Opinion
J-S81020-16 No. 2556 EDA 2015
01-19-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. BOBBY YOUNG Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 28, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004642-2014 BEFORE: BOWES, J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Bobby Young appeals from the July 28, 2015 judgment of sentence entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas following his convictions after a bench trial for recklessly endangering another person and endangering the welfare of children. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2705 and 4304(a)(1), respectively.
The well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Gregory H. Mallon set forth a detailed factual and procedural history underlying this appeal, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/2/16, at 1-10 ("1925(a) Op.").
Young raises the following issues on appeal:
1. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENSE MOTIONS FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT RAISED ORALLY AT SENTENCING SINCE THE VERDICTS OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGES OF RECKLESSLY ENDANGERING ANOTHER PERSON AND ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE THAT TENDED TO SHOW THAT MR. YOUNG WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE MANNER IN WHICH HE SOUGHT MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR THE INFANT VICTIM.Young's Br. at 7-8.
2. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ON EITHER CHARGE SINCE THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO ESTABLISH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF RECKLESSLY ENDANGERING ANOTHER PERSON AND ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN, SPECIFICALLY WHERE THE RECORD WHOLLY REFUTES ANY CONCLUSION THAT MR. YOUNG KNOWINGLY, INTENTIONALLY OR RECKLESSLY FAILED TO SEEK PROPER MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR THE INFANT VICTIM.
3. WHETHER THE SENTENCING SCHEME IMPOSED IS ILLEGAL WHERE THE CHARGE OF RECKLESSLY ENDANGERING ANOTHER PERSON AND ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN SHOULD HAVE MERGED FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
Young first argues that the trial court erred by not granting him an arrest of judgment because the weight of the evidence "slanted overwhelmingly in favor of acquittal on all counts." Id. at 23. According to Young, the record shows that the victim went into distress while in the care of Taniesha Smith ("Mother") and Young "show[ed] his propensity for wanting to do the right thing" by scheduling an appointment with the doctor. Id. at 20-21. Young's weight claim is based in large part on two contentions about the trial. First, he argues that while the charges in the criminal information and the prosecution's asserted theory of the case were based on the allegation that Young caused violent harm to the child on or about December 14, 2013, the trial court found Young guilty on a different theory - that Young failed in his obligation to seek medical care for the victim despite evidence of the victim's serious injuries and failure to thrive over the course of months. Id. at 21-22. Second, Young complains that with respect to both the charges in the information and the prosecution's principal theory of the case - that the victim suffered an acute injury on or about December 14 - the evidence at trial strongly suggested that it was Mother rather than Father who was at fault. Id. at 22-23.
In his brief, Young argues that a "miscarriage of justice" occurred because the allegations in the criminal information and the Commonwealth's opening remarks at trial focused on an "acute traumatic injury on or about the weekend of December 14th/15th, 2013." Young's Br. at 21-22. The Commonwealth responds that Young waived this argument by failing to raise it before the trial court or in his Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) statement. Cmwlth.'s Br. at 15. We agree with the Commonwealth.
While we understand that Young may not have known before trial that the Commonwealth would introduce the malnourishment and "failure to thrive" evidence, Young did not object to this evidence when presented by the Commonwealth, move for relief based on the Commonwealth's alleged deviation from the criminal information, or include this issue in his Rule 1925 Statement. Indeed, Young's counsel devoted a substantial portion of this closing statement to arguing that the Commonwealth had failed to prove facts sufficient to support this theory of the case. N.T. Closing, 5/1/15, at 17-19, 23-27. Therefore, Young has waived this issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Commonwealth v. Lord , 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) ("Any issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.").
Preliminarily, we must determine whether Young preserved his weight of the evidence claim for review, as Young's motion for arrest of judgment before sentencing was a motion for extraordinary relief pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 704. The comment to Rule 704 specifically states that "the making of a motion for extraordinary relief does not, of itself, preserve any issue raised in the motion, nor does the judge's denial of the motion preserve any issue." Pa.R.Crim.P. 704, cmt. This Court has held that motions for extraordinary relief are not "a 'substitute vehicle' for raising a matter that should be raised in a post-sentence motion." Commonwealth v. Grohowski , 980 A.2d 113, 115-16 (Pa.Super. 2009).
