Opinion
No. WOCR-2006-02568, 2006-02569, 2006-02570, 2006-02571.
March 6, 2008.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS INDICTMENTS
Jose Alvarado suffered a fatal heart attack when he was allegedly struck over the head and kicked during a melee with several other men in a restaurant. Co-defendants Armando Caceras, Carlos Terreros, Luis Bravo and Maico Caceras are charged with Alvarado's murder as joint venturers. The defendants now move to dismiss the charges, arguing that the evidence presented to the grand jury does not establish probable cause to support the indictments against them. Specifically, Armando Caceras and Bravo argue that the evidence fails to establish a joint venture. Additionally, Armando Caceras, Terreros and Bravo contend that the evidence fails to show they acted with the malice necessary to support the murder charges. Finally, all four defendants claim that the evidence fails to show a causal nexus between the beating and Alvarado's death. After hearing, and for the reasons discussed below, the defendants' motions are DENIED.
Discussion
I. The Joint Venture
To prove a joint venture, co-perpetrators must be present at the crime scene, must have the intent to commit the crime or knowledge that another intends to commit the crime, and must assist others or be ready and willing to assist others in committing the criminal acts if necessary. Commonwealth v. Tague, 434 Mass. 510, 514 (2001);Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 689-90 (2001);Commonwealth v. Young, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 60, 68 n. 9 (2002). Each co-defendant must share the mental state required for the crime charged.Id., citing Commonwealth v. Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 486-87 (1988). The element of knowledge may be inferred when a joint venturer is aware of the circumstances and then participates in the crime.Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 406 Mass. 843, 846 (1990).
The grand jury heard evidence that the co-defendants were sitting together at a table in a Denny's restaurant when Alvarado and three companions approached them and exchanged words. The four co-defendants stood up. Maico Caceras took a swing at Alvarado or at one of his companions. Alvarado pushed Maico Caceras, who then slapped Alvarado in the face. A fight broke out involving all eight individuals. The four co-defendants picked up chairs. One of Alvarado's companions and a waitress each grabbed chairs away from Armando Caceras and Terreros. Maico Caceras threw or swung a heavy wooden chair at Alvarado, hitting him over the head and knocking him to the floor. Bravo and Terreros kicked Alvarado once he was on the floor. The four co-defendants then fled from the restaurant, leaving Alvarado apparently unconscious, with multiple blunt impact injuries to his head, torso and lower extremities. Alvarado was pronounced dead shortly thereafter.
At the grand jury stage, the evidence must meet a standard equivalent to probable cause to arrest, a significantly lower standard than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for conviction.Commonwealth v. Alves, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 909 (2007);Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982). The evidence presented here meets that standard because it demonstrates that Bravo and Terreros participated directly in the attack by kicking Alvarado after he was knocked to the floor by Maico Caceras, and that Armando Caceras was about to throw a chair when he was stopped by one of Alvarado's companions. The evidence also establishes that Bravo and Terreros armed themselves with chairs during the incident. Reasonable inferences may thus be drawn that Armando Caceras, Terreros and Bravo shared Maico Caceras' intent to attack Alvarado, and were ready and willing to assist him. See Commonwealth v Badgett, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 625-26 (1995) (murder indictments against two co-defendants were supported by probable cause where both defendants were involved in a brawl with the victim and others and each defendant was observed holding a knife at various stages of the altercation).
Armando Caceras and Bravo argue that because witnesses gave conflicting and inconsistent versions of the events, the evidence presented to the grand jury falls short of establishing their participation as joint venturers. It is a well-established principle, however, that "[t]he weight and credibility of the evidence is wholly for the grand jury." Attorney General v. Joseph Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 310 (1922); Badgett, 38 Mass. App. Ct. at 626, n. 5 (grand jury may choose to believe one version rather than another version of conflicting testimony). Where, as here, there is no claim that exculpatory evidence was wrongfully withheld from the grand jury, it was entirely proper for the grand jury to accept a version of the facts where all four defendants acted together in the fatal attack on Alvarado.
II. Malice and the Murder Indictments
The defendants contend that the evidence presented to the grand jury is, at most, sufficient to support probable cause for the crime of manslaughter, because evidence of malice is lacking. Malice to support a charge of murder requires proof of specific intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm. Malice may also be inferred in circumstances where the defendant knew or should have known that death would likely result from the contemplated act. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 446 Mass. 555, 559 (2006), and cases cited.
The evidence presented to the grand jury establishes that the defendants acted with malice when they participated as joint venturers with Maico Caceras who hit Alvarado over the head with a heavy wooden chair. Malice may be inferred from the use of a dangerous weapon.Commonwealth v. Oliviera, 445 Mass. 837, 843 (2006). An implement, such as a chair, which is not a dangerous weapon per se (because it is not designed and constructed to produce death or great bodily harm), may be a dangerous weapon when used in a dangerous manner.Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303-04 (1980), and cases cited;United States v. Johnson, 324 F. 2d 264, 266 (4th Cir. 1963) (chair brought down upon victim's head was dangerous weapon as used). The evidence here establishes probable cause that the defendants possessed the requisite intent for the crime of murder in the first or second degree.
III. Causation
Dr. Henry Nields, the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy of Alvarado, testified before the grand jury. On external examination, Dr. Nields found that Alvarado sustained multiple blunt impact injuries to his head, torso, and lower extremities. The internal examination revealed that Alvardo had an enlarged heart and there was microscopic evidence of high blood pressure. On the basis of his autopsy findings and information from the police investigation, Dr. Nields concluded that Alvarado's death was a homicide. He determined that Alvarado suffered a sudden death during the physical altercation due to hypertensive cardiovascular disease. He opined that the physical stress from the blunt trauma sustained during the assault induced the fatal cardiac arrhythmia that caused Alvarado to collapse. The defendants contend that this evidence is inadequate because it does not show that their conduct was a proximate cause of the death. In particular, the defendants point out that Dr. Nields was equivocal about whether the blunt trauma injuries themselves were potentially fatal.
Proximate cause is established when conduct sets into motion a chain of events resulting in the death. "Conduct is a proximate cause of death if the conduct, `by the natural and continuous sequence of events, causes the death and without which the death would not have occurred.'"Commonwealth v. Carlson, 447 Mass. 79, 83 (2006), quotingCommonwealth v. Rosado, 434 Mass. 197, 202 (2001). Additionally, the "longstanding rule in Massachusetts, in criminal law as well as in tort, is that `the wrongdoer takes the victim as he or she finds him.'"Carlson, 447 Mass. at 86, quoting Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 433 Mass. 305, 313 (2001). Furthermore, under our law, if the act hastened the death, then the death was caused by the act. Carlson, 447 Mass. at 86, citingCommonwealth v. Fox, 7 Gray 585, 586-87 (1856); also see Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 379 Mass. 810, 815 (1980) (fatal coronary thrombosis of firefighter, brought on by his efforts in fighting a fire set by defendant, supported an inference that defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the firefighter's death); Commonwealth v. Baker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 760, 766-67 (2006) (where victim's death resulted from severe beating by defendant in conjunction with victim's acute alcohol intoxication, defendant's acts proximately caused victim's death although injuries from beating alone were not fatal). Where Dr. Nields testified that the blunt trauma inflicted upon Alvarado during the fight caused his fatal heart attack, the defendants' argument is unavailing.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants' motions to dismiss the indictments are DENIED.