Opinion
DOCKET NUMBERS 2021 CA 0706 2021 CA 0707
02-25-2022
Requel Lashay COMPTON v. Jeffrey Bernard CHATMAN
Rickey O. Thomas, New Roads, Louisiana, and Kathleen M. Wilson, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Jeffrey Bernard Chatman Veronica Jones, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Requel Lashay Compton Hillar C. Moore III, District Attorney, Amanda Kinchen Gros, Assistant District Attorney, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services & Child Support Enforcement
Rickey O. Thomas, New Roads, Louisiana, and Kathleen M. Wilson, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Jeffrey Bernard Chatman
Veronica Jones, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Requel Lashay Compton
Hillar C. Moore III, District Attorney, Amanda Kinchen Gros, Assistant District Attorney, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services & Child Support Enforcement
BEFORE: McDONALD, LANIER, WOLFE, JJ.
McDONALD, J.
The defendant, Jeffrey Bernard Chatman, appeals a judgment denying his motion to modify or dissolve a protective order issued against him under the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes, La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq. After review, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Chatman and the petitioner, Requel Lashay Compton, were previously involved in a relationship and are the parents of two children, J.L.C., born October 21, 2009, and A.L.C., born July 18, 2013. The record does not show a final custody determination of the children but does show that Mr. Chatman is under a court order to pay monthly child support for J.L.C.
On January 6, 2014, about six months after A.L.C.'s birth, Ms. Compton, on behalf of herself and the children, filed a Petition for Protection from Abuse against Mr. Chatman, alleging he had sexually abused J.L.C. She also alleged Mr. Chatman had threatened on many occasions that, if she reported him to authorities and he had to go to jail, he would kill her and the children. On that same date, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order and ordered Mr. Chatman to appear at The record does not showa later hearing to show cause why the court should not issue a protective order.
Although the temporary restraining order was renewed and the original hearing rescheduled, the trial court ultimately held a hearing on the matter on February 12, 2014, at which the parties represented themselves and both testified. At the end of the hearing, based on Mr. Chatman's "agreement" to the Protective Order, the trial court granted the Protective Order "as requested." Immediately thereafter, the trial court signed a Louisiana Uniform Abuse Prevention Order Form, issuing a Protective Order against Mr. Chatman. The first page of the Protective Order, issued pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq. , stated: "This order shall be effective through 11:59 PM on 8/12/15. NOTE: Some provisions of this order MAY NOT EXPIRE. See paragraphs 1-5 ." (Emphasis in original.) As reproduced below, on pages 2 and 3 of the Protective Order, the trial court initialed paragraphs 1-5 and marked boxes indicating that those provisions did not expire: ?
The courts of this state shall use a uniform form for the issuance of any protective or restraining order, which form shall be developed, approved, and distributed by the judicial administrator's office, [and] shall be titled the "Uniform Abuse Prevention Order." La. R.S. 46:2136.2C.
The record does not show that Mr. Chatman timely filed a motion for new trial or an appeal from the Protective Order.
On November 13, 2019, Mr. Chatman filed a motion to dissolve the Protective Order, asserting that it was his understanding that the Protective Order was set to expire 18 months after its issuance, i.e., on August 12, 2015. He claimed the parties reconciled and began living together again in October 2014, while the Protective Order was in effect. Mr. Chatman further asserted that the parties continued to live together, and he only later discovered that there was still an "active" Protective Order prohibiting him from seeing his children. Mr. Chatman claimed that he has been restricted from seeing the children for more than two years because of the non-expiring Protective Order of which he was not aware; he requested that the Protective Order be dissolved. The rule to show cause order attached to Mr. Chatman's motion was "FILED UNSIGNED." The next day, Mr. Chatman filed another motion to dissolve the Protective Order, asserting that "[t]he parties ... were under the presumption that the current [Protective Order] was for 18 [months] as opposed to for a lifetime" and that he "would like to have the matter resolved by the courts so he could visit with his minor children whom he hadn't seen in 2 years." The trial court dismissed this second motion after Mr. Chatman failed to appear at a scheduled hearing.
On December 5, 2019, Mr. Chatman filed a third motion to modify/dissolve the Protective Order, requesting that the Court "remove the ‘Does not expire’ in paragraph[s] 1-5" of the Protective Order. On December 18, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the matter, at which the parties were both represented by counsel and at which both parties testified. On February 3, 2020, the trial court signed a judgment denying Mr. Chatman's third motion. Mr. Chatman appealed from the February 3, 2020 judgment, but this court dismissed the appeal, because the appealed judgment was not a valid, final judgment. Compton v. Chatman, 20-0874 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/25/21), 2021 WL 734025, *2-3. On April 26, 2021, the trial court signed another judgment, which denied Mr. Chatman's third motion and dismissed it in favor of Ms. Compton. Mr. Chatman has again appealed.
