Summary
concluding that sudden emergency instruction should have been given where there was no allegation that defendant was speeding or violating traffic laws; rather, defendant made "split-second decision to switch lanes" when suddenly faced with car improperly stopped in busy, slick intersection
Summary of this case from Collins v. RamboOpinion
No. 12S02-9110-CV-862.
October 29, 1991.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Clinton County, Jack R. O'Neill, J.
Peter L. Obremskey, Carol Sparks Drake, Bridget L. Rogers, Parr, Richey, Obremskey Morton, Lebanon, James D. Moore, Ryan, Hartzell, Moore Cook, Frankfort, for appellant.
Michael Eugene Douglas, Frankfort, for appellee.
James Brian Compton brought a negligence action against Mary R. Pletch stemming from an automobile collision from which Compton incurred medical expenses and other costs. After a jury trial, Compton was found to be forty percent at fault for the accident. Finding that the total damage Compton suffered was $26,000, the jury awarded Compton a verdict against Pletch of $15,600.
Compton appealed, claiming the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a sudden emergency instruction. The Court of Appeals determined the doctrine of sudden emergency is still viable in tort actions under the Comparative Fault Act, I.C. 34-4-33-1, et seq. It held that failure to give the sudden emergency instruction prejudiced Compton. The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for new trial. Compton v. Pletch (1990), Ind. App., 561 N.E.2d 803.
We believe the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that the sudden emergency instruction was appropriate. We therefore grant transfer and adopt the Court of Appeals opinion in Compton v. Pletch (1990), Ind. App., 561 N.E.2d 803. Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B)(3). We vacate the Court of Appeals' opinion on rehearing, Compton v. Pletch (1991), Ind. App., 565 N.E.2d 771.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial on liability and damages.
DeBRULER, GIVAN, DICKSON and KRAHULIK, JJ., concur.