Opinion
No. 13-04-259-CV
Memorandum Opinion Delivered and Filed August 11, 2005.
On Appeal from the 329th District Court of Wharton County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices HINOJOSA and RODRIGUEZ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Continental Casualty Company ("CCC"), appeals from the trial court's judgment upholding a decision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission ("TWCC") in favor of appellee, Barry Mangum. We affirm.
Background
Mangum is a former employee of Stewart Stevenson Services, Inc. Stewart Stevenson provided their employees with workers' compensation insurance from CCC. Mangum was employed as a mechanic on an assembly line with Stewart Stevenson for over seven years, installing the brake and exhaust systems on trucks, which required the frequent use of pneumatic tools in repetitive motions.
Mangum began having problems with his hands in 1999. He first believed the pain and numbness in his hands was caused by poor circulation. He began reporting his problems to his doctor in November of 1999 and was initially diagnosed with arthritis and high blood pressure. During a return visit on December 2, 1999, his doctor found signs of possible carpal tunnel syndrome and referred Mangum to a second doctor. Mangum was examined by the second doctor on December 8; this doctor confirmed that Mangum was exhibiting symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome, told him to start wearing splints on his wrists, and began tests to verify that the problem was in fact carpal tunnel syndrome. The test results were analyzed on December 28 and found to be suggestive of carpal tunnel syndrome, although an official diagnosis was not made until March of 2000.
Mangum reported the doctor's findings to his employer on January 5, 2000. He continued to work until March 20, 2000, when he underwent wrist surgery to correct the injury. He was unable to resume working until May 8, 2000.
Mangum sought workers' compensation benefits for this period of unemployment following his surgery, which CCC contested. A hearing officer of the TWCC heard his case and determined that (1) Mangum had sustained a compensable occupational disease-related injury, (2) the date of the injury was December 8, 1999, and (3) CCC was responsible for paying Mangum workers' compensation benefits for his inability to work from March 20 to May 8.
CCC appealed the decision of the TWCC to the Wharton County district court, arguing that because Mangum was initially warned that he may be suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome on December 2, the date of his injury was December 2, not December 8. The date of the injury was a key issue in determining CCC's liability because an employee is required to report a work-related injury to his employer within thirty days in order to be eligible for benefits. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 409.001(a) (Vernon 1996). Mangum reported his injury to his supervisor on January 5, which was more than thirty days after the initial exam on December 2, but less than thirty days after the confirmation of his symptoms on December 8. Following a bench trial, the judge affirmed the findings of the TWCC, and CCC accordingly filed its appeal with this Court.
CCC now appeals in three issues: (1) the trial court erred in finding that Mangum should have known that he had carpal tunnel syndrome and that it was work-related as of December 8, because the evidence is factually insufficient to support the court's rulings; (2) the trial court erred in finding that Mangum should have known that he had carpal tunnel syndrome and that it was work-related as of December 8 because the evidence is legally insufficient to support the court's rulings; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that Mangum timely reported his work-related injury to his employer pursuant to section 409.001 because the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's rulings. All three of these issues, however, turn on the single question of whether the trial court's finding of fact that Mangum's injury occurred on December 8 and not on December 2 was correct.
Standard of Review
The trial court performs a "modified de novo review" of a TWCC decision. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Manasco, 971 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex. 1998); Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 530-31 (Tex. 1995). The Texas Workers' Compensation Act provides that the reviewing court is informed of the TWCC decision, but independently decides the issues by a preponderance of the evidence. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.301 (Vernon 1996); Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 531.
Findings of fact in a case tried to the court have the same force and effect as a jury's verdict on questions, and are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency under the same standards. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991); Min v. Avila, 991 S.W.2d 495, 500 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); see Gutierrez v. Elizondo, 139 S.W.3d 768, 773-74 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (discussing the well-settled standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency).
Texas Labor Code
Under section 409.001 of the Texas Labor Code, an employee must notify an employer of an injury no later than thirty days after the date which "if the injury is an occupational disease, the employee knew or should have known that the injury may be related to the employment." TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 409.001(a)(2). An "occupational disease" is defined in the labor code as the following:
a disease arising out of and in the course of employment that causes damage or harm to the physical structure of the body, including a repetitive trauma injury. The term includes a disease or infection that naturally results from the work-related disease. The term does not include an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of employment, unless that disease is an incident to a compensable injury or occupational disease.
Id. § 401.011(34) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (emphasis added).
Arthritis, poor circulation and high blood pressure are ordinary diseases of life and not necessarily linked to or caused by an occupational injury or disease. See Aetna Cas. Surety Co. v. Burris, 600 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The TWCC does not typically consider ailments like arthritis to fall under the definition of occupational disease. See, e.g., Appeal No. 032809, 2003 TX Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 2619, at *8 (Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Dec. 11, 2003); Appeal No. 990732. 1999 TX Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 3697, at *6 (Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n May 24, 1999).
At the time of Mangum's December 2 visit to his doctor, he had been diagnosed previously with arthritis and high blood pressure. During this particular visit, the doctor informed Mangum that he was also demonstrating some signs of carpal tunnel syndrome. However, at this point, it was unclear whether Mangum actually had developed carpal tunnel syndrome or was still suffering from the effects of his arthritis; his doctor had to refer him to another physician in order to determine if these new symptoms were, in fact, indicative of carpal tunnel syndrome. Therefore, there was no evidence in the record to suggest that, as of this December 2 doctor's visit, Mangum "knew or should have known" that his condition was beyond an "ordinary disease of life" and actually consisted of a work-related injury. At most, he and his doctor had a suspicion that his pre-existing condition had possibly developed or changed into a work-related injury. This suspicion is not equivalent to actual or constructive knowledge, which is required by the statute before an employee is obligated to report to his supervisor.
The trial court resolved the conflict regarding the date of Mangum's injury by deciding that it occurred on December 8, and Mangum was therefore legally entitled to compensation after reporting this injury within thirty days as required by statute. Viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to this verdict and disregarding all evidence to the contrary, we conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support this outcome. See Gutierrez, 139 S.W.3d at 773. Reviewing the entirety of the evidence for factual sufficiency, we conclude that the trial court properly resolved the conflict before it and its resolution is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust and is therefore factually sufficient. See id. at 773-74.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.