Opinion
2909 EDA 2022 J-S31044-23
01-17-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NEHEEM WILLIAMSON Appellant
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 24, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006998-2021
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM
McLAUGHLIN, J.
Neheem Williamson appeals the judgment of sentence entered following his convictions for second-degree murder and robbery. Williamson challenges the admission of evidence and the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b) and 3701(a)(1)(i), respectively.
The Commonwealth charged Williamson with the above-referenced crimes for the death of Tyree Roundtree, Williamson's work supervisor. Williamson's cousin, Danette Blair, was present on the day of the murder and called 911. Blair gave a statement to police and testified at the preliminary hearing.
Immediately before trial, the Commonwealth litigated a motion to admit Blair's preliminary hearing testimony as an unavailable witness. See N.T., 8/22/22, at 97-98. It presented testimony from Detective Timothy Hartman, Detective Jeffrey Gilson, and Detective Mark Shade.
Detective Hartman testified that one week before the trial, the prosecution contacted him to make efforts to find Blair. Id. at 99. These efforts included conducting record checks of various databases including the Pennsylvania driver's license database, the Pennsylvania state and Philadelphia police report databases, and the Pennsylvania Justice Network's database. Id. at 99-100. From his search, he learned of two addresses connected to Blair. He checked both of those addresses but did not find Blair. Id. at 100, 101. He also learned of a phone number related to Blair. Id. at 101. Detective Hartman sent a text message to that number but did not get a response. Id. When he called the number, a female answered the phone but hung up once he identified himself as a detective with the Philadelphia Police Department. Id. at 101-102. Four days before trial, Detective Hartman met with Blair's mother who informed him that Blair had not lived with her for over a year. Id. at 102. Detective Hartman also found two email addresses associated with Blair. Id. at 103. He emailed both accounts and did not get a response. Detective Hartman testified that he also searched for Blair on Facebook and Instagram and did not find any accounts related to her. Id. at 104.
Detective Gilson testified that on July 27, 2023, the Commonwealth asked that he and his partner, Detective McDermott, locate Blair. Id. at 112. He testified that he did "a records check to try to narrow down a phone number, [and] address for Ms. Blair." Id. This search identified an address associated with Blair's mother. Id. at 112-113. He testified that on August 1, he met Blair's mother at her home, and she told him that Blair "was aware of the trial coming up[.]" Id. at 113. Detective Gilson left his card with Blair's mother and left Blair's subpoena. Id. Detective Gilson also testified regarding the various searches of databases that he conducted:
I began with a general address search in JNET. I did a DHS search for welfare recipients. I checked pedestrian and vehicle investigation stops in Philadelphia which indicated this same address in Lansdowne. I checked other recent contacts. I attempted to find perhaps a rap sheet. It didn't exist.Id. at 114. He said that he did not speak to any of Blair's family members other than her mother because he "didn't have contact information for them, nor did I find anybody except" for her mother. Id. at 118.
Detective Mark Shade testified that he checked city, state, and federal prison databases, and inquired of the Philadelphia, Delaware County, and Montgomery County medical examiners' offices for Blair on the morning of trial. Id. at 120-21. He learned that Blair was not in custody, was not in any hospitals in the area, and had not been brought to any morgue in the Philadelphia area. Id. at 121-22.
The Commonwealth argued it should be allowed to present Blair's preliminary hearing testimony at trial. It maintained that Blair had previously testified under oath, was subject to cross-examination, and "there was no information withheld at that previous hearing that the defense could now cross-examine on such that they would be prejudiced." Id. at 127-128. The defense countered that "there was not a full and fair cross-examination done by counsel" because counsel did not ask Blair specific questions such as "anything in terms of what happened." Id. at 132. The court determined that Blair was an unavailable witness and permitted the Commonwealth to introduce her preliminary hearing testimony into evidence. Id. at 135.
Williamson proceeded by way of a jury trial at which the following evidence was presented, as aptly summarized by the trial court:
On May 8, 2021, at approximately 9 a.m., on the 1600 block of Granite Street in Philadelphia, [Williamson] robs and kills his supervisor, Tyree Roundtree, while the decedent drove him to work. As a supervisor, the decedent would often have large sums of cash on his person to pay workers and purchase supplies for the construction company. N.T. 8/22/2022 at 167-169; N.T. 8/23/22 at 41-54.
