Opinion
J-S39020-16 No. 1237 MDA 2015
05-06-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. GERALD WOLFE, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 9, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-40-CR-0003522-2014 CP-40-CR-0003526-2014 BEFORE: STABILE, J., PLATT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.* MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Gerald Wolfe, appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his open guilty plea. Appellant's counsel seeks to withdraw from representation pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago , 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We deny counsel's petition to withdraw, affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for resentencing consistent with this decision.
In response to counsel's petition to withdraw, Appellant filed an application for relief. Based on our disposition, we deny the application as moot.
We take the following facts from the trial court's opinion and our independent review of the certified record. On April 7, 2015, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the charge of burglary at docket number 3522-2014, and to burglary and receiving stolen property at docket number 3526-2014. The charges related to Appellant's theft of jewelry from the victims' homes.
On June 9, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant at docket number 3522-2014 to not less than three nor more than six years of incarceration. At docket number 3526-2014, the court sentenced Appellant to consecutive terms of not less than two nor more than four years' incarceration on the burglary conviction, and not less than two nor more than four years of incarceration on the receiving stolen property conviction. On June 11, 2015, Appellant filed a motion to modify his sentence, which the court denied on June 15, 2015. Appellant timely appealed. On January 28, 2016, counsel filed his petition to withdraw and Anders brief on the basis that the appeal is frivolous. On February 16, 2016, Appellant responded to counsel's petition to withdraw.
On July 21, 2015, the court ordered Appellant to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal within twenty-one days. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On September 8, 2015, Appellant's counsel filed a Rule 1925(c) statement advising the court of his intent to file an Anders brief, and in which he alleges that, on August 11, 2015, the court granted him an extension of time within which to file the statement. ( See Rule 1925(c) Statement, 9/08/15); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). Our review of the certified record and the docket in this matter does not reveal that such an order was filed. However, the court filed an opinion on December 11, 2015 in which it addressed the discretionary aspects of Appellant's sentence, and did not recommend waiver. ( See Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/15, at unnumbered pages 2-3); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Therefore, we will not find Appellant's appeal waived for his counsel's failure to file the statement in a timely manner. See Commonwealth v. Veon , 109 A.3d 754, 762 (Pa. Super. 2015).
The standard of review for an Anders brief is well-settled.
Court-appointed counsel who seek to withdraw from representing an appellant on direct appeal on the basis that the appeal is frivolous must:
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to anything that arguably might support the appeal but which does not resemble a "no-merit" letter or amicus curiae brief; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise the defendant of his or her right to retain new counsel or raise any additional points that he or she deems worthy of the court's attention.
Commonwealth v. Lilley , 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations and some quotation marks omitted). Further, our Supreme Court ruled in Santiago , supra , that Anders briefs must contain "a discussion of counsel's reasons for believing that the client's appeal is frivolous[.]" Santiago , supra at 360.
[T]his Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.
Instantly, counsel's Anders brief and application to withdraw substantially comply with the applicable technical requirements and reveal that he has made "a conscientious examination of the record [and] determined that the appeal would be frivolous[.]" Lilley , supra at 997 (citation omitted). Additionally, the record establishes that counsel served Appellant with a copy of the Anders brief and application to withdraw, and a letter of notice, which advised Appellant of his right to retain new counsel or to proceed pro se and raise additional issues to this Court. See id.; ( see also Petition to for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, 1/28/16, Exhibit A, at 1). Further, the application and brief cite "to anything that arguably might support the appeal[.]" Lilley , supra at 997 (citation omitted); ( see also Anders Brief, at 2-4). As noted by our Supreme Court in Santiago , the fact that some of counsel's statements arguably support the frivolity of the appeal does not violate the requirements of Anders. See Santiago , supra at 360-61. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel complied with Anders ' technical requirements. See Lilley , supra at 997.
Having concluded that counsel's petition and brief substantially comply with the technical Anders requirements, we must "conduct [our] own review of the trial court's proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous." Lilley , supra at 998 (citation omitted). We conclude that it is not.
The Anders brief raises one question for our review: "Whether the imposition of consecutive sentences of [three] to [six] years; [two] to [four] years; [two] to [four] years (aggregate [seven] to [fourteen] years [of imprisonment]) on two charges of burglary and one charge of receiving stolen property is harsh and excessive[?]" ( Anders Brief, at 1) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). However, in his pro se reply to the Anders brief, Appellant argues that he intended to challenge the legality of his sentence because the convictions of burglary and receiving stolen property at docket number 3526-2014 should have merged for sentencing purposes. ( See Appellant's Application for Relief, 2/16/16, at 1-2 ¶¶ 3-5). We agree with Appellant.
Although Appellant did not challenge the legality of his sentence in the trial court, the issue cannot be waived. Commonwealth v. Dickson , 918 A.2d 95, 99 (Pa. 2007) ("[I]f the sentence clearly implicates the legality of sentence, whether it was properly preserved below is of no moment, as a challenge to the legality of sentence cannot be waived.") (citation omitted).
We note that "the Commonwealth concedes that the receiving stolen property conviction should have merged into the burglary conviction at information [number] . . . 3526-2015." (Commonwealth's Letter, 2/29/16, at 1) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
It is well-settled that "questions of merger relate to the legality of sentence." Commonwealth v. Rodriguez , 673 A.2d 962, 967 (Pa. Super. 1996), appeal denied, 692 A.2d 565 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted). "Issues relating to the legality of sentence are questions of law, and thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Commonwealth v. Clarke , 70 A.3d 1281, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 85 A.3d 481 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). Finally, "in construing statutes, [we must] . . . ascertain and effectuate the intent of the [legislature], a task that is best accomplished by considering the plain language of the [statutes] at issue." Id.; see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903.
Section 3502 of the Crimes Code provides, in pertinent part, that: "A person may not be sentenced both for burglary and for the offense which it was his intent to commit after the burglarious entry . . . unless the additional offense constitutes a felony of the first or second degree." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(d); see also Commonwealth v. Benedetto , 462 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. Super. 1983) (holding that "receiving stolen property should have merged with burglary for sentencing purposes.") (citation omitted).
Here, at docket number 3526-2014, the court sentenced Appellant on both burglary, as a felony of the second degree, and receiving stolen property, as a felony of the third degree. ( See N.T. Sentencing, 6/09/15, at 13; see also N.T. Guilty Plea, 4/07/15, at 3). Therefore, based on the plain language of the Crimes Code, see Clarke , supra at 1284, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court committed an error of law where the two charges should have merged for sentencing purposes. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(d); Benedetto , supra at 832.
Accordingly, we disagree with Appellant's counsel that there is no non-frivolous issue in Appellant's case. We vacate Appellant's sentence for burglary and receiving stolen property at case number 3526-2014 only, and we remand for resentencing.
Because of our disposition, and Appellant's representation that it was never his intent to challenge the discretionary nature of his sentence or the sentence imposed at docket number 3522-2014, ( see Appellant's Application for Relief, at 1 ¶¶ 3-5), we will not address the discretionary aspects of sentence issue raised in the Anders brief.
Judgment of sentence vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for resentencing. Counsel's petition to withdraw denied. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 5/6/2016