Opinion
16-P-540
05-05-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Addis Gabriel WOLDEGUIORGUIS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Addis Gabriel Woldeguiorguis, appeals from an order denying his motion for new trial. His motion advanced the claim that "there was no strong factual basis for [his] plea[s]." We discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the judge's decision. We therefore affirm.
Background. On June 18, 2013, the defendant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle to endanger, wantonly or recklessly permitting bodily injury on a disabled person by a caretaker (10 counts), and possession of cocaine.
During the plea hearing, the prosecutor summarized the facts that she expected could be proved had the case gone to trial and the defendant agreed that the facts recited by the prosecutor were true. The judge was informed that the defendant, while operating a van containing twelve disabled adults, crashed into a parked trash truck causing bodily injury to ten of the passengers. The trash truck was large and yellow with flashing lights. The investigation revealed that at the time of the crash the van was traveling at approximately thirty-four miles per hour in a thirty mile per hour zone. There were no skid marks on the road or evidence of breaking by the defendant prior to the crash. The investigation did not support the defendant's explanation of being affected by solar glare. The defendant denied that he had any medical condition that would account for the crash.
More than two years after pleading guilty, the defendant filed a motion seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas. The defendant claimed that his guilty pleas were invalid because there was no strong factual basis that he engaged in wanton or reckless behavior, contrary to the requirements of Commonwealth v. Hart, 467 Mass. 322, 325-326 (2014), and Mass.R.Crim.P. 12(c)(5)(A), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004). After a hearing, before the same judge who accepted the defendant's guilty pleas, the motion was denied "for substantially the reasons set forth in the Commonwealth's opposition."
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001)." Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 178 (2014). We review the motion judge's conclusion for abuse of discretion or error of law. See Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 47 (2015). A strong policy of finality limits the grant of new trial motions to exceptional situations, and such motions should not be allowed lightly. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Mass. 657, 662-663 (1998). We grant "substantial deference" to a decision on a new trial "when the judge passing on the motion is the same judge who heard the plea." Commonwealth v. Grant, 426 Mass. 667, 672 (1998), S.C., 440 Mass. 1001 (2003).
2. Denial of motion. The defendant argues that the judge's denial of his motion constituted abuse of discretion and error of law. The defendant claims that the prosecutor's factual recitation was insufficient as to the elements of wanton or reckless. We disagree.
A judge may accept a plea of guilty only if it is voluntarily and intelligently made, and "there are sufficient facts on the record to establish each element of the offense." Hart, supra at 325, quoting from Commonwealth v. DelVerde, 398 Mass. 288, 297 (1986). A judge accepting a guilty plea "is not required to determine whether the defendant is or is not guilty of the offense charged." Commonwealth v. Jenner, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 763, 773, (1987). Rather, a plea judge "need determine only whether ... any information he has obtained in the plea hearing, is sufficient, when considered with reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, to support the charge to which the defendant is offering a plea of guilty." Ibid. See Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 758 (2015).
The defendant agrees that his pleas were made voluntarily and intelligently.
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"The essence of wanton or reckless conduct is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another." Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399 (1944).
Here, there was a substantial factual basis presented to the judge on the element of wanton or reckless conduct. The judge heard that the defendant was the operator of a van transporting twelve disabled adults that crashed into a parked trash truck. The truck was large, yellow, and had flashing lights. The investigation revealed that the van was travelling at thirty-four miles per hour and the defendant did not use his breaks before hitting the truck. The defendant offered no viable explanation for how the accident happened. These facts taken with any reasonable inferences would allow the judge to determine that driving a van with passengers on board into a parked truck without making any attempt to stop or avoid the collision was conduct that involved a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm would result to the passengers. We see no abuse of discretion or error of law in the judge's exercise of her "separate and independent duty ... to determine that a sufficient factual basis exist[ed] for the charge[s]" to which the defendant pleaded guilty. Hart, 467 Mass. at 325. As such, the motion judge properly denied the motion for new trial.
Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.