After 8:30 a.m., the decedent arrives in a single cabin work truck at the Walgreens at the intersection of Frankford Avenue and Bridge Street to transport [Williamson] and Danette Blair ("Blair"), [Williamson's] cousin, to that day's work site. Blair was in the middle front seat with [Williamson] seated in the front passenger seat. [Williamson] asks the decedent to drive to the 1600 block of Granite Street, a block away, so he can grab "something" from a house where the workers for the company frequent. N.T. 8/23/22 at 41-54.
When the decedent arrives at the location, [Williamson] reaches down, pulls out a gun, points it at him, and demands the money. Blair tells [Williamson] "Bro, what are you doing? Like come on, bro. This is not - we're just going to work, bro. You're doing too much." Blair then tells the decedent to "forget the money. Get out." Before [sic] climbing out of the truck on the passenger side. Once Blair is out of the truck, Blair hears the gunshot when
[Williamson] shoots the decedent. [Williamson] flees the scene. N.T. 8/23/22 at 41-54.
Immediately, Blair calls 911 and stays with the decedent until police arrive several minutes later. Police rush the decedent to Temple Hospital, where he later dies of a single perforating gunshot wound to his lower back. From the scene, police recovered one projectile. N.T. 8/22/22 at 168; N.T. 8/23/22 at 96, 149-150, 174.
On May 12, 2021, when [Williamson] was arrested, he gave a statement to the police initially claiming he was at home the day of the incident. When the interviewing officer explained that this was his opportunity to explain the situation, [Williamson] claimed that Blair was the shooter. N.T. 8/22/22 at 97-135; N.T. 8/23/22 at 165-167.
Order and Opinion, filed 1/3/23, at 2-3. The jury returned guilty verdicts for the above-referenced offenses. The court sentenced Williamson to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Williamson filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence, the court's determination that Blair was an unavailable witness, and the admission of Blair's preliminary hearing testimony. See Post Sentence Motions, filed 9/11/22. The court denied the motion and this appeal followed.
The court reinstated Williamson's direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc on November 16, 2022, following his request in a Post Conviction Relief Act petition. See Order, filed 11/16/22.
Williamson raises the following issues:
I. Did the trial court err in granting the Commonwealth's unavailability motion regarding witness Danette Blair and allowing her prior preliminary hearing testimony to be read into the record?
II. Was the evidence sufficient to support a guilty verdict for both second-degree murder and robbery where
the only evidence implicating [Williamson] was the prior testimony of an unavailable witness?
III. Were the guilty verdicts for second-degree murder and robbery against the weight of the evidence where the only evidence was the prior testimony of an unavailable witness and [Williamson's] statement to police that this unavailable witness was, in fact, the perpetrator?
Williamson's Br. at 4 (answer of trial court omitted).
Unavailability of Witness
Williamson argues that the Commonwealth failed to show that Blair was an unavailable witness under Rule 804(a)(5) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. He claims that the Commonwealth "made only lackluster efforts" to locate Blair. Id. at 12. He notes that the Commonwealth did not attempt to find her until three weeks before trial, did not interview her known employer at the time, and did not speak to any of her family members besides her mother. Due to the "anemic" efforts of the Commonwealth, Williamson contends that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to admit Blair's preliminary hearing testimony. Id. at 16.
"The admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's evidentiary rulings will be reversed on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion." Commonwealth v. Le, 208 A.3d 960, 970 (Pa. 2019).
Preliminary hearing testimony may be admitted at trial over a hearsayobjection pursuant to Pa.R.E. 804(b)(1). Rule 804(b)(1) permits such testimony "when the witness is unavailable, the defendant had counsel, and the defendant had a full and fair opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing." Commonwealth v. Rizzo, 726 A.2d 378, 380 n.2 (Pa. 1999); Pa.R.E. 804(b)(1).
Hearsay is "a statement that the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing" and "a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Pa.R.E. 801(c).
Rule 804 governs when a witness may be considered unavailable:
a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant:
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(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure:
(A) the declarant's attendance, in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(1) or (6); or
(B) the declarant's attendance or testimony, in the case of a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(2), (3), or (4).Pa.R.E. 804(a)(5).