On appeal, Mr. Chatman states he "is not attempting to [re-litigate] the matter of the protective order" and that he "was aware and acquiesced to the 18-month" effective period. He essentially contends, however, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to modify the non-expiring Protective Order because: (1) the trial court did not inform him of the non-expiring provisions when it issued the Protective Order in 2014, as required by La. R.S. 46:2136F(2)(b); and, (2) he has shown a change in circumstances sufficient to modify or dissolve the Protective Order's non-expiring provisions.
DOMESTIC ABUSE PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Protective orders are issued in domestic violence matters pursuant to the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes, La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq. The purpose of these statutes is to provide domestic violence victims a civil remedy to attain immediate and easily accessible protection. La. R.S. 46:2131 ; Pierce v. Pierce, 19-0689 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/21/20), 298 So.3d 902, 906. A court may issue a domestic abuse protective order, if the court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, and if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard is given to the person against whom the order is sought, such that his due process rights are protected. See La. R.S. 46:2136B(2); Darby v. Duplechain, 16-2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/4/16), 192 So.3d 258, 259. The court may issue the protective order for "good cause shown," which requires a showing of immediate and present danger of abuse. La. R.S. 46:2135A; 46:2136; Pierce, 298 So.3d at 906.
In determining the existence of an immediate and present danger of abuse, the court shall consider any and all past history of abuse, or threats thereof. There is no requirement that the abuse itself be recent, immediate, or present. La. R.S. 46:2135A.
Except as provided in La. R.S. 46:2136F(2), any final protective order shall be for a fixed period of time, not to exceed 18 months; however, the court has discretion to extend a protective order after conducting a contradictory hearing. La. R.S. 46:2136F(1). Linder the exception provided in La. R.S. 46:2136F(2), the court may grant a protective order for an indefinite period of time, on its own motion or by motion of the petitioner, but only as to that portion of the protective order that directs the defendant to refrain from abusing, harassing, or interfering with the protected persons as provided in La. R.S. 46:2135A(1) (A protective order may "[direct] the defendant to refrain from abusing, harassing, or interfering with the person or employment or going near the residence or place of employment of the petitioner [or] the minor children ... on whose behalf [the] petition was filed ...."). The court must conduct a hearing for a motion to issue an indefinite protective order and shall hold such hearing concurrently with the hearing for the rule to show cause why the protective order should be issued. See La. R.S. 46:2136F(2)(b).
Once a protective order is issued, any party may motion the court to modify it to exclude any item included in the prior order or to include any item that could have been included in the prior order. La. R.S. 46:2136D(l). The court may make such inclusion or exclusion only after notice to the other parties and a hearing. Id. Further, of particular relevance here, any party may motion the court to modify the effective period of a protective order pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2136F(2). See La. R.S. 46:2136(0)(2) ; State v. Fink , 20-139 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/1/20), 296 So.3d 1270, 1277. The court may modify the indefinite effective period of a prior protective order after a hearing and only after a good faith effort has been made to provide reasonable notice of the hearing to the victim, his/her agent, or counsel, and either: (1) the victim, his/her agent, or counsel is present at the hearing or provides written waiver of such appearance, or (2) the victim could not be located. La. R.S. 46:2136D(2); 46:2136F(2)(c)(i) and (ii).
An appellate court reviews domestic protective orders for abuse of discretion. Head v. Robichaux , 18-0366 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/2/18), 265 So.3d 813, 817. Moreover, we review the trial court's factual findings relating to such protective orders under a manifest error standard of review. Id. In matters of credibility, we must give great deference to the trial court's findings, as the trial court is in the best position to view the witnesses' demeanor and mannerisms. Id. When conflicting testimony exists, this court cannot disturb the trial court's reasonable credibility evaluations and reasonable factual inferences. Stobart v. State , DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 882-83 (La. 1993) ; Pierce , 298 So.3d at 907.
Non-Expiring Protective Order
Mr. Chatman first contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to modify the Protective Order, because the trial court did not inform him of the Protective Order's non-expiring provisions when it issued the order in 2014. He claims the trial court's failure to so inform him renders the Protective Order "null."
