence and strict liability. In addition, the court found that “alteration by the user [was] a superseding cause that [broke] the chain of causation.” As to the cause of action for failure to warn, the court agreed with Kingman and TSA that there was no duty to warn users of the risks of products made by other manufacturers. It also found that because the paintball gun was not defective and Kingman and TSA had no duty to warn, the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress also failed.
After independently reviewing the record, we agree that Kingman and TSA showed that the component part defense applied and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A. Negligence and Strict Liability:
In a products liability action, plaintiff must prove that the design of defendant’s product was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s injury. (Bunch v. Hoffinger Industries, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1302 (Bunch.) Here, the Contoises fail to raise triable issues of fact to counter the defenses claimed by Kingman and TSA.
1. The Component Part Defense:
Kingman and TSA asserted the component part defense in their motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication. They cited Zambrana and argued that the component parts in this case -- the cylinder, valve, ASD and gun -- were “sold separately and used according to the owner’s preference.” The Contoises responded that the component part defense was inapplicable as a matter of law because there was a triable issue whether the paintball gun was defective in design, and “the Kingman Spyder Victor was designed to be used with the valve and cylinder in one ‘ultimate’ finished product.”
Under the component part doctrine, “[a] component part manufacturer may be held liable for damages caused by a component part which was defective at the time it left the component part manufacturer’s factory. [Citations.]” (Wiler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 621, 629.) On the other hand, courts are reluctant to impose liability for defective design of the finished product on the component part manufacturer where that manufacturer “had no role in designing the finished product and . . . supplied a nondefective component part.” (Lee v. Electric Motor Div. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 375, 385 (Lee).) The so-called component part doctrine “‘rests on a “line of cases holding an entity supplying a nondefective raw material or a component part is not strictly liable for defects in the final product over which it had no control.” [Citations.] Under the rule of these cases, the manufacturer of a product component or ingredient is not liable for injuries caused by the finished product unless it appears that the component itself was “defective” when it left the manufacturer. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Tellez-Cordova v. Campbell-Hausfeld/Scott Fetzger Company (2004) 129 Cal.App.4th 577, 581 (Tellez-Cordova).) “The component part cases involve ‘generic’ or ‘off-the-shelf’ components, as opposed to those which are ‘“really a separate product with a specific purpose and use.”’ [Citations.]” (Springmeyer v. Ford Motor Co. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1554 (Springmeyer).)
Restatement Third of Torts, section 5 provides: “One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing product components who sells or distributes a component is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by a product into which the component is integrated if:
Courts describe two policy reasons for “‘why multi-use component and raw material suppliers should not have to assure the safety of their materials as used in other companies’ finished products.’” (Springmeyer, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1554.) “‘First, . . . that would require suppliers to “retain an expert in the client’s field of business to determine whether the client intends to develop a safe product.”’ [Citation.] . . . A second, related rationale is that ‘finished product manufacturers know exactly what they intend to do with a component or raw material and therefore are in a better position to guarantee that the component or raw material is suitable for their particular applications.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Control over the design that caused the injury is essential to imposition of liability. (See Fierro v. International Harvester Co. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 862, 869; and Walker v. Stauffer Chemical Corp. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 669, 674.)
California courts have developed a body of law describing what constitutes component part for purposes of applying the defense. Kingman and TSA rely principally on Zambrana, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d 209. In that case, the plaintiff sued Firestone, the manufacturer and retailer of tires and metal valve stems inserted in the wheels in 1964, and the Standard Oil Company, retailer who installed new tires in 1965, for injuries suffered in an accident caused by a sudden loss of tire pressure. The loss of tire pressure allegedly occurred when a metal valve stem and metal extension assembly on the tire broke. Firestone did not manufacture or sell the metal extension, which the plaintiff had bought elsewhere before she purchased tires and valve stems from Firestone in 1964. Plaintiff conceded that neither the metal valve stem nor the metal extension assembly was defective in and of itself, but argued that she was entitled to recovery on strict liability because the combination of the two metal parts was dangerous due to defective design or manufacture. (Id. at pp. 212-213, 216-217.) On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Firestone, concluding that under the facts of the case, Firestone was “neither a ‘designer’ nor ‘manufacturer’ of the combination of parts which [was] said to be ‘defective.’” (Id. at pp. 212, 217.) Significantly for our purposes, the court noted that the metal valve stem and metal extension were “sold separately and the owner’s preference [in whether to use a metal or rubber valve stem] prevail[ed].” (Id. at p. 217.)