When the Commonwealth seeks to admit prior recorded testimony under Rule 804(b)(1), it must show that it made a "good faith" effort to locate the witness. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 A.2d 842, 844 (Pa. 1975). "The length to which the prosecution must go to produce the testimony is a question of reasonableness." Commonwealth v. Melson, 637 A.2d 633, 638 (Pa.Super. 1994). "It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine what constitutes a good faith effort to locate a missing witness, and the decision of the court will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Lebo, 795 A.2d 987, 990 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations omitted).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Blair was unavailable. Three detectives testified about their extensive efforts to find Blair. Detective Hartman searched multiple databases which gave him various addresses, emails, and phone numbers for Blair. Detective Hartman tried to locate Blair through each of these means to no avail. Detective Gilson also conducted numerous database searches to no avail. Both he and Detective Hartman contacted Blair's mother who assured them that Blair no longer lived with her. Furthermore, Detective Shade conducted checks the morning of trial and determined that Blair was not in the custody of any prison, had not been admitted to any hospital in the area, and had not been brought to any morgue in the area. These efforts exhibited a good faith effort and were reasonable attempts to secure Blair's presence at trial. This issue fails.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Willamson argues that "[t]he only evidence implicating" him in the murder was Blair's testimony. Williamson's Br. at 18. He alleges "that a conviction based solely on hearsay testimony is insufficient." Id. In support of this conclusion, he cites our Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020), where the Court concluded that hearsay evidence alone was insufficient to meet a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by determining "whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168, 175 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citations and quotations omitted). The Commonwealth must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the perpetrator of the crimes. Id. "Evidence of identification need not be positive and certain to sustain a conviction." Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 874 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof through wholly circumstantial evidence, and it is within the purview of the fact finder to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. Id. at 872-73.
Here, Williamson does not suggest that a particular element of second-degree murder or robbery was not met. Instead, he claims the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the perpetrator of the robbery and murder.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Blair's identification testimony was sufficient. In her prior testimony, Blair testified that Williamson, her cousin, shot the victim and then ran from the scene. See N.T., Trial, 8/23/22, at 42. She also testified that she gave a statement to police again identifying Williamson as the perpetrator. See id. at 46-47. Furthermore, Blair testified that only she, the victim, and Williamson were in the vehicle together. See id. at 41-42. While Blair was the only witness to the crime, her testimony alone was sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth's burden of establishing that Williamson was the perpetrator of the crimes. See Commonwealth v. Kearney, 601 A.2d 346, 349 n.6 (Pa.Super. 1992) ("It is well-settled that the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecution witness may be sufficient to convict in spite of contrary evidence from the defense, if the trier of fact, based on the evidence before it, chooses to lend credibility to the former").
To the extent that Williamson argues that McClelland warrants a reversal here, we disagree. The McClelland Court concluded that hearsay evidence alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. 233 A.3d at 721. The instant case involves the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, not at a preliminary hearing. Furthermore, in McClelland, "the Commonwealth relied exclusively and only on evidence that could not be presented at trial." Id. at 736. Here, as discussed above, the Commonwealth relied on admissible evidence.
Weight of the Evidence
Williamson's final claim challenges the weight of the evidence. He argues that the jury's verdict "was nothing more than a guess as to who committed the murder." Williamson's Br. at 24. He notes that "the jury did not have the ability to evaluate Ms. Blair's credibility because she did not appear to testify[.]" Id. Additionally, he notes that the jury was presented with Blair's testimony as well as his own testimony. Hence, he maintains "the fact-finder was asked to choose between two competing stories and there was no physical evidence to corroborate or discredit either version of events." Id.
We review the trial court's rejection of a challenge to the weight of the evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 192 A.3d 1149, 1152-53 (Pa.Super. 2018). To succeed on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, "a defendant must prove the evidence is so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court." Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa.Super. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (citation omitted). "When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court's decision is extremely limited." Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 498 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted).
Here, as Williamson suggests, the jury heard two versions of what happened leading up to the victim's murder, Blair's preliminary hearing testimony and Williamson's trial testimony. Additionally, the jury heard circumstantial evidence which included that Blair called 911 immediately after the shooting; that Blair was still at the scene when police arrived; Blair's written statement to police identifying Williamson as the perpetrator; Williamson's flight from the scene; and Williamson's differing stories about his involvement during his initial contact with police. The jury was free to believe all, part, or none of this evidence, and sitting as fact finder, it assessed the evidence and ultimately found Williamson guilty of the murder and robbery of the victim. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this claim. We affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered.