Opinion
20-P-1021
12-20-2021
COMMONWEALTH v. Christopher WILSON.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Christopher Wilson, was convicted of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a ) (1). On appeal, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a motor vehicle on a public way while impaired by the influence of intoxicating liquor. We affirm.
Background. We summarize the facts, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). On March 8, 2017, at approximately 12:20 A.M. , while State Trooper Feras Irqsusi was traveling on Charlesgate East, he observed a Ford Focus stopped on a grassy area located next to the ramp that connects Charlesgate East to Storrow Drive. Trooper Irqsusi testified that vehicles are not permitted to stop or park on the grassy area, and for a vehicle to stop there, it would have to drive onto the ramp and over a curb. As a result, he activated his emergency lights, pulled his vehicle over, exited, and walked to the grassy area where the vehicle was located.
Trooper Irqsusi testified, and the defendant does not dispute, that the ramp is a public way maintained by the Commonwealth.
Before approaching, Trooper Irgsusi noticed that all of the vehicle's lights were on, including the brake lights, which indicated to him that someone was seated inside and pressing down on the brakes. The trooper then approached the vehicle and, as he had suspected, observed a male, later identified as the defendant, seated in the driver's seat, with the car in drive and his foot on the brake pedal. The defendant appeared to be "passed out," and Trooper Irqsusi unsuccessfully sought to wake him by knocking on the window. When the defendant did not awake, the trooper began "pounding at the window," and shouting "[c]an you hear me[?]" but again the defendant did not move. At this point, the trooper decided to open the door and attempt to physically rouse the defendant. After nudging the defendant "with pretty good force," the defendant eventually woke up.
Once the defendant was roused, Trooper Irqsusi asked him whether he was okay and if he knew where he was. The defendant spoke with a heavy slur and his responses were incomprehensible. Additionally, when the defendant spoke, Trooper Irqsusi detected "a very strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his breath." Eventually, after further questioning, the defendant informed the trooper that he was on his way home from the House of Blues in Boston, where he had attended a concert with his brother. When asked if had consumed alcohol the defendant responded, "not much." The defendant informed the trooper that his brother was the one who had driven the vehicle, but Trooper Irqsusi testified that nobody else was in the vehicle or in the vehicle's general vicinity. Trooper Irqsusi again asked the defendant if he knew where he was or if he knew what city he was in, and the defendant's response indicated that he was not aware that he was in the city of Boston. At some point, another trooper had arrived on the scene, and Trooper Irqsusi briefly walked away from the defendant's vehicle to inform that trooper that the defendant was most likely intoxicated. When Trooper Irqsusi returned, he discovered that the defendant had fallen back to sleep. The trooper again woke the defendant up, and then made several requests for the defendant to step out of the vehicle.
Eventually, the defendant willingly exited the vehicle and Trooper Irqsusi noticed that he was unsteady on his feet and had to hold onto the vehicle to maintain his balance. The trooper led the defendant to the front of his police cruiser, where the area was flat and well lit, and asked the defendant to perform the nine-step walk-and-turn field sobriety test. Trooper Irqsusi instructed the defendant to place his feet heel-to-toe while he demonstrated the test, but the defendant was unable to hold that position. After Trooper Irqsusi demonstrated the test for the defendant, the defendant attempted the test, but he was unable to walk in a straight line, and none of his steps were heel-to-toe, as instructed. Next, the trooper asked the defendant to complete the one-leg stand test. He instructed the defendant to raise one of his legs six inches off the ground, with his arms by his side, while counting to thirty. The defendant attempted the test, but he was unable to keep his foot elevated for longer than "a couple seconds." Following the administering of these tests, Trooper Irqsusi placed the defendant under arrest.
Discussion. "In determining the validity of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence at trial, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 578-579 (2011), quoting Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677. "The inferences that support a conviction ‘need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.’ " Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 (2014).
To support an OUI conviction under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a ) (1), the Commonwealth must "prove that the defendant (1) physically operated a vehicle; (2) on a public way or place to which the public has a right of access; and (3) had a blood alcohol content percentage of .08 or greater or was impaired by the influence of intoxicating liquor" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Faherty, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133-134 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. AdonSoto, 475 Mass. 497, 509 (2016). The defendant concedes that there was sufficient evidence of operation, but contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he operated a vehicle on a public way and was impaired while doing so.
"A public way or place is defined as ‘any way or ... any place to which the public has a right of access, or ... any place to which members of the public have access as invitees or licensees.’ " Commonwealth v. Tsonis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 217 (2019), quoting G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a ) (1). "[I]t is the objective appearance of the way that is determinative of its status, rather than the subjective intent of the property owner." Commonwealth v. Belliveau, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 830, 832 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Kiss, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 247, 249-250 (2003). "Some of the usual indicia of accessibility to the public include paving, curbing, traffic signals, street lights, and abutting houses or businesses." Id. at 833, quoting Commonwealth v. Smithson, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 549-550 (1996).
Although the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that the grassy area where his vehicle was stopped constituted a public way under the statute, we need not reach that conclusion because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the defendant drove his car on the ramp connecting Charlesgate East and Storrow Drive -- a publicly owned roadway which is maintained by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts -- before ultimately coming to a stop on the grassy area. Trooper Irqsusi testified that the only way a vehicle could drive onto the grassy area was by traveling on the ramp and over a curb. When Trooper Irqsusi discovered the defendant, he was seated in the driver's seat, with his foot was on the brake pedal, the car was running and in drive, and no other persons were present in the area. Moreover, it was around 12:20 A.M. , and the defendant stated that he was on his way home from a concert at the House of Blues in Boston. Based on this evidence, the jury were entitled to infer that the defendant had recently operated his vehicle on public way. See Commonwealth v. Hilton, 398 Mass. 63, 67 n.5 (1986), quoting State v. Pritchett, 53 Del. 583, 598-599 (Super. Ct. 1961) ("Defendant's car didn't reach the position where it was found by some magical process; no figure from outer space dropped it from the sky"). The jury were not required to credit the defendant's statement that his brother was the one driving the vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Mendez, 476 Mass. 512, 524 (2017) ("The credibility of witnesses is for the jury to decide").
Further, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol while he operated his vehicle on the public roadway. To prove that the defendant was under the influence, "the Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant was drunk, only that alcohol diminished [his] ability to operate a motor vehicle safely." Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392 (2017). Here, the evidence of the defendant's intoxication was fairly strong. When Trooper Irqsusi initially found the defendant, he was in an area for which cars were not authorized with the vehicle in drive and his foot on the break, unresponsive and needed to be physically shaken to rouse him from his sleep. Moreover, when the defendant eventually awoke, he "exhibited classic symptoms of alcohol intoxication." Id. His speech was slurred; a "very strong" odor of alcohol emanated from his breath; he admitted to consuming alcohol; and he was unsteady on his feet and could not successfully complete the field sobriety tests. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sudderth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 321 (1994). He also fell back asleep during the interaction, and again, had to be awaken. Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, it would be more than reasonable for a jury to infer, based on the defendant's level of intoxication when he was found by Trooper Irqsusi, that the defendant was intoxicated before stopping his car on the grassy area, and therefore operated his vehicle on a public roadway while under the influence of alcohol.
Judgment affirmed.