Opinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1899
02-15-2019
Steven Conrad, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Rory Gallagher Marion County Public Defender Appellate Division Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General Evan Matthew Comer Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Rory Gallagher
Marion County Public Defender
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General
Evan Matthew Comer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable Kurt Eisgruber, Judge
The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No. 49G01-1705-F5-18057
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
[1] During the summer of 2018, Steven Conrad was convicted of Level 5 felony burglary and given a sentence of three years, with two years to serve through Marion County Community Corrections and one year suspended to probation. The trial court ordered Conrad to begin the executed portion of his sentence on home detention but gave community corrections "discretion to move him to other components as deemed appropriate." Tr. p. 91. The court added, "He'll be placed on a sliding scale for his community corrections monitoring fees." Id.; see also Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 10, 13.
[2] Conrad now appeals, arguing that it is the responsibility of the trial court to set an offender's home-detention fee and that the trial court improperly delegated that responsibility to community corrections in this case. We agree as to the first part. Indiana Code section 35-38-2.5-6(7) provides that an order for home detention must include, among other things, "[a] requirement that the offender pay a home detention fee set by the court[.]" (Emphasis added.) The second part of Conrad's argument may be correct, too, but we do not have enough information to know one way or the other. All the trial court said was that Conrad would be "placed on a sliding scale for his community corrections monitoring fees." There is no indication in the record of what "sliding scale" the court was referring to, who established the scale, or who administers it, so we have no way of knowing whether the court intended to delegate any statutory responsibility to community corrections. Therefore, we vacate the part of the sentencing order relating to the community-corrections/home
detention fee, but we remand this matter to give the trial court an opportunity to clarify its intent regarding that fee.
[3] Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.