We need go no further than the Piscataway jurisdiction, New Jersey, to find case law disfavoring the use of this raw ratio data in setting property assessments, whether by assessors or the courts. Continental Paper Co. v. Village of Ridgefield Park, 300 A.2d 850 (N.J. Super.App. Div. 1973) and Murnick v. Asbury Park, 471 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1984), make it perfectly clear that the test for disproportionate taxation, as in Rhode Island, is one of discriminatory purpose, not discriminatory effect. That is, provided a town's assessor uses the same percentage of value as its assessment figure for all properties in a given year, the analysis is at an end.
The chapter 123 ratios were 106% in 1979, 98% in 1980, and 96% in 1981. The elements of a Kents action ( In re Appeal of Kents, 34 N.J. 21, 166 A.2d 763 (1961)) were succinctly set forth in Continental Paper Co. v. Ridgefield Park, 122 N.J. Super. 446, 300 A.2d 850 (App.Div. 1973): In order to make out a case of actionable discrimination, these elements must be proved: (1) that the real property generally in the municipality was assessed at less than true value; (2) what the common assessment level was and (3) the true value of the subject property upon which the common level percentage would operate.
Each plaintiff also claimed "its full rights under" the provisions of N.J.S.A. 54:2-40.4 et seq., L. 1973, c. 123, commonly known as chapter 123. The court's determinations in these cases are circumscribed by Continental Paper Co. v. Ridgefield Park, 122 N.J. Super. 446, 300 A.2d (App.Div. 1973), in which the Appellate Division said: In order to make out a case of actionable discrimination, these elements must be proved: (1) that the real property generally in the municipality was assessed at less than true value; (2) what the common assessment level was, and (3) the true value of the subject property upon which the common level percentage would operate.
Id. at 29, 166 A.2d 763. Following Kents, the Appellate Division in Continental Paper Co. v. Ridgeville Park, 122 N.J. Super. 446, 300 A.2d 850 (App.Div. 1973), held that in order to establish a case of actionable discrimination the following elements must be proved:. . . (1) that the real property generally in the municipality was assessed at less than true value; (2) what the common assessment level was and (3) the true value of the subject property upon which the common level percentage would operate.
Prior to the advent of chapter 123 a party was often hard-pressed to prove its claim of discrimination. The elements of such proofs were succinctly set forth in Continental Paper Co. v. Ridgefield Part, 122 N.J. Super. 446, 300 A.2d 850 (App.Div. 1973). In order to make out a case of actionable discrimination, these elements must be proved: (1) that the real property generally in the municipality was assessed at less than true value; (2) what the common assessment level was and (3) the true value of the subject property upon which the common level percentage would operate.
(citations omitted) If there is no common level shown and there is none which the assessor is endeavoring to apply, and the assessment is substantially higher than the "average ratio" determined by the Director of Taxation, the "average ratio" may be applied under Kents, and the assessment reduced by that proportion. [ Continental Paper Co. v. Ridgefield Park Vil., 122 N.J. Super. 446, 450-451, 300 A.2d 850 (App.Div. 1973)]. In Continental Paper Co. discrimination relief was denied because there was no evidential foundation in the record to support a finding of a common level of assessment, nor was there a showing that there was no common level, in which event the Director's ratio could be enlisted.
In re Appeals of Kents, 34 N.J. 21, 23, 166 A.2d 763 (1961). The evidence required to establish a case of actionable discrimination entitling a taxpayer to relief was set forth in Continental Paper Co. v. Ridgefield Park, 122 N.J. Super. 446, 300 A.2d 850 (1973), as follows: In order to make out a case of actionable discrimination these elements must be proved: (1) that the real property generally in the municipality was assessed at less than true value; (2) what the common level was; and, (3) the true value of the subject property upon which the common level percentage would operate.
This rule has been followed faithfully. See Matawan v. Tree Haven Apartments, Inc., 108 N.J. Super. 111, 260 A.2d 235 (App.Div. 1969); Continental Paper Co. v. Ridgefield Park, 122 N.J. Super. 446, 300 A.2d 850 (App.Div. 1973), certif. den. 63 N.J. 328, 307 A.2d 101 (1973), and Anaconda Co. v. Perth Amboy, 157 N.J. Super. 42, 384 A.2d 531 (App.Div. 1978), certif.
( In re Appeal of Kents, 34 N.J. 21, 166 A.2d 763 (1961)). The elements of a Kents action were succinctly set forth in Continental Paper Co. v. Ridgefield Park, 122 N.J. Super. 446, 300 A.2d 850 (App.Div. 1973): . . .
The assessments and the judgments of the Division were as follows: 1971 1972 1973 Assessments $4,807,900 $5,010,400 $15,031,200 Judgments appealed from 4,572,835 4,572,835 10,558,022 The Division's judgment was on two grounds: (1) the taxpayer had established its claim of "discrimination" (see In re Appeals of Kents, 2124 Atlantic Ave., 34 N.J. 21 (1961); Continental Paper Co. v. Ridgefield Park, 122 N.J. Super. 446, 450-451 (App.Div.), certif. den. 63 N.J. 328 (1973)), and therefore application of the average ratio of the Director of Taxation was justified; (2) reduction in the true value of the property was appropriate.