Opinion
Civ. No. 99-0813, SECTION "K"(1).
February 14, 2001.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 143) filed by Carline Management Company, Inc and CSS Atlanta, Inc. ("Carline"), third-party defendants. The case at bar concerns damages allegedly caused when a group of eight loaded barges broke away from Capital Marine's Triangle fleet on February 12, 1999. These eight barges traveled approximately one mile downriver and struck a block of barges at the fleeting facility of Consolidated Grain Barge Company ("CGB"). More barges broke away from that facility and apparently injured other downriver structures and vessels. CGB, barge owners and companies with downriver facilities damaged by the breakaway barges have all sued Capital Marine. Carline was brought into the case as a third-party defendant by CGB and subsequently sued as a direct defendant by several plaintiffs in intervention. The basis for these claims against Carline is that Carline's vessel, the M/V CSS ATLANTA, struck the CGB's Block No. 2 two days (February 10, 1999) before the incident at issue herein.
Carline has filed the instant motion seeking dismissal (1) on the basis that there are no material facts at issue and/or (2) on the legal theory that superceding or intervening cause relieves Carline from liability for plaintiffs' damages. Pretermitting whether there are any issues of fact legitimately contested, the Court finds the motion meritorious based on the later theory — that is superceding or intervening cause — for the reasons that follow.
Background
CGB contends that on February 10, 1999, the CSS ATLANTA, with a loaded three barge tow, was traveling northbound on the Mississippi River in the vicinity of CGB's barge fleeting facility. Shortly after midnight, an allision allegedly occurred between the CSS ATLANTA and her tow and the stationary No. 2 Tier of CGB's westbank fleet when the loaded three barge tow of CSS ATLANTA broke apart and fell down on the stationary No. 2 Tier. CGB contends that this allision caused numerous barges within that tier to be set adrift which then, together with the loaded tow of the CSS ATLANTA, drifted down river and allided with the No. 3 Tier resulting in the anchor pile for the No. 3 Tier being destroyed.
It is uncontested by either CGB or Capital Marine (the only parties who oppose the motion) that at the time of the Triangle breakaway on February 12, 1999, CGB was not fleeting any barges at Block 2 and 3 located on the westbank. It is also uncontested that after the Carline accident of February 10 and by the time of the Triangle accident of February 12, CGB absorbed elsewhere in its fleet the barges removed from Block 2 and 3 that had to be relocated as a result of the Carline accident. It is the placement of those barges at Stern Buoy No. 3 and Tier No. 1 which Capital Marine contends resulted in CGB permit violations which is a basis for its defense against CGB's in this case. Finally, Capital Marine does not contest but CGB does contes the allegation that the M/V CSS ATLANTA's accident of February 10 did not involve CGB Blocks 1, 3 S/B, 4, 5, and 6. Regardless, the allision that is the subject of this suit did not occur until a full two days after the Carline accident.
Standard for Motion for Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Stults v. Conoco, 76 F.3d 651, 656, (5th Cir. 1996), (citingSkotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). Finally, the court notes that the substantive law determines of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The court now turns to the merits of the arguments with these standards in mind.
Superceding or Intervening Cause Relieves Consolidated from Liability
This Court has grappled with the theory of relief from liability based on the theory of superceding or intervening cause in In the Matter of TT Boat Corp., 1999 WL 223165 (E.D.La. April 14, 1999) in which it explained as follows:
. . . The "superseding cause" doctrine is similar and related to the principle of "proximate causation." Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 116 S.Ct. 813 (1996). Under the "superseding cause" doctrine, a party may be exonerated from liability where its negligence substantially contributed to another party's injury "but the injury was actually brought about by a cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable" Id. quoting Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-3, at 165-66 (2d Ed. 1994). The doctrine asks whether a defendant "is to be held liable for an injury to which he has in fact made a substantial contribution, when it is brought about by a cause of independent origin, for which he is not responsible." Nunley v. M/V Dauntless Coloctronis, 727 F.2d 455, 464 (5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit has explained that an intervening, negligent, act of a third person is not a superseding cause if one of the following scenarios exists:
(a) the actor at the time of negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or (b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or (c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.
Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 1982), quoting Nunley, 727 F.2d at 464-65.
While CGB opines that there are material facts at issue that preclude summary judgment, the Court is less than convinced of that proposition. Nevertheless, pretermitting that question, considering the circumstances surrounding the February 10, 1999, allision none of these exceptions to the application of superseding cause are applicable to the case at bar. Carline could not have "realized" there would be another breakaway of barges. No reasonable man, knowing of the Carline accident, would not regard it as highly extraordinary that another breakaway impacting this same facility would occur two days later. Finally, the intervening act — the Triangle breakaway — is not a "normal consequence" of a situation created by Carline's conduct and that the Triangle breakaway is not extraordinarily negligent in the context of Carline's liability. TT Boats at *9-*10.
This statement is not to be construed as a finding with respect to Capital Marine's liability; it is made solely in the context of the analysis for Carline's liability.
As such, the Court finds that Canine cannot be held liable for an injury to which Carline has allegedly made a substantial contribution, when the injury was brought about by a cause of independent origin, for which Canine was not responsible. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 143) filed by Carline Management Company, Inc and CSS Atlanta, Inc. is GRANTED.