Opinion
2018 CA 1530
05-31-2019
CONTIN-U-CARE OUTREACH SERVICES, LLC v. Secretary Rebekah GEE, MD, The Louisiana Department of Health, and Tara Leblanc
Douglas L. Cade, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendants/Appellants, Secretary Rebekah Gee, MD, the Louisiana Department of Health, and Tara Leblanc Elizabeth J. Wilson, Linda Rodrigue, Jennifer Thomas, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, Contin-U-Care Outreach Services, LLC
Douglas L. Cade, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for Defendants/Appellants, Secretary Rebekah Gee, MD, the Louisiana Department of Health, and Tara Leblanc
Elizabeth J. Wilson, Linda Rodrigue, Jennifer Thomas, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, Contin-U-Care Outreach Services, LLC
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McCLENDON, AND HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
WHIPPLE, C.J.
Defendants, Rebekah Gee, M.D., Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health, the Louisiana Department of Health (LDH), and Tara Leblanc, appeal a judgment of the district court denying their exception of prematurity and granting plaintiff, Contin-U-Care Outreach Services, LLC's (Contin-U-Care), motion for preliminary and permanent injunctions. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 11, 2018, Contin-U-Care, an in-home care-services provider, filed a petition for temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctions, and damages against defendants, Dr. Gee, LDH and Ms. Leblanc, in the 19th Judicial District Court. Approximately two months prior, Contin-U-Care, which provides the above-mentioned services to elderly and infirm Medicaid beneficiaries in and around the New Orleans area, received notice from LDH that it would be excluded from participating in the Medical Assistance Program (Medicaid), effective July 13, 2018, for a period of five years, due to several violations of the program as outlined in the notice. Almost immediately, LDH began notifying Contin-U-Care's clients that Contin-U-Care would no longer be participating in the Medicaid program. LDH included a list of alternate providers of these services to Contin-U-Care's clients, advising them that they would need to switch providers and inform LDH of same, if they wished to avoid a break in their services.
As provided in the notice of exclusion, on May 23, 2018, Contin-U-Care sent a written request for an informal review of LDH's decision to exclude Contin-U-Care from the Medicaid program. An informal hearing was held on June 13, 2018, after which LDH reaffirmed its decision to exclude Contin-U-Care from the program in a letter dated June 21, 2018. The letter further advised that Contin-U-Care was entitled to seek an appeal before the Division of Administrative Law, and provided instructions regarding such an appeal.
Instead of filing an appeal, Contin-U-Care filed a petition for injunctive relief in the 19th Judicial District Court, seeking to enjoin LDH, Dr. Gee, and Ms. Leblanc, from requiring Contin-U-Care's beneficiaries to change providers and for judgment requiring LDH to return Contin-U-Care to the "freedom of choice" list to allow it to do business as usual until exhaustion of all of its appeals.
On July 12, 2018, the district court signed a temporary restraining order, enjoining LDH, Dr. Gee, Ms. Leblanc and the Office of Aging and Adult Services from:
The temporary restraining order was signed by District Court Judge Janice Clark.
i. eliminating Contin-U-Care from the waiver provider "freedom of choice list" and the LT-PCS "freedom of choice list" prior to the exhaustion of all administrative and judicial proceedings;
ii. notifying Contin-U-Care's beneficiaries and their case managers that Contin-U-Care is no longer participating/will no longer be participating in the Medicaid Program prior to a final decision from the Secretary following an Administrative Hearing on the merits of the exclusion and exhaustion of all administrative and judicial proceedings;
iii. preventing Contin-U-Care's beneficiaries from returning to Contin-U-Care immediately, without any delay or showing of good cause; and
iv. interfering in the return of Contin-U-Care's beneficiaries to its services.
The order further set the hearing on the preliminary and permanent injunctions for August 6, 2018.
On July 20, 2018, Contin-U-Care filed an unopposed motion to extend the temporary restraining order so that its effects would continue until the hearing on August 6, 2018. On that same day, Contin-U-Care requested a suspensive administrative appeal of the decision by LDH to exclude Contin-U-Care from participating in the Medicaid program.