Mr. Chatman correctly notes that, under La. R.S. 46:2136F(2)(b), the trial court was required to hold a show cause hearing on the issuance of the Protective Order itself, and concurrent with that hearing, the trial court was required to address the non-expiring provisions of the Protective Order. Here, the trial court held the show cause hearing on February 12, 2014; Mr. Chatman and Ms. Compton both testified at that hearing but were not represented by counsel. Mr. Chatman denied molesting J.L.C. and claimed Ms. Compton fabricated the molestation allegations against him. He told the trial court, however, that he was willing to agree to a restraining order against him "for her sake," because he would "rather just stay away from her completely ... before she comes up with another story like that and [has] me locked up or something like that." After Mr. Chatman's testimony, the trial court stated, "[I]n light of the fact that Mr. Chatman is agreeing [to] the Protective Order, the Court will grant the Protective Order as requested ...."
Our review of the February 12, 2014 hearing transcript shows that Mr. Chatman received a copy of the Protective Order before leaving court, and the Protective Order clearly stated that paragraphs 1-5 did not expire. Nevertheless, the transcript also shows that the trial court did not review the terms of the Protective Order with the parties, and particularly, did not inform them that paragraphs 1-5 did not expire. Rather, after stating that the Protective Order would be granted "as requested," the trial court merely instructed Mr. Chatman to remain in court to receive a certified copy of the Protective Order and the hearing was then concluded. Thus, we agree that the trial court erred in failing to address the Protective Order's non-expiring provisions at the hearing, as required by La. R.S. 46:2136F(2)(b). However, we disagree with Mr. Chatman that such error renders the Protective Order null.
The nullity of a final judgment may be demanded for vices of either form or substance, as provided in La. C.C.P. arts. 2002 through 2006. La. C.C.P. art. 2001. Mr. Chatman does not explain how the Protective Order is a nullity under La. C.C.P. art. 2002, nor does he explain how it was obtained by "fraud or ill practices" under La. C.C.P. art. 2004. And, even if the trial court's failure to inform him of the Protective Order's non-expiring provisions was an "ill practice," Mr. Chatman did not timely assert an action to annul the Protective Order for such, because such an action must be brought within one year of the plaintiff's discovery of the ill practice. See La. C.C.P. art. 2004B. Here, Mr. Chatman admits that he discovered the Protective Order's non-expiring provisions in January 2018, when he was arrested for violating the Protective Order. But, he did not file his first motion to modify or dissolve the Protective Order until November 14, 2019, almost two years after that discovery. Further, he was able to present his case for modification/dissolution at the subsequent hearing held on December 18, 2019. Thus, we conclude that, under the facts of this case, Mr. Chatman has failed to show that the trial court's failure to concurrently address the Protective Order's non-expiring provisions at the show cause hearing renders the Protective Order null.
An "ill practice" includes any improper practice or procedure that operates, even innocently, to deprive a litigant of some legal right, including the right to appear and assert a defense. Expert Oil & Gas, LLC v. Mack Energy Co., 16-0068 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/16), 203 So.3d 1080, 1084.
Modification of the Non-Expiring Protective Order
Mr. Chatman next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to modify the Protective Order based on a change of circumstances. He argues that his "scorned ex-partner" is being allowed to withhold his children from him when there is no evidence of abuse.
As mentioned above, the trial court held a hearing on Mr. Chatman's motion to modify the Protective Order on December 18, 2019. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court informed Mr. Chatman's attorney that she would not be allowed to retry the merits of why the court issued the Protective Order in 2014 and indicated she was using the improper procedure to seek modification. Nevertheless, the trial court then directed Mr. Chatman's attorney to put on what evidence she had to support a modification of the Protective Order, and both Mr. Chatman and Ms. Compton testified on both direct and cross examination.
Given that La. R.S. 46:2136F(2) clearly gave Mr. Chatman a right to file a motion to modify the effective period of the Protective Order, we question the trial court's insistence that Mr. Chatman was using the wrong procedure to seek a modification. After carefully reviewing the December 18, 2019 hearing transcript, however, we find the court did give Mr. Chatman's attorney an adequate opportunity to prove grounds for a modification, and, as discussed below, Mr. Chatman's attorney failed to carry that burden of proof. Accord Patterson v. Charles, 19-0333 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/11/19), 282 So.3d 1075, 1096 (finding defendant accused of stalking had meaningful opportunity to be heard). We note, however, that due process may have required a different result had the trial court summarily denied Mr. Chatman's motion without giving him a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See McKinsey v. Castle, 21-0368 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/10/21), 2021 WL 3522093, *6 (reversing protective order because defendant was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to defend against domestic violence allegations). See also Darby v. Duplechain, 16-2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/4/16), 192 So.3d 258, 259 (reversing a protective order against a former boyfriend who had no opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of the protective order). See also Betterman v. Kukelhan, (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 2008), 977 So.2d 702, 703 (finding error in a trial court's summary denial of a former boyfriend's motion to vacate a non-expiring domestic violence protection injunction, without affording him a hearing and opportunity to be heard). We now turn to the merits.
