"Subvention" refers to claims by local governments and agencies in California for reimbursement from the state for costs of complying with state mandates for which the mandate does not concomitantly provide funds to the local agency. ( Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 395, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231 ( Connell ).) In the event a local agency believes it is entitled to subvention for a new unfunded state mandate, the agency may file a "test claim" with the Commission on State Mandates (Commission).
"[S]ubvention" refers to claims by local governments and agencies in California for reimbursement from the state for costs of complying with state mandates for which the mandate does not concomitantly provide funds to the local agency. ( Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 395, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231 ( Connell ).) In the event a local agency believes it is entitled to subvention for a new unfunded state mandate, the agency may file a "test claim" with the Commission on State Mandates (Commission).
"[S]ubvention" refers to claims by local governments and agencies in California for reimbursement from the state for costs of complying with state mandates for which the mandate does not concomitantly provide funds to the local agency. (Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 395 (Connell).) In the event a local agency believes it is entitled to subvention for a new unfunded state mandate, the agency may file a "test claim" with the Commission on State Mandates (Commission).
The sole issue before us is whether permittees have "the authority, i.e., the right or power, to levy fees sufficient to cover the costs of the state-mandated program." ( Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 401, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231.) The inquiry is an issue of law, not a question of fact.
However, where the facts are undisputed and the issues present questions of law, the appellate court is not bound by the trial court's decision but may make its own determination. ( Ibid.)" (Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 394 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231].) DISCUSSION
This observation, however, does not diminish the basic principle underlying the state mandate process that sections 17514 and 17566, subdivision (d) embody: To the extent a local agency or school district "has the authority" to charge for the mandated program or increased level of service, that charge cannot be recovered as a state-mandated cost. (See Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 401 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231] ["the plain language of [section 17556, subdivision (d)] precludes reimbursement where the local agency has the authority, i.e., the right or the power, to levy fees sufficient to cover the costs of the state-mandated program"]; see Connell, at pp. 397-398.) In light of sections 17514 and 17556, subdivision (d), the Commission found the Health Fee Elimination Program to be a reimbursable state-mandated program to the extent the cost to community college districts of maintaining their level of health services at the 1986-1987 level, as required by the Health Fee Elimination Program mandate, is not covered by the nominal health fee authorized by section 76355, subdivision (a)(1) ($10 maximum per semester per student).
We do not reach this issue because we exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate, in the interests of justice and judicial economy. ( Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 744-747 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 872 P.2d 143]; Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 393-394 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231].) The merits of the issue have been fully briefed by the parties, and this is a case in which the failure to consider the issue at this juncture would be a dereliction of our duties as a reviewing court.
Finally, if the probate court's order were not appealable, we would exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. ( Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 745-747 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 872 P.2d 143]; Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 393-394 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231].) II.Stephen, as a Remainder Beneficiary, Had Standing Under Probate Code Section 17200, Subdivision (b)(7) to Petition the Probate Court for an Order Compelling the Trustee to Account.
This is plainly correct because, regarding a trial court's ruling on a petition for a writ of mandate, an appellate court can and should make its own determination when the case involves the "resolution of questions of law where the facts are undisputed." ( Evans v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 398, 407 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 782, 703 P.2d 122]; see also Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 394 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 231].) This appeal clearly involves questions of law, specifically, the interpretation and application of provisions of (1) the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq., hereafter Bill of Rights Act) and (2) the California Public Records Act (CPRA), relating to the inspection of public records (§ 6250 et seq.).
"An appealable judgment or order is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal." (Connell v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 382, 392; Code Civ. Proc, § 904.1.) An order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not an appealable order.