LDH opposed Contin-U-Care's motion for preliminary and permanent injunctions and also filed an exception of prematurity, contending that Contin-U-Care had not yet exhausted its administrative remedies, and therefore, could not seek relief from the district court.
The hearing on the exception of prematurity and motion for preliminary and permanent injunctions was held on August 6, 2018. After hearing the arguments of the parties, the district court took the matters under advisement. On September 6, 2018, the district court issued its ruling, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
After a review of the law and argument of the parties, including the exhibits introduced in connection with this hearing, the court denies defendant's dilatory exception of prematurity and grants plaintiff's petition seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction against [the defendants]. The Court finds that this present action is not connected with the administrative appeal but with the protection of [Contin-U-Care's] due process rights which the law grants by the taking of a suspensive appeal. The court further finds that the taking of a suspensive administrative appeal prohibits [the defendants] from taking ANY action which causes damage to the business of [Contin-U-Care]. [Emphasis added.]
The defendants then filed the instant appeal.
DISCUSSION
Appellate courts have the duty to determine sua sponte whether their subject matter jurisdiction exists, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Gaten v. Tangipahoa Parish School System, 2011-1133 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/23/12), 91 So.3d 1073, 1074. This court's appellate jurisdiction extends only to "final judgments." See LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083(A) ; Rose v. Twin River Development, LLC, 2017-0319 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/1/17), 233 So.3d 679, 683. Under Louisiana law, a final judgment is one that determines the merits of a controversy in whole or in part. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1841. A valid judgment must be precise, definite, and certain; must contain decretal language; and must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. Gaten, 91 So.3d at 1074. These determinations should be evident from the language of the judgment without reference to other documents in the record. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Company, Inc., 2017-1250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/18), 268 So.3d 1044, 1046–47, 2018 WL 6716997 *4 (en banc).
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1918 provides not only that a final judgment be identified by appropriate language, but "when written reasons for the judgment are assigned, they shall be set out in an opinion separate from the judgment." It is well settled that this portion of the article is merely precatory and does not render a judgment, identified as such and complete in every respect, invalid simply because it includes written reasons in the body of the document. Conley v. Plantation Management Co., LLC, 2012-1510 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/6/13), 117 So.3d 542, 547, writ denied. 2013-1300 (La. 9/20/13), 123 So.3d 178 ; Hinchman v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 130, 292 So.2d 717, 719-720 (La. 1974). Thus, the fact that the judgment in the case before us is contained in a three-page document which contains reasons for judgment, does not alone invalidate the judgment.
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Similarly, a judgment granting an injunction must describe in reasonable detail the act or acts sought to be restrained. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3605. The proscribed conduct must be ascertainable from the four comers of the injunctive order or judgment, and not by the mere reference to the petition or other documents. See Spohrer v. Fore, 2009-1295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/11/10), 2010 WL 2342658 *5 (unpublished). The ruling in the instant case does not contain sufficient decretal language, as it merely "grants plaintiff's petition seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction." Thus, as rendered, there is no way to ascertain the proscribed conduct from the judgment itself.
Moreover, we find that the statement in the court's ruling that "[t]he court further finds that the taking of a suspensive administrative appeal prohibits [the defendants] from taking ANY action which causes damages to the business of [Contin-U-Care]" likewise fails to specify or order any discernible or particular acts to be proscribed. Finally, to the extent that this statement could be read as ordering that the defendants refrain from any acts which cause damage to Contin-U-Care's business, this provision appears to be overly broad and vague.
In sum, because the judgment lacks sufficient decretal language, ascertainable from the four comers of the order or judgment and fails to state or describe in any detail the act or acts to be restrained, the ruling on which this appeal is based is not a final appealable judgment. In the absence of a valid final judgment clearly stating or ordering the relief to be granted, we are constrained to conclude that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the appeal of the trial court's September 6, 2018 judgment is hereby dismissed and the matter is remanded to the trial court. We decline to assess costs pending the rendition of a final judgment.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
McClendon, J. concurs.