The basis of the trial court's denial of Mr. Chatman's motion is as follows. At the December 18, 2019 modification hearing, Mr. Chatman testified that he was present at the December 12, 2014 hearing that resulted in the Protective Order against him. He testified that the trial court told him then that the Protective Order would last 18 months. He then stated that, sometime after the Protective Order was issued, perhaps beginning in 2015 or 2016, he, Ms. Compton, and their children lived together as a family for two to three years. He explained that he did everything a father living with his children would do, including cooking and cleaning for them, bathing them, and picking them up from school. Mr. Chatman admitted that, in January 2018, he and Ms. Compton got into an argument, Ms. Compton called the police, and the police arrested Mr. Chatman for violation of the Protective Order and damage to property for breaking a television. Mr. Chatman denied breaking the television. According to Mr. Chatman, the day of his arrest was when he and Ms. Compton first became aware that the non-expiring provisions of the Protective Order were still in effect. He testified that, with that knowledge, he did not see Ms. Compton again after January 2018, but also stated that he had talked to both her and to his children a number of times since then. Mr. Chatman denied that he was a danger to Ms. Compton or to his children.
On cross examination, Mr. Chatman admitted that Ms. Compton called the police on him twice during their reconciliation. He stated that he never physically harmed Ms. Compton or his children; he admitted to punching a hole in a wall once, but stated that it was only because Ms. Compton had attacked him. Ms. Compton's attorney asked Mr. Chatman about an incident during the reconciliation where he punched dents in Ms. Compton's car. Mr. Chatman acknowledged the incident, which he thought occurred in 2015 or 2106, but he initially denied denting Ms. Compton's car. When Ms. Compton's attorney played a recording of the incident in open court, however, Mr. Chatman admitted to the trial court that he can be heard banging on the car and saying, "Come outside you mother f ----------- wh---."
Ms. Compton next testified at the modification hearing. After hearing the recording again, she testified that the car damage incident occurred in the summer of 2017 and confirmed that Mr. Chatman did call her the foul name and he did put two dents in her car. Although she summoned the police, Ms. Compton stated that Mr. Chatman was not arrested for the incident. Contrary to Mr. Chatman's testimony, Ms. Compton testified that, during their entire relationship, she and Mr. Chatman had "never been together for a full year" and that they had "been off and on the entire time [she had] known him." She characterized their relationship as "constant violence, lies, [and] deception." When asked why she was afraid of Mr. Chatman, Ms. Compton testified that he was a habitual liar, violent, and a rapist. When asked to describe the alleged violence, Ms. Compton stated that he had touched her, punched her, and raped her. Regarding the January 2018 incident resulting in Mr. Chatman's arrest, Ms. Compton testified that he threatened her life, broke things in her house, and then denied that he had. Again contrary to Mr. Chatman's testimony, she stated that she had not contacted him once since January 2018.
After Ms. Compton's testimony, the trial court orally denied Mr. Chatman's motion to modify or dissolve the Protective Order and noted that "there had been plenty testimony put on that would cause [the court] not to modify" it. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion nor manifestly err in concluding Mr. Chatman failed to show cause for modification or dissolution of the Protective Order. The trial court heard the parties’ conflicting testimony regarding their domestic relationship following issuance of the Protective Order, which demonstrated that Mr. Chatman verbally abused and threatened Ms. Compton, broke her television, damaged her vehicle, and punched a hole in a wall — behavior requiring police intervention on at least two occasions. Although the parties’ testimony conflicted, we give great deference to the trial court, which was in the best position to view the demeanor and mannerisms of Mr. Chatman and Ms. Compton and to assess their credibility. This court cannot disturb the trial court's reasonable credibility evaluations and reasonable factual inferences. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882-83 (La. 1993) ; Pierce, 298 So.3d at 908.
Although we affirm the trial court judgment, we note that, in the future, Mr. Chatman may again file a motion to change the effective date of the Protective Order, pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2136F(2), to show that the Protective Order's non-expiring provisions are no longer warranted.
CONCLUSION
For reasons stated herein, we affirm the April 26, 2021 judgment, denying Jeffrey Bernard Chatman's motion to modify/dissolve the February 12, 2014 Protective Order, and dismissing the motion in favor of Requel Lashay Compton. We assess appeal costs to Jeffrey Bernard Chatman.
AFFIRMED.
Wolfe, J., dissents