The court reached a similar result in Lee, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d 375, where plaintiff lost her right hand when it caught in a meat grinder used in her business. She and her husband sued the manufacturer of the meat grinder and the manufacturer and supplier of the motor installed in the meat grinder on theories of negligent design, manufacture and failure to warn, strict liability, among others. (Id. at pp. 381-382.) They argued that the defective design and manufacture of the motor and lack of warning of the defect proximately caused plaintiff’s injury because her injuries would have been less severe had the motor stopped immediately when turned off. (Id. at p. 382.) The appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer of the motor. It found that there was no defect in the motor at the time it left defendant’s plant. (Id. at p. 384.) Analogizing to Zambrana, the court noted the evidence established that “defendant had no role in the design of the machine, and that defendant reasonably relied on [the maker of the meat grinder] to take appropriate measures to insure proper design [of the meat grinder] and installation of the motor.” (Id. at pp. 386-387.) The manufacturer of the meat grinder knew what kind of motor he needed and did not seek advice from the manufacturer of the motor on which one to choose. (Id. at pp. 364-365.)
Here, the Contoises allege that “the thread design of the paintball gun’s ASA is defective because it accepts a valve designed so that it will always unscrew from the cylinder before it unscrews from the ASA when the torque on each end of the valve is the same.” They explain that “As designed, the gun accepted a valve/cylinder assembly containing an improperly-installed ASD, which heightened the risk of inadvertent detachment by breaking the ‘secure attachment’ between the valve and the cylinder.” They rely on Tellez-Cordova, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th 577, in support of their argument that the component part defense does not apply. In Tellez-Cordova, the plaintiff filed a complaint for products liability alleging that he developed interstitial pulmonary fibrosis as a result of exposure to airborne toxins produced and released by tools used in making lamps. As liberally construed for purposes of the defendants’ demurrer, the complaint alleged that “the discs and wheels [did] not create respirable metallic dust unless they [were] used with [defendants’] power tools, because it [was] the speed and force of those tools which cause[d] the dust to become airborne.” (Id. at p. 580.) The trial court sustained the defendant tool makers’ demurrer and the appellate court reversed. (Id. at p. 588.) It distinguished Zambrana, Lee and other component part cases involving “‘“generic” or “off-the-shelf”’” components, explaining that the facts alleged in this case showed “not that [defendants] manufactured component parts to be used in a variety of finished products, outside their control, but instead that [defendants] manufactured tools which were specifically designed to be used with the abrasive wheels or discs they were used with, for the intended purpose of grinding and sanding metals, that the tools necessarily operated with those wheels or discs, that the wheels and discs were harmless without the power supplied by the tools, and that when the tools were used for the purpose intended by [defendants], harmful respirable metallic dust was released into the air.” (Id. at p. 582, italics added.) The court continued: “In Lee, the motor could have been used for multiple purposes. In Zambrana, the stem extension could have been used with other kinds of stems and the hazard was obvious. Here, of course, the allegations are that the hazard was not obvious and that [defendants’] products were designed to be used in but one ultimate ‘finished product,’ that is, in combination with the specified abrasive wheels and discs.” (Id. at p. 584.)
The problem with the Contoises’ argument is that the paintball gun was sold separately and functioned with different valve/cylinder assemblies than the one in issue. The undisputed facts of this case reveal that the paintball gun and the valve/cylinder assembly were sold to Faria’s mother and to Faria at separate times and at different places. They were used together as a finished product, an operable paintball gun ready to shoot on demand, only because Faria, the consumer, chose to integrate the two products.
Like the metal valve stem extension or electric motor at issue in Zambrana and Lee, the paintball gun was not designed to work solely with this particular CO2 cylinder or vice versa. The evidence is that the paintball gun could attach to a variety of C02 cylinders, including -- Faria’s 14-ounce CO2 cylinder. Faria used his gun for a period of time with a 14-ounce CO2 cylinder before he purchased the 20-ounce Catalina cylinder. There is no evidence that this particular valve/cylinder assembly was specifically designed to work solely with the Kingman’s paintball gun or vice versa. The cylinders and valves were essentially “‘off-the-shelf,’” “‘generic’” components. (Springmeyer, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1554.)