In its opinion, the trial court notes that Young's oral motion for arrest of judgment appeared to combine a motion for an arrest of judgment based upon sufficiency of the evidence and a motion for a new trial based upon the weight of the evidence under Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 606 and 607. See 1925(a) Op. at 11. The record shows, however, that Young orally moved for extraordinary relief - in the form of an arrest of judgment - pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 704(b). N.T. Sentencing, 7/28/15, at 13.
We conclude that Young waived his weight of the evidence claim. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607 sets forth the requirements for preserving a weight of the evidence challenge:
(A) A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial:
(1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing;
(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or
Pa. R. Crim. P. 607(A). Here, the record shows that Young did not file a written motion, before or after sentencing, challenging the weight of the evidence. Further, Young's oral motion for extraordinary relief did not challenge the weight of the evidence. Had Young wanted to challenge the weight of the evidence, he could and should have done so through a separate oral motion at sentencing or by written motion either before or after sentencing. In these circumstances, we conclude that Young did not preserve his weight of the evidence challenge and therefore waived this claim.(3) in a post-sentence motion.
Rather, in support of the motion, Young introduced new evidence. These new facts could not be considered when determining whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
The trial court also considered the motion in terms of sufficiency of the evidence, rather than the weight of the evidence. The trial court explained its reasoning for denying the motion:
I'm denying your Motion for Extraordinary Relief based on, you know, the reasons I've said, that the records are replete with evidence that this child was -- there was a breach of a duty of care and on the Recklessly Endangering [Another Person] there was reckless, sufficient reckless[ness] displayed on the part of [Young.] He understands I'm not putting the blame on him for an intentional injury. I found him not guilty of that one. There was not enough evidence.N.T. Sentencing, 7/28/15, at 30.
Even had the trial court addressed Young's weight of the evidence claim, which it did not, Young's waiver would still stand. See Commonwealth v. Lofton , 57 A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa.Super. 2012) ("Failure to properly preserve [a weight of the evidence] claim will result in waiver, even if the trial court addresses the issue in its opinion.")
Young next argues that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to convict him. Young once again contends that the victim was not in his care when the injuries manifested and "[t]here is not a scintilla of proof from any witness or from the medical records that would allow any fact finder to reasonably conclude that [Young] abused his child during the time frame at issue." Young's Br. at 26-27.
This Court's standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims is as follows:
We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.Commonwealth v. Rodriguez , 141 A.3d 523, 525 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Tarrach , 42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa.Super. 2012)).
The evidence established at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth's burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant's guilt is to be resolved by the fact[-]finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
In its opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant elements of the offenses, addressed Young's claims, and properly determined that the evidence was sufficient to maintain the convictions. See 1925(a) Op. at 13-19. The evidence presented by the Commonwealth showed failures by Young, over a period of months, to take any action with respect to the victim's welfare and that these failures recklessly subjected the victim to serious bodily injury. After reviewing the briefs, the record, and the trial court's opinion, we affirm based on the trial court's reasoning. See id.
Finally, Young argues that his convictions should have merged for sentencing purposes. According to Young, the trial court's citation of Commonwealth v. Martir , 712 A.2d 327 (Pa.Super. 1998), was misguided because the appellant in Martir committed each crime by separate acts, whereas here "the elements of recklessly endangering another person are completely subsumed within the duty requirement of [endangering welfare of children]." Young's Br. at 33. Young asks this Court to reconsider its decision in Martir and "find that merger was proper under the facts presented in this appeal." Id. Merger is a pure question of law over which we exercise plenary review. Commonwealth v. Pettersen , 49 A.3d 903, 911 (Pa.Super. 2012).
