Opinion
CASE NO. 801 CRD-2-88-12
MARCH 21, 1990
The claimant was represented by Stuart Einhorn, Esq.
The respondent was represented by Robert Fitzgerald, Esq., Asselin and Associates.
This Petition for Review from the December 12, 1988 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Second District was heard December 1, 1989 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners A. Thomas White, Jr. and James Metro.
OPINION
Respondent seeks review of the Second District December 12, 1988 Finding and Award. The trial Commissioner found claimant's June 9, 1988 back injury arose in and out of the course of employment. The Respondent contends the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish a causal relationship.
There was testimony from the claimant that on June 1988 he twisted his back and fell to the ground while disconnecting a trailer at work. Dr. David Cavicke, the neurosurgeon who operated on claimant's back, declared his condition to be work related. Our review is limited to determining whether there was evidence to support the trial Commissioner's conclusion and whether the conclusion was contrary to law or based on unreasonable or impermissible factual inferences. Fair vs. People's Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535 (1988).
The appellant employer argues that Dr. Cavicke's report fails to satisfy the standard for medical opinions requiring reasonable medical probability. See Madore v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 709, 714, (1926).
Our decision in Aurora v. Miami Plumbing Heating, Inc., 2 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 113, 238 CRD-7-83 (1983) aff'd 6 Conn. App. 45 (1986) (per curiam) is on point. In Aurora, the employer contended that the written medical report stating
"In my opinion, the injury . . . is likely to have resulted in an exacerbation of his lumbar radiculopathy secondary to his lumbar stenosis," and "[i]t is my medical opinion that his [The Claimant's] lumbar stenosis did antedate his injury . . . and made his overall permanent disability materially and substantially greater than had he experienced a herniated nucleus pulposus alone," was insufficient to establish the existence of a pre-existing injury with medical probability. We upheld the Commissioner's conclusion that the physician's statements constituted a sufficient basis to find reasonable probability. Moreover, if the appellant wished to probe further into the physician's written statement, the respondent was free to call that doctor to the stand. We think the same reasoning applies here.
As Sec. 31-301c(b) requires, we grant interest at the rate permitted by statute on benefits remaining unpaid during the pendency of the appeal.
We affirm the Second District and dismiss the appeal.
Commissioners White and Metro concur in this opinion.