Opinion
No. 5-838 / 04-1640
Filed February 1, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Thomas Koehler, Judge.
Respondents appeal from the district court's ruling on judicial review reversing and remanding the workers' compensation decision. REVERSED.
Jean Dickson Feeney of Betty, Neuman McMahon, P.L.C., Davenport, for appellants.
Paul J. McAndrew, Jr. of Paul McAndrew Law Firm, Coralville, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
North American Van Lines (NAVL) and Insurance Company, State of Pennsylvania, Respondents, appeal from the district court's ruling on judicial review reversing and remanding the workers' compensation commissioner's appeal decision. We reverse the decision of the district court and affirm the decision of the commissioner.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Stephan Conti worked as an over-the-road, semi-tractor-trailer truck driver for NAVL. On March 23, 1999, he was loading store fixtures at a Blockbuster Video store located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for transport to California when a day laborer assisting in loading the truck jammed Conti in the ribs with metal shelving. Conti straightened and hit his head and neck on the overhead decking. He continued loading the trailer after the accident. The pain became progressively worse and on March 30, 1999, Conti saw a physician in Tulsa, Oklahoma. He was diagnosed with rib contusions, provided a belt to wear, and prescribed pain medications. As the rib pain subsided, Conti began experiencing arm, neck, and shoulder pain. Over the next eighteen months, Conti's pain continued to worsen. He continued to work, although he took more time off than usual in an attempt to recuperate. NAVL terminated Conti effective September 18, 2000, for refusing to take an assigned load. Conti refused due to ongoing pain that prevented him from performing the duties required of him as a truck driver.
After his initial visit to a physician in March 1999, Conti did not seek further medical treatment until November 2000, when he consulted with Dr. Robert Callahan, an orthopedic surgeon. Conti told Dr. Callahan that his neck pain resulted from the March 23, 1999, accident. Dr. Callahan recommended a cervical decompression and fusion, which he performed on Conti in January 2003.
In February 2001 Conti filed for workers' compensation benefits based on the March 23, 1999 accident. A hearing was held on February 12, 2003. At the hearing, Conti testified he reported the March 23, 1999 injury to NAVL via his cell phone on the day of the accident and on several occasions thereafter. His co-driver, Jean Ketner, provided similar testimony. Deposition testimony and other evidence introduced at the hearing, however, contradicted Conti's and Ketner's testimony. The dispatcher to whom Conti claimed he reported the injury was no longer employed by NAVL on the date of the accident. Other dispatchers did not remember Conti reporting an injury; dispatcher notes regarding telephone conversations with drivers did not indicate a report of injury by Conti. Conti did not follow NAVL's written policy of calling an 800 number and filling out a written report following a work injury. NAVL first learned of the injury in December 2000 when Conti first pursued a Florida claim for the alleged work injuries (the Florida claim was subsequently dismissed).
Following the hearing, the deputy commissioner issued an arbitration decision dismissing Conti's petition with prejudice. The deputy commissioner concluded Conti failed to provide timely notice of the injury to NAVL as required by Iowa Code section 85.23 (2001). Conti appealed, and on January 29, 2004, the workers' compensation commissioner affirmed the deputy commissioner's decision. Conti filed a petition for judicial review. The district court remanded the final decision back to the commissioner for a specific finding as to whether Conti was aware of the "probable compensable character" of his condition. See Johnson v. Heartland Specialty Foods, 672 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Iowa 2003) (noting that "[u]nder the discovery rule, the time within which a proceeding must be commenced does not begin to run until the claimant, as a responsible person, should recognize the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character of the condition").
Respondents appeal, arguing (1) Conti failed to preserve the discovery rule issue for judicial review by failing to raise it before the commission; and even if he did (2) the commissioner made a sufficient finding with regard to the discovery rule, and (3) substantial evidence supports the commissioner's finding.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
Our review is governed by the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A (2003). See Iowa Code § 86.26 (2001). The district court functions in an appellate capacity in exercising its judicial review power. Hill v. Fleetguard, Inc., 705 N.W.2d 665, 669 (Iowa 2005). When reviewing the district court's decision, we apply the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether the conclusions we reach are the same as those of the district court. Id. We affirm if the conclusions are the same; otherwise we reverse. Id. The agency's findings of fact are binding on us if they are supported by substantial evidence. Fears v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 382 N.W.2d 473, 475 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). "However, neither we nor the district court is bound by the agency's legal conclusions." Id.
III. Preservation of Error
Respondents argue Conti failed to raise the discovery rule issue before the agency in his agency appeal briefs. Therefore, Respondents contend, Conti failed to preserve the issue for judicial review, and the district court erred in remanding the case on the basis of the discovery rule.