We conclude that Martir is controlling and affirm the trial court. In its opinion, the trial court aptly cited Martir for the proposition that endangering the welfare of children is neither a lesser-included offense nor a greater-included offense of recklessly endangering another person. 1925(a) Op. at 20-21 (citing Martir , 712 A.2d at 329-30). While Martir was decided before our legislature enacted the statutory merger analysis under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765, the decision analyzed the statutory elements of each offense as required by the test that section 9765 later codified:
Section 9765 provides that "[n]o crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. Under section 9765, courts must:
determine whether offenses are greater and lesser-included offenses [by] compar[ing] the elements of the offenses. If the elements of the lesser offense are all included within the elements of the greater offense and the greater offense has at least one additional element, which is different, then the sentences merge. If both crimes require proof of at least one element that the other does not, then the sentences do not merge.Commonwealth v. Nero , 58 A.3d 802, 806 (Pa.Super. 2012) (internal citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Baldwin , 985 A.2d 803, 835 (Pa. 2009) (finding that statutory-element test of section 9765 "focuses solely on the elements of the offenses for which a criminal defendant has been convicted").
Appellant's argument must fail because every element of endangering the welfare of children is not subsumed in the elements of reckless endangerment. First, and most importantly, a conviction for endangering the welfare of children requires proof that the accused acted "knowingly," i.e., that the accused not only knew that he has a duty to protect the child but also knew that the child was placed in
circumstances that could threaten the child's welfare. A conviction for reckless endangerment obviously requires proof that the accused acted only recklessly. Thus, a person could never be convicted of endangering the welfare of a child based upon reckless conduct alone.Martir , 712 A.2d at 329-30 (emphasis in original) (some internal citations and quotations omitted). We conclude that this analysis is just as apt after section 9765's adoption as it was under the pre-section 9765 rubric.
* * *
Second, a conviction for endangering the welfare of a child requires proof that the accused is aware of his or her duty to protect the child. Reckless endangerment does not require the Commonwealth to prove that the accused has any special duty to protect his victim from harm. Once again, a conviction for the crime of endangering the welfare of a child requires proof of an element, which is not subsumed within any element of reckless endangerment.
Third, endangering the welfare of a child requires proof that the victim is "a child under the age of 18 years of age." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304. Reckless endangerment does not require proof of the victim's age.
* * *
Even if we were to consider endangering the welfare of children as the greater-included offense, it is obvious that the crimes do not merge. A conviction for reckless endangerment requires proof of conduct that places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury, while a conviction for endangering the welfare of children only requires proof of circumstances that could threaten the child's physical or psychological welfare. Thus, reckless endangerment requires proof of a fact that endangering the welfare of children does not. In other words, the element of conduct which places or may place a person in danger of death or serious bodily injury is not subsumed within proof that a child is placed in circumstance that could threaten the child. Thus, reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of endangering the welfare of children, and the crimes do not merge.
"[B]oth this Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court historically have struggled to articulate and apply the proper test for merger claims." Commonwealth v. Raven , 97 A.3d 1244, 1249-50 (Pa.Super.), app. denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014) (describing history of merger tests in Pennsylvania). However, despite the changes in merger analysis, all merger tests (before and after section 9765) have included a comparison of the statutory elements in the greater- and lesser-included offenses. See , e.g., Commonwealth v. Anderson , 650 A.2d 20, 24 (Pa. 1994) ("Our inquiry . . . is whether the elements of the lesser crime are all included within the elements of the greater crime, and the greater offense includes at least one additional element which is different, in which case the sentences merge, or whether both crimes require proof of at least one element which the other does not, in which case the sentences do not merge.").
Further, Young's argument that Martir is distinguishable because the appellant in Martir committed two separate criminal acts is unavailing. Even if Young's conduct could be considered one criminal act for the purposes of section 9765, Martir focused on the elements of the crimes in question and did not address the single-criminal-act requirement of merger. Our decision in Martir did not turn on the facts of that case.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/19/2017
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