Opinion
Case Number CV-01-20656-JF, [Doc. No. 20].
November 10, 2004
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT [ 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)]
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Marjorie L. Connor filed this action on July 16, 2001, challenging the November 7, 2000, determination of an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") that she was not disabled. This Court granted summary judgment for Defendant on March 8, 2002. Plaintiff appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded on January 29, 2004. Plaintiff filed a motion and application for attorneys' fees on February 2, 2004. On March 17, 2004, this Court remanded the case to the Defendant for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals opinion. Defendant filed its opposition to the fee motion on February 12, 2004. Plaintiff responded on February 17, 2004. The matter was taken under submission without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's application will be GRANTED.
II. DISCUSSION
For purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), an applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party when the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded, whether or not benefits ultimately are awarded. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Shalala v. Shaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993)). Under EAJA, a prevailing party in an action in which the United States is a party may recover attorneys' fees and costs unless the Court finds that the United States' position was substantially justified or that special circumstances exist which would render an award of fees and costs unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). It is the government's burden to show that its position was substantially justified or that special circumstances existed. Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. The party seeking the award of fees and costs must apply for such award "within thirty days of final judgment in the action." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). In the instant case, Plaintiff is the prevailing party and her application for attorneys' fees and costs was timely.The Court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award, including the reasonableness of the hours claimed by the prevailing party. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). In doing so, the Court should provide a clear but concise explanation of its reasons for the fee award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. When considering a fee application under EAJA, the most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 433. In the instant action, Plaintiff requests payment for 74.5 hours at $161.62 per hour for a total fee of $12,040.69. Plaintiff also requests payment of costs incurred in the amount of $834.60. Defendant does not dispute the reasonableness the requested fees or costs.
Defendant argues, however, that the government's position was substantially justified at all times during the litigation, and that Plaintiff therefore is not entitled to attorneys' fees. "Substantially justified" means "justified to a degree that could satisfy the reasonable person." Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1993)). A substantially justified position must have a basis in both law and fact. Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258 (citing Pierce, 487 U.S. at 656 and Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff contends that the government's position did not have a reasonable basis in law because the ALJ applied a superseded standard when evaluating Plaintiff's mental illness. Gutierrez holds that an ALJ must comply with the applicable version the Social Security Administration ("SSA") regulations. Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1259 (government's litigation position was not substantially justified because the ALJ's failure to follow SSA regulation was not justified). On November 7, 2000, when the ALJ made the underlying determination in this case, the relevant standard was 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e)(2) (effective September 20, 2000). This regulation requires an ALJ to make specific findings in each of the four functional areas that the Commissioner uses to evaluate the severity of a mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e). The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment for the government because the ALJ did not make findings regarding the four functional areas when evaluating Plaintiff's impairment but instead attached a Psychiatric Review Technique Form ("PRTF") which rated functional categories according to the old scales. Defendant maintains that the ALJ's decision met the substantive requirements of the regulation and was defective only in form. This assertion is contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision. In Gutierrez, the government's position was not substantially justified because the ALJ had failed to comply with the applicable SSA regulation. This Court sees no reason why the rationale should not apply here.
The applicable regulation at the time of the Gutierrez determination required the ALJ to complete a PRTF. It is true that the ALJ appears to have complied with the old regulation in evaluating Plaintiff's impairment. But Defendant does not claim, as in Gutierrez, that the new regulation was ambiguous, nor does Defendant give any reason why the ALJ did not follow the new regulation.
Plaintiff also contends that the government's position did not have a reasonable basis in fact because the ALJ discounted medical evidence documenting a severe mental impairment. Defendant maintains that the ALJ's determination was reasonably based in fact because two physicians found Plaintiff's impairments were not severe. The Court need not address this factual question because the government's position did not have a reasonable basis in law for the reasons discussed above.
III. ORDER
Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion and application for attorneys' fees and costs is GRANTED.