Having concluded that the paintball gun was a component part of the paintball equipment, separate from the valve/cylinder assembly we next decide whether Kingman and TSA established the elements of the component part defense. Contois provided no evidence that Kingman or TSA were involved in the design of the valve/cylinder assembly put together by National Paintball Supply. The remaining question is whether the paintball gun was defective. We conclude that it was not.
2. The Paintball Gun Was Not Defective:
The Contoises allege that “the gun itself facilitated inadvertent detachment because of the thread design in its ASA.”
We therefore consider the paintball gun and its ASA apart from the valve/cylinder assembly in deciding whether the Contoises raise a triable issue that the gun was defective.
California courts have developed two alternative tests to determine whether a product has a design defect: (1) the consumer expectations test; and (2) the risk-benefit test. (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 429-430.) Under the consumer expectations test, “a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” (Id. at p. 429.) Under the risk-benefit test, “a product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that the product’s design embodies ‘excessive preventable danger,’ or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 430.) The Contoises fail to raise a triable issue under either test.
The paintball gun performs “as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner” under the consumer expectations test. (Barker, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 429.) The undisputed evidence shows that it is not defective per se or when used as intended. Indeed, the gun is alleged to be defective only when connected to a particular valve/cylinder assembly, the valve/cylinder assembly is disconnected to install an ASD and reconnected at less than 40 foot-pounds of torque, the modification is carried out against clearly printed warnings, and equal torque is later applied to the valve/cylinder assembly over a period of several months - a convoluted and unforeseeable path to liability. Unlike Brady and Faria, an ordinary consumer would have read, understood and abided by the instructions that accompanied the paintball gun and the warnings on the cylinder itself. (See Temple v. Velcro USA (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1094 [an adequate warning is a defense to an action for strict liability].) Those warnings advised: “The paintball marker is NOT a toy. It can cause injury or death. Caution: do not unscrew the tank valve from the tank. Doing so may cause serious injury or death.”
A design defect is shown under the risk-benefit test, “if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.” (Barker, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 432.) Here, the design of the Spyder Victor paintball gun did not cause Colette’s death or the Contoises’ damages. Because the gun was not defective, there was no connection between the actions of Kingman and TSA and Colette’s death. Accordingly, the superseding cause argument is irrelevant.
B. Duty To Warn:
The Contoises argue that “as a matter of law, Kingman and TSA had a duty to warn of the risk of death or serious injury from the inadvertent detachment of a cylinder from a valve in [the] paintball equipment” because the risk was foreseeable. They maintain that there was a factual issue whether Kingman and TSA breached that duty as the importer and seller of the Spyder Victor paintball gun. There is no merit in the Contoises’ argument.
Our conclusion that the Spyder Victor paintball gun and its ASA, and the valve and cylinder were components of the combination of parts needed to fire a paintball gun supports our conclusion that Kingman was under no duty to warn about the danger associated with the valve/cylinder assembly. A manufacturer’s duty to warn is limited to characteristics of its own product and there is no requirement that a manufacturer studies the products of other manufacturers and warns users of their risks. (Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 357, 364; see also, Garman, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 638 [“To say that the absence of a warning to check for gas leaks in other products makes the stove defective is semantic nonsense”].) In any event, Kingman did warn purchasers of the paintball gun not to “unscrew the tank valve from the tank” and that “[d]oing so may cause serious injury or death.”
As the issue is not before us, we do not consider the application of the component part defense to the valve, cylinder or valve/cylinder assembly in this case.
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Having concluded that Kingman and TSA were entitled to summary adjudication of the cause of action for negligence, we also conclude there is no basis for the Contoises’ claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court properly granted summary adjudication on that cause of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment on Kingman’s and TSA’s motion for summary judgment is affirmed. Defendants Kingman and TSA shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (3).) The judgment on Catalina’s motion for summary adjudication is reversed. The Contoises shall recover costs on appeal as to that portion of their appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (3).)
We concur: HULL, Acting P. J., ROBIE, J.
“(a) the component is defective in itself, as defined in this Chapter, and the defect causes the harm; or
“(b)(1) the seller or distributor of the component substantially participates in the integration of the component into the design of the product; and
“(2) the integration of the component causes the product to be defective, as defined in this Chapter; and
“(3) the defect in the product causes the harm.”