Claims not raised before the industrial commissioner will not be considered by the court on judicial review. Cargill, Inc. v. Conley, 620 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Iowa 2000). In his "Intra-Agency Appeal Brief," Conti argued "NAVL has not proven it more likely than not that it did not have section 85.23 notice." Conti's brief cited the discovery rule in an overview of the applicable law, but his argument related to section 85.23 notice had to do with Conti's assertion that he reported the injury to NAVL shortly after it occurred. After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, Conti concluded the argument:
When considering the testimony of NAVL truck drivers, the continuous reporting of Conti and Ketner, the conflicting questionable testimony of [NAVL dispatchers], NAVL's failure to maintain relevant Qualcomm records, combined with overwhelming proof of NAVL's organizational chaos, Defendants' affirmative notice defense should be discarded and proper 85.23 notice for Conti's March 23, 1999 injury must be found.
The evidence presented by Conti at the hearing raised the issue of whether NAVL received notice of the injury shortly after it occurred. At no point before the commissioner did Conti argue he had provided timely notice of his injury due to application of the discovery rule. The district court erred in remanding the commissioner's decision on this basis.
IV. Discovery Rule
Even if Conti preserved the discovery rule issue for judicial review, we conclude the commissioner's decision adequately addressed the issue. Therefore, remand by the district court was not appropriate.
The commissioner must state the evidence relied upon and "specify in detail the reasons for [the commissioner's] conclusions." Catalfo v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 213 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1973); see also Iowa Code § 17A.16(1) (2003). The decision must be "sufficiently detailed to show the path [the commissioner] has taken through conflicting evidence." Id. "[T]he commissioners' duty to furnish a reasoned opinion [is] satisfied if `it is possible to work backward . . . and to deduce what must have been [the agency's] legal conclusions and [its] findings of fact.'" Bridgestone/Firestone v. Accordino, 561 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Norland v. Iowa Dep't of Job Servs., 412 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Iowa 1987)).
The deputy commissioner found that Conti "did not and had no intention of reporting a work injury or claiming an injury before [December 2000]. By his own admission at hearing, he chose not to do so because he was fearful of alleged retaliation." The deputy commissioner cited Conti's failure to seek reimbursement for treatment as "even more evidence of intent not to report, but cover up, a work injury." Further, the deputy commissioner found "Any rational person would have realized that he had some sort of serious problem after only a few months of continuous, increasing pain from the March 23, 1999 injury" and that Conti, "as a reasonable person, should have known of the probable consequences and seriousness of this injury long before 90 days prior to the time NAVL first learned of the injury from Florida authorities in December 2000." In his conclusions of law, the deputy commissioner cited to case law addressing the discovery rule. The commissioner affirmed and adopted these findings of fact and conclusions of law.
We conclude the deputy commissioner's decision, affirmed by the commissioner, adequately raised and addressed the discovery rule issue. Substantial evidence supports the commissioner's findings. Therefore, the district court erred in remanding the decision for further findings.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's ruling and reinstate the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner.
REVERSED.
Mahan, J., concurs; Hecht, J., dissents.
I respectfully dissent. The agency's decision clearly discloses the agency was confronted with, and intended to resolve, the question of whether timely notice of Conti's injury was received by respondents. Respondents clearly concede the agency considered the relevance of the discovery rule to that question, as they contend on appeal "[i]t is quite conspicuous and explicit from a reading of the deputy commissioner's decision that the `discovery rule' was addressed." The record before the agency unmistakably documents that Conti again raised in his brief on intra-agency appeal the principle that the time period for notice under Iowa Code section 85.23 "does not begin to run until claimant, as a reasonable man, should recognize the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character of his injury or disease." Given the abundant evidence that Conti raised, and the agency considered, the discovery rule question, I would hold that error was preserved. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 540 (Iowa 2002) (recounting the purposes of our error preservation rules).
In my view, the agency's decision fails completely to provide an explanation of or factual basis for a finding that Conti knew or should have known that his cervical-spine condition was probably compensable at a time more than ninety days before respondents concede they received actual notice of the claim. See Johnson v. Heartland Specialty Foods, 672 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Iowa 2003) (stating the ninety-day period in which a claimant must give the employer notice of injury under Iowa Code section 85.23 does not begin to run until "as a reasonable person, [he]should recognize the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character of the condition"). I do not dispute the existence of a factual basis for the agency's finding that a "rational person would have realized he had some sort of serious problem after a few months of continuous, increasing pain." However, the compensability prong of the discovery rule is distinct from the injury prong. See Swartzendruber v. Schimmel, 613 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 2000). Because I conclude the agency's decision is not sufficiently detailed to show the path taken through the evidence relevant to the compensability prong, I would affirm the district court's decision to remand this case for further proceedings. Bridgestone/Firestone v. Accordino, 561 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1997).
It should be noted that Swartzendruber did not raise the "probable compensability character component of the discovery